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path: root/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h
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2026-04-04riscv: cfi: clear CFI lock status in start_thread()Zong Li
When libc locks the CFI status through the following prctl: - PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS - PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS A newly execd address space will inherit the lock status if it does not clear the lock bits. Since the lock bits remain set, libc will later fail to enable the landing pad and shadow stack. Signed-off-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260323065640.4045713-1-zong.li@sifive.com [pjw@kernel.org: ensure we unlock before changing state; cleaned up subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
2026-01-29riscv: add kernel command line option to opt out of user CFIDeepak Gupta
Add a kernel command line option to disable part or all of user CFI. User backward CFI and forward CFI can be controlled independently. The kernel command line parameter "riscv_nousercfi" can take the following values: - "all" : Disable forward and backward cfi both - "bcfi" : Disable backward cfi - "fcfi" : Disable forward cfi Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6 Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-21-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com [pjw@kernel.org: fixed warnings from checkpatch; cleaned up patch description, doc, printk text] Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
2026-01-29riscv/signal: save and restore the shadow stack on a signalDeepak Gupta
Save the shadow stack pointer in the sigcontext structure when delivering a signal. Restore the shadow stack pointer from sigcontext on sigreturn. As part of the save operation, the kernel uses the 'ssamoswap' instruction to save a snapshot of the current shadow stack on the shadow stack itself (this can be called a "save token"). During restore on sigreturn, the kernel retrieves the save token from the top of the shadow stack and validates it. This ensures that user mode can't arbitrarily pivot to any shadow stack address without having a token and thus provides a strong security assurance during the window between signal delivery and sigreturn. Use an ABI-compatible way of saving/restoring the shadow stack pointer into the signal stack. This follows the vector extension, where extra registers are placed in a form of extension header + extension body in the stack. The extension header indicates the size of the extra architectural states plus the size of header itself, and a magic identifier for the extension. Then, the extension body contains the new architectural states in the form defined by uapi. Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-17-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com [pjw@kernel.org: cleaned patch description, code comments; resolved checkpatch warning] Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
2026-01-29riscv: Implement indirect branch tracking prctlsDeepak Gupta
This patch adds a RISC-V implementation of the following prctls: PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS, PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS and PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS. Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-14-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com [pjw@kernel.org: clean up patch description] Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
2026-01-29riscv: Implement arch-agnostic shadow stack prctlsDeepak Gupta
Implement an architecture-agnostic prctl() interface for setting and getting shadow stack status. The prctls implemented are PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS and PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS. As part of PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS/PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, only PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE is implemented because RISCV allows each mode to write to their own shadow stack using 'sspush' or 'ssamoswap'. PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS locks the current shadow stack enablement configuration. Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6 Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-12-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com [pjw@kernel.org: cleaned up patch description] Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
2026-01-29riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on cloneDeepak Gupta
Userspace specifies CLONE_VM to share address space and spawn new thread. 'clone' allows userspace to specify a new stack for a new thread. However there is no way to specify a new shadow stack base address without changing the API. This patch allocates a new shadow stack whenever CLONE_VM is given. In case of CLONE_VFORK, the parent is suspended until the child finishes; thus the child can use the parent's shadow stack. In case of !CLONE_VM, COW kicks in because entire address space is copied from parent to child. 'clone3' is extensible and can provide mechanisms for specifying the shadow stack as an input parameter. This is not settled yet and is being extensively discussed on the mailing list. Once that's settled, this code should be adapted. Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6 Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-11-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com [pjw@kernel.org: cleaned up patch description] Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
2026-01-25riscv: Add usercfi state for task and save/restore of CSR_SSP on trap entry/exitDeepak Gupta
Carve out space in the RISC-V architecture-specific thread struct for cfi status and shadow stack in usermode. This patch: - defines a new structure cfi_status with status bit for cfi feature - defines shadow stack pointer, base and size in cfi_status structure - defines offsets to new member fields in thread in asm-offsets.c - saves and restores shadow stack pointer on trap entry (U --> S) and exit (S --> U) Shadow stack save/restore is gated on feature availability and is implemented using alternatives. CSR_SSP can be context-switched in 'switch_to' as well, but as soon as kernel shadow stack support gets rolled in, the shadow stack pointer will need to be switched at trap entry/exit point (much like 'sp'). It can be argued that a kernel using a shadow stack deployment scenario may not be as prevalent as user mode using this feature. But even if there is some minimal deployment of kernel shadow stack, that means that it needs to be supported. Thus save/restore of shadow stack pointer is implemented in entry.S instead of in 'switch_to.h'. Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com> Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6 Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-5-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com [pjw@kernel.org: cleaned up patch description] Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>