/include/dt-bindings/

; Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the branchy loop k value 2025-05-08T14:28:35Z James Morse james.morse@arm.com 2025-04-29T12:55:17Z urn:sha1:a1152be30a043d2d4dcb1683415f328bf3c51978 Add a helper to expose the k value of the branchy loop. This is needed by the BPF JIT to generate the mitigation sequence in BPF programs. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the platform is mitigated by firmware 2025-05-08T14:28:35Z James Morse james.morse@arm.com 2024-08-19T13:15:53Z urn:sha1:e7956c92f396a44eeeb6eaf7a5b5e1ad24db6748 is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected() allows the caller to determine if the CPU is known to need a firmware mitigation. CPUs are either on the list of CPUs we know about, or firmware has been queried and reported that the platform is affected - and mitigated by firmware. This helper is not useful to determine if the platform is mitigated by firmware. A CPU could be on the know list, but the firmware may not be implemented. Its affected but not mitigated. spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation() handles this distinction by checking the firmware state before enabling the mitigation. Add a helper to expose this state. This will be used by the BPF JIT to determine if calling firmware for a mitigation is necessary and supported. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> arm64: errata: Assume that unknown CPUs _are_ vulnerable to Spectre BHB 2025-03-14T17:58:25Z Douglas Anderson dianders@chromium.org 2025-01-07T20:05:59Z urn:sha1:e403e8538359d8580cbee1976ff71813e947101e The code for detecting CPUs that are vulnerable to Spectre BHB was based on a hardcoded list of CPU IDs that were known to be affected. Unfortunately, the list mostly only contained the IDs of standard ARM cores. The IDs for many cores that are minor variants of the standard ARM cores (like many Qualcomm Kyro CPUs) weren't listed. This led the code to assume that those variants were not affected. Flip the code on its head and instead assume that a core is vulnerable if it doesn't have CSV2_3 but is unrecognized as being safe. This involves creating a "Spectre BHB safe" list. As of right now, the only CPU IDs added to the "Spectre BHB safe" list are ARM Cortex A35, A53, A55, A510, and A520. This list was created by looking for cores that weren't listed in ARM's list [1] as per review feedback on v2 of this patch [2]. Additionally Brahma A53 is added as per mailing list feedback [3]. NOTE: this patch will not actually _mitigate_ anyone, it will simply cause them to report themselves as vulnerable. If any cores in the system are reported as vulnerable but not mitigated then the whole system will be reported as vulnerable though the system will attempt to mitigate with the information it has about the known cores. [1] https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Spectre-BHB [2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219175128.GA25477@willie-the-truck [3] https://lore.kernel.org/r/18dbd7d1-a46c-4112-a425-320c99f67a8d@broadcom.com Fixes: 558c303c9734 ("arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250107120555.v4.2.I2040fa004dafe196243f67ebcc647cbedbb516e6@changeid Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> arm64: Fix circular header dependency 2023-12-21T00:26:30Z Kent Overstreet kent.overstreet@linux.dev 2023-01-24T02:55:54Z urn:sha1:04bc786d663543512d08f1b86c7bcefb5144afe3 Replace linux/percpu.h include with asm/percpu.h to avoid circular dependency. Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>