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authorJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2025-09-19 17:19:47 -0700
committerJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2025-09-19 17:19:47 -0700
commit0c2a4d304cea450d9f99e2092a731150a67ecc6b (patch)
tree9a207a8332693122582ef1fe4fa9acf845f63ef1 /tools/perf/scripts/python/event_analyzing_sample.py
parent6a46e4faa8fd848acec81bd6149a44c3b9b17de6 (diff)
parent6b0ed6a3a89cd2d04980e15a44c645bebb077418 (diff)
downloadkernel-0c2a4d304cea450d9f99e2092a731150a67ecc6b.tar.gz
Merge branch 'net-stmmac-remove-mac_interface'
Russell King says: ==================== net: stmmac: remove mac_interface The dwmac core supports a range of interfaces, but when it comes to SerDes interfaces, the core itself does not include the SerDes block. Consequently, it has to provide an interface suitable to interface such a block to, and uses TBI for this. The driver also uses "PCS" for RGMII, even though the dwmac PCS block is not present for this interface type - it was a convenice for the code structure as RGMII includes inband signalling of the PHY state, much like Cisco SGMII does at a high level. As such, the code refers to RGMII and SGMII modes for the PCS, and there used to be STMMAC_PCS_TBI and STMMAC_PCS_RTBI constants as well but these were never set, although they were used in the code. The selection of the PCS mode was from mac_interface. Thus, it seems that the original intention was for mac_interface to describe the interface mode used within the dwmac core, and phy_interface to describe the external world-accessible interface (e.g. which would connect to a PHY or SFP cage.) It appears that many glue drivers misinterpret these. A good exmple is socfpga. This supports SGMII and 1000BASE-X, but does not include the dwmac PCS, relying on the Lynx PCS instead. However, it makes use of mac_interface to configure the dwmac core to its GMII/MII mode. So, when operating in either of these modes, the dwmac is configured for GMII mode to communicate with the Lynx PCS which then provides the SGMII or 1000BASE-X interface mode to the external world. Given that phy_interface is the external world interface, and mac_interface is the dwmac core interface, selecting the interface mode based on mac_interface being 1000BASEX makes no sense. Moreover, mac_interface is initialised by the stmmac core code. If the "mac-mode" property is set in DT, this will be used. Otherwise, it will reflect the "phy-mode" property - meaning that it defaults to phy_interface. As no in-kernel DT makes reference to a "mac-mode" property, we can assume that for all in-kernel platforms, these two interface variables are the same. The exception are those platform glues which I reviwed and suggested they use phy_interface, setting mac_interface to PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_NA. The conclusion to all of this is that mac_interface serves no useful purpose, and causes confusion as the platform glue code doesn't seem to know which one should be used. Thus, let's get rid of mac_interface, which makes all this code more understandable. It also helps to untangle some of the questions such as: - should this be using the interface passed from phylink - should we set the range of phylink supported interfaces to be more than one - when we get phylink PCS support for the dwmac PCS, should we be selecting it based on mac_interface or phy_interface, and how should we populate the PCS' supported_interface bitmap. Having converted socfpga to use phy_interface, this turns out to feel like "the right way" to do this - convert the external world "phy_interface" to whatever phy_intf_sel value that the dwmac core needs to achieve the connection to whatever hardware blocks are integrated inside the SoC to achieve the requested external world interface. As an illustration why - consider that in the case of socfpga, it _could_ have been implemented such that the dwmac PCS was used for SGMII, and the Lynx PCS for 1000BASE-X, or vice versa. Only the platform glue would know which it is. I will also note that several cores provide their currently configured interface mode via the ACTPHYIF field of Hardware Feature 0, and thus can be read back in the platform-independent parts of the driver to decide whether the internal PCS or the RGMII (or actually SMII) "PCS" should be used. This is hot-off-the-press, and has only been build tested. As I have none of these platforms, this series has not been run-tested, so please test on your hardware. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aMrPpc8oRxqGtVPJ@shell.armlinux.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/scripts/python/event_analyzing_sample.py')
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00'>2021-08-09ucounts: add missing data type changesSven Schnelle commit f9c82a4ea89c3 ("Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t") changed the data type of ucounts/ucounts_max to long, but missed to adjust a few other places. This is noticeable on big endian platforms from user space because the /proc/sys/user/max_*_names files all contain 0. v4 - Made the min and max constants long so the sysctl values are actually settable on little endian machines. -- EWB Fixes: f9c82a4ea89c ("Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t") Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Acked-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210721115800.910778-1-svens@linux.ibm.com v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210721125233.1041429-1-svens@linux.ibm.com v3: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210730062854.3601635-1-svens@linux.ibm.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8735rijqlv.fsf_-_@disp2133 Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> 2021-03-16fanotify: reduce event objectid to 29-bit hashAmir Goldstein objectid is only used by fanotify backend and it is just an optimization for event merge before comparing all fields in event. Move the objectid member from common struct fsnotify_event into struct fanotify_event and reduce it to 29-bit hash to cram it together with the 3-bit event type. Events of different types are never merged, so the combination of event type and hash form a 32-bit key for fast compare of events. This reduces the size of events by one pointer and paves the way for adding hashed queue support for fanotify. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304104826.3993892-3-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> 2021-03-16fsnotify: allow fsnotify_{peek,remove}_first_event with empty queueAmir Goldstein Current code has an assumtion that fsnotify_notify_queue_is_empty() is called to verify that queue is not empty before trying to peek or remove an event from queue. Remove this assumption by moving the fsnotify_notify_queue_is_empty() into the functions, allow them to return NULL value and check return value by all callers. This is a prep patch for multi event queues. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304104826.3993892-2-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> 2021-02-23Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of ↵Linus Torvalds git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner: "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and maintainers. Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here are just a few: - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the implementation of portable home directories in systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at login time. - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged containers without having to change ownership permanently through chown(2). - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their Linux subsystem. - It is possible to share files between containers with non-overlapping idmappings. - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC) permission checking. - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of all files. - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home directory and container and vm scenario. - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only apply as long as the mount exists. Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull this: - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away in their implementation of portable home directories. https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/ - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734 - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is ported. - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers. I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones: https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/ This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and xfs: https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to merge this. In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount. By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace. The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the testsuite. Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is currently marked with. The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern of extensibility. The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped mount: - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in. - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts. - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped. - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem. The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler. By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no behavioral or performance changes are observed. The manpage with a detailed description can be found here: https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8 In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify that port has been done correctly. The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform mounts based on file descriptors only. Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2() RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and path resolution. While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing. With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api, covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and projects. There is a simple tool available at https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you decide to pull this in the following weeks: Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home directory: u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/ total 28 drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 . drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 .. -rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful -rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/ total 28 drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 . drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 .. -rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful -rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file -rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file -rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names # file: mnt/my-file # owner: u1001 # group: u1001 user::rw- user:u1001:rwx group::rw- mask::rwx other::r-- u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names # file: home/ubuntu/my-file # owner: ubuntu # group: ubuntu user::rw- user:ubuntu:rwx group::rw- mask::rwx other::r--" * tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits) xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl xfs: support idmapped mounts ext4: support idmapped mounts fat: handle idmapped mounts tests: add mount_setattr() selftests fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP fs: add mount_setattr() fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper fs: split out functions to hold writers namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt() mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags nfs: do not export idmapped mounts overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts ima: handle idmapped mounts apparmor: handle idmapped mounts fs: make helpers idmap mount aware exec: handle idmapped mounts would_dump: handle idmapped mounts ... 2021-01-24fs: add file and path permissions helpersChristian Brauner Add two simple helpers to check permissions on a file and path respectively and convert over some callers. It simplifies quite a few codepaths and also reduces the churn in later patches quite a bit. Christoph also correctly points out that this makes codepaths (e.g. ioctls) way easier to follow that would otherwise have to do more complex argument passing than necessary. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-4-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> 2021-01-05inotify, memcg: account inotify instances to kmemcgShakeel Butt Currently the fs sysctl inotify/max_user_instances is used to limit the number of inotify instances on the system. For systems running multiple workloads, the per-user namespace sysctl max_inotify_instances can be used to further partition inotify instances. However there is no easy way to set a sensible system level max limit on inotify instances and further partition it between the workloads. It is much easier to charge the underlying resource (i.e. memory) behind the inotify instances to the memcg of the workload and let their memory limits limit the number of inotify instances they can create. With inotify instances charged to memcg, the admin can simply set max_user_instances to INT_MAX and let the memcg limits of the jobs limit their inotify instances. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201220044608.1258123-1-shakeelb@google.com Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> 2020-12-03inotify: convert to handle_inode_event() interfaceAmir Goldstein Convert inotify to use the simple handle_inode_event() interface to get rid of the code duplication between the generic helper fsnotify_handle_event() and the inotify_handle_event() callback, which also happen to be buggy code. The bug will be fixed in the generic helper. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202120713.702387-3-amir73il@gmail.com CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b9a1b9772509 ("fsnotify: create method handle_inode_event() in fsnotify_operations") Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> 2020-11-09inotify: Increase default inotify.max_user_watches limit to 1048576Waiman Long The default value of inotify.max_user_watches sysctl parameter was set to 8192 since the introduction of the inotify feature in 2005 by commit 0eeca28300df ("[PATCH] inotify"). Today this value is just too small for many modern usage. As a result, users have to explicitly set it to a larger value to make it work. After some searching around the web, these are the inotify.max_user_watches values used by some projects: - vscode: 524288 - dropbox support: 100000 - users on stackexchange: 12228 - lsyncd user: 2000000 - code42 support: 1048576 - monodevelop: 16384 - tectonic: 524288 - openshift origin: 65536 Each watch point adds an inotify_inode_mark structure to an inode to be watched. It also pins the watched inode. Modeled after the epoll.max_user_watches behavior to adjust the default value according to the amount of addressable memory available, make inotify.max_user_watches behave in a similar way to make it use no more than 1% of addressable memory within the range [8192, 1048576]. We estimate the amount of memory used by inotify mark to size of inotify_inode_mark plus two times the size of struct inode (we double the inode size to cover the additional filesystem private inode part). That means that a 64-bit system with 128GB or more memory will likely have the maximum value of 1048576 for inotify.max_user_watches. This default should be big enough for most use cases. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201109035931.4740-1-longman@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> 2020-07-27inotify: do not set FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD in non-dir mark maskAmir Goldstein FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD has currently no meaning for non-dir inode marks. In the following patches we want to use that bit to mean that mark's notification group cares about parent and name information. So stop setting FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD for non-dir marks. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200722125849.17418-3-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> 2020-07-27fsnotify: pass dir argument to handle_event() callbackAmir Goldstein The 'inode' argument to handle_event(), sometimes referred to as 'to_tell' is somewhat obsolete. It is a remnant from the times when a group could only have an inode mark associated with an event. We now pass an iter_info array to the callback, with all marks associated with an event. Most backends ignore this argument, with two exceptions: 1. dnotify uses it for sanity check that event is on directory 2. fanotify uses it to report fid of directory on directory entry modification events Remove the 'inode' argument and add a 'dir' argument. The callback function signature is deliberately changed, because the meaning of the argument has changed and the arguments have been documented. The 'dir' argument is set to when 'file_name' is specified and it is referring to the directory that the 'file_name' entry belongs to. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> 2020-04-27inotify: Fix error return code assignment flow.youngjun If error code is initialized -EINVAL, there is no need to assign -EINVAL. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200426143316.29877-1-her0gyugyu@gmail.com Signed-off-by: youngjun <her0gyugyu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> 2020-03-24fsnotify: replace inode pointer with an object idAmir Goldstein The event inode field is used only for comparison in queue merges and cannot be dereferenced after handle_event(), because it does not hold a refcount on the inode. Replace it with an abstract id to do the same thing. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200319151022.31456-8-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> 2019-09-23Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of ↵Linus Torvalds git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Add LSM hooks, and SELinux access control hooks, for dnotify, fanotify, and inotify watches. This has been discussed with both the LSM and fs/notify folks and everybody is good with these new hooks. - The LSM stacking changes missed a few calls to current_security() in the SELinux code; we fix those and remove current_security() for good. - Improve our network object labeling cache so that we always return the object's label, even when under memory pressure. Previously we would return an error if we couldn't allocate a new cache entry, now we always return the label even if we can't create a new cache entry for it. - Convert the sidtab atomic_t counter to a normal u32 with READ/WRITE_ONCE() and memory barrier protection. - A few patches to policydb.c to clean things up (remove forward declarations, long lines, bad variable names, etc) * tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: lsm: remove current_security() selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob selinux: avoid atomic_t usage in sidtab fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications selinux: always return a secid from the network caches if we find one selinux: policydb - rename type_val_to_struct_array selinux: policydb - fix some checkpatch.pl warnings selinux: shuffle around policydb.c to get rid of forward declarations 2019-08-12fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notificationsAaron Goidel As of now, setting watches on filesystem objects has, at most, applied a check for read access to the inode, and in the case of fanotify, requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No specific security hook or permission check has been provided to control the setting of watches. Using any of inotify, dnotify, or fanotify, it is possible to observe, not only write-like operations, but even read access to a file. Modeling the watch as being merely a read from the file is insufficient for the needs of SELinux. This is due to the fact that read access should not necessarily imply access to information about when another process reads from a file. Furthermore, fanotify watches grant more power to an application in the form of permission events. While notification events are solely, unidirectional (i.e. they only pass information to the receiving application), permission events are blocking. Permission events make a request to the receiving application which will then reply with a decision as to whether or not that action may be completed. This causes the issue of the watching application having the ability to exercise control over the triggering process. Without drawing a distinction within the permission check, the ability to read would imply the greater ability to control an application. Additionally, mount and superblock watches apply to all files within the same mount or superblock. Read access to one file should not necessarily imply the ability to watch all files accessed within a given mount or superblock. In order to solve these issues, a new LSM hook is implemented and has been placed within the system calls for marking filesystem objects with inotify, fanotify, and dnotify watches. These calls to the hook are placed at the point at which the target path has been resolved and are provided with the path struct, the mask of requested notification events, and the type of object on which the mark is being set (inode, superblock, or mount). The mask and obj_type have already been translated into common FS_* values shared by the entirety of the fs notification infrastructure. The path struct is passed rather than just the inode so that the mount is available, particularly for mount watches. This also allows for use of the hook by pathname-based security modules. However, since the hook is intended for use even by inode based security modules, it is not placed under the CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH conditional. Otherwise, the inode-based security modules would need to enable all of the path hooks, even though they do not use any of them. This only provides a hook at the point of setting a watch, and presumes that permission to set a particular watch implies the ability to receive all notification about that object which match the mask. This is all that is required for SELinux. If other security modules require additional hooks or infrastructure to control delivery of notification, these can be added by them. It does not make sense for us to propose hooks for which we have no implementation. The understanding that all notifications received by the requesting application are all strictly of a type for which the application has been granted permission shows that this implementation is sufficient in its coverage. Security modules wishing to provide complete control over fanotify must also implement a security_file_open hook that validates that the access requested by the watching application is authorized. Fanotify has the issue that it returns a file descriptor with the file mode specified during fanotify_init() to the watching process on event. This is already covered by the LSM security_file_open hook if the security module implements checking of the requested file mode there. Otherwise, a watching process can obtain escalated access to a file for which it has not been authorized. The selinux_path_notify hook implementation works by adding five new file permissions: watch, watch_mount, watch_sb, watch_reads, and watch_with_perm (descriptions about which will follow), and one new filesystem permission: watch (which is applied to superblock checks). The hook then decides which subset of these permissions must be held by the requesting application based on the contents of the provided mask and the obj_type. The selinux_file_open hook already checks the requested file mode and therefore ensures that a watching process cannot escalate its access through fanotify. The watch, watch_mount, and watch_sb permissions are the baseline permissions for setting a watch on an object and each are a requirement for any watch to be set on a file, mount, or superblock respectively. It should be noted that having either of the other two permissions (watch_reads and watch_with_perm) does not imply the watch, watch_mount, or watch_sb permission. Superblock watches further require the filesystem watch permission to the superblock. As there is no labeled object in view for mounts, there is no specific check for mount watches beyond watch_mount to the inode. Such a check could be added in the future, if a suitable labeled object existed representing the mount. The watch_reads permission is required to receive notifications from read-exclusive events on filesystem objects. These events include accessing a file for the purpose of reading and closing a file which has been opened read-only. This distinction has been drawn in order to provide a direct indication in the policy for this otherwise not obvious capability. Read access to a file should not necessarily imply the ability to observe read events on a file. Finally, watch_with_perm only applies to fanotify masks since it is the only way to set a mask which allows for the blocking, permission event. This permission is needed for any watch which is of this type. Though fanotify requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, this is insufficient as it gives implicit trust to root, which we do not do, and does not support least privilege. Signed-off-by: Aaron Goidel <acgoide@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>