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authorMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>2019-07-23 13:11:26 +0900
committerMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>2019-07-27 12:18:19 +0900
commitb2eff0921805935132bc308d3c769ef2efb321ad (patch)
treeb358b29f950d0f5d8f0134e6c6348f76e88c8743 /scripts/stackusage
parent5f9e832c137075045d15cd6899ab0505cfb2ca4b (diff)
downloadkernel-b2eff0921805935132bc308d3c769ef2efb321ad.tar.gz
kbuild: remove unused objectify macro
Commit 415008af3219 ("docs-rst: convert lsm from DocBook to ReST") removed the last users of this macro. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/stackusage')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.46.0) at 2026-08-15 00:31:32 +0000
nserted (using __xlated_unpriv) and modify the error message if the nospec is able to mitigate a problem that previously shadowed another problem (in that case __xlated_unpriv does not work, therefore just add a comment). Define SPEC_V1 to avoid duplicating this ifdef whenever we check for nospec insns using __xlated_unpriv, define it here once. This also improves readability. PowerPC can probably also be added here. However, omit it for now because the BPF CI currently does not include a test. Limit it to EPERM, EACCES, and EINVAL (and not everything except for EFAULT and ENOMEM) as it already has the desired effect for most real-world programs. Briefly went through all the occurrences of EPERM, EINVAL, and EACCESS in verifier.c to validate that catching them like this makes sense. Thanks to Dustin for their help in checking the vendor documentation. [1] https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1954/ ("Mitigating Spectre-PHT using Speculation Barriers in Linux eBPF") [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.00078 ("VeriFence: Lightweight and Precise Spectre Defenses for Untrusted Linux Kernel Extensions") [3] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/runtime-speculative-side-channel-mitigations.html ("Managed Runtime Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations") [4] https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3359789.3359837 ("Speculator: a tool to analyze speculative execution attacks and mitigations" - Section 4.6 "Stopping Speculative Execution") [5] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/software-techniques-for-managing-speculation.pdf ("White Paper - SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES FOR MANAGING SPECULATION ON AMD PROCESSORS - REVISION 5.09.23") [6] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0597/2020-12/Base-Instructions/SB--Speculation-Barrier- ("SB - Speculation Barrier - Arm Armv8-A A32/T32 Instruction Set Architecture (2020-12)") [7] https://wiki.raptorcs.com/w/images/5/5f/OPF_PowerISA_v3.1C.pdf ("Power ISA™ - Version 3.1C - May 26, 2024 - Section 9.2.1 of Book III") [8] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/40332.pdf ("AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volumes 1–5 - Revision 4.08 - April 2024 - 7.6.4 Serializing Instructions") Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de> Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de> Cc: Dustin Nguyen <nguyen@cs.fau.de> Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de> Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603212428.338473-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> selftests/bpf: Add cmp_map_pointer_with_const test 2025-06-09T23:42:04Z Ihor Solodrai isolodrai@meta.com 2025-06-09T18:30:23Z urn:sha1:eb6c99278490a9045662cbc2df9e2a99489df37a Add a test for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP comparison with a non-0 constant. A BPF program with this code must not pass verification in unpriv. Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250609183024.359974-3-isolodrai@meta.com bpf: Make reg_not_null() true for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP 2025-06-09T23:42:04Z Ihor Solodrai isolodrai@meta.com 2025-06-09T18:30:22Z urn:sha1:5534e58f2e9bd72b253d033ee0af6e68eb8ac96b When reg->type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, it can not be null. However the verifier explores the branches under rX == 0 in check_cond_jmp_op() even if reg->type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, because it was not checked for in reg_not_null(). Fix this by adding CONST_PTR_TO_MAP to the set of types that are considered non nullable in reg_not_null(). An old "unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero" selftest fails with this change, because now early out correctly triggers in check_cond_jmp_op(), making the verification to pass. In practice verifier may allow pointer to null comparison in unpriv, since in many cases the relevant branch and comparison op are removed as dead code. So change the expected test result to __success_unpriv. Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250609183024.359974-2-isolodrai@meta.com bpf: verifier: Refactor helper access type tracking 2025-01-17T01:51:10Z Daniel Xu dxu@dxuuu.xyz 2025-01-14T20:28:44Z urn:sha1:37cce22dbd51a3ef7f6c08c3fb5f1c5075a17fbb Previously, the verifier was treating all PTR_TO_STACK registers passed to a helper call as potentially written to by the helper. However, all calls to check_stack_range_initialized() already have precise access type information available. Rather than treat ACCESS_HELPER as a proxy for BPF_WRITE, pass enum bpf_access_type to check_stack_range_initialized() to more precisely track helper arguments. One benefit from this precision is that registers tracked as valid spills and passed as a read-only helper argument remain tracked after the call. Rather than being marked STACK_MISC afterwards. An additional benefit is the verifier logs are also more precise. For this particular error, users will enjoy a slightly clearer message. See included selftest updates for examples. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ff885c0e5859e0cd12077c3148ff0754cad4f7ed.1736886479.git.dxu@dxuuu.xyz Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>