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[ Upstream commit 912d1c6680bdb40b72b1b9204706f32b6eb842c3 ]
Commit 93bba24d4b5a ("btrfs: Enhance btrfs_trim_fs function to handle
error better") intended to make device trimming continue even if one
device fails, tracking failures and reporting them at the end. However,
it used 'break' instead of 'continue', causing the loop to exit on the
first device failure.
Fix this by replacing 'break' with 'continue'.
Fixes: 93bba24d4b5a ("btrfs: Enhance btrfs_trim_fs function to handle error better")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Robbie Ko <robbieko@synology.com>
Signed-off-by: jinbaohong <jinbaohong@synology.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5138c936c2c82c9be8883921854bc6f7e1177d8c ]
commit c06c303832ec ("ocfs2: fix xattr array entry __counted_by error")
doesn't handle all cases and the cleanup job for preserved xattr entries
still has bug:
- the 'last' pointer should be shifted by one unit after cleanup
an array entry.
- current code logic doesn't cleanup the first entry when xh_count is 1.
Note, commit c06c303832ec is also a bug fix for 0fe9b66c65f3.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251210015725.8409-2-heming.zhao@suse.com
Fixes: 0fe9b66c65f3 ("ocfs2: Add preserve to reflink.")
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 404d779466646bf1461f2090ff137e99acaecf42 ]
idmap lookups can time out while the cache is waiting for a userspace
upcall reply. In that case cache_check() returns -ETIMEDOUT to callers.
The nfsd_map_name_to_[ug]id functions currently proceed with attempting
to map the id to a kuid despite a potentially temporary failure to
perform the idmap lookup. This results in the code returning the error
NFSERR_BADOWNER which can cause client operations to return to userspace
with failure.
Fix this by returning the failure status before attempting kuid mapping.
This will return NFSERR_JUKEBOX on idmap lookup timeout so that clients
can retry the operation instead of aborting it.
Fixes: 65e10f6d0ab0 ("nfsd: Convert idmap to use kuids and kgids")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anthony Iliopoulos <ailiop@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bd3138e8912c9db182eac5fed1337645a98b7a4f ]
In debugging other problems with generic/753, it turns out that it's
possible for the system go to down in the middle of a remote xattr set
operation such that the leaf block entry is marked incomplete and
valueblk is set to zero. Make this no longer a failure.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.15
Fixes: 13791d3b833428 ("xfs: scrub extended attribute leaf space")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3eefc0c2b78444b64feeb3783c017d6adc3cd3ce ]
xfs/592 and xfs/794 both trip this assertion in the leaf block freemap
adjustment code after ~20 minutes of running on my test VMs:
ASSERT(ichdr->firstused >= ichdr->count * sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t)
+ xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_size(leaf));
Upon enabling quite a lot more debugging code, I narrowed this down to
fsstress trying to set a local extended attribute with namelen=3 and
valuelen=71. This results in an entry size of 80 bytes.
At the start of xfs_attr3_leaf_add_work, the freemap looks like this:
i 0 base 448 size 0 rhs 448 count 46
i 1 base 388 size 132 rhs 448 count 46
i 2 base 2120 size 4 rhs 448 count 46
firstused = 520
where "rhs" is the first byte past the end of the leaf entry array.
This is inconsistent -- the entries array ends at byte 448, but
freemap[1] says there's free space starting at byte 388!
By the end of the function, the freemap is in worse shape:
i 0 base 456 size 0 rhs 456 count 47
i 1 base 388 size 52 rhs 456 count 47
i 2 base 2120 size 4 rhs 456 count 47
firstused = 440
Important note: 388 is not aligned with the entries array element size
of 8 bytes.
Based on the incorrect freemap, the name area starts at byte 440, which
is below the end of the entries array! That's why the assertion
triggers and the filesystem shuts down.
How did we end up here? First, recall from the previous patch that the
freemap array in an xattr leaf block is not intended to be a
comprehensive map of all free space in the leaf block. In other words,
it's perfectly legal to have a leaf block with:
* 376 bytes in use by the entries array
* freemap[0] has [base = 376, size = 8]
* freemap[1] has [base = 388, size = 1500]
* the space between 376 and 388 is free, but the freemap stopped
tracking that some time ago
If we add one xattr, the entries array grows to 384 bytes, and
freemap[0] becomes [base = 384, size = 0]. So far, so good. But if we
add a second xattr, the entries array grows to 392 bytes, and freemap[0]
gets pushed up to [base = 392, size = 0]. This is bad, because
freemap[1] hasn't been updated, and now the entries array and the free
space claim the same space.
The fix here is to adjust all freemap entries so that none of them
collide with the entries array. Note that this fix relies on commit
2a2b5932db6758 ("xfs: fix attr leaf header freemap.size underflow") and
the previous patch that resets zero length freemap entries to have
base = 0.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.12
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f415 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6f13c1d2a6271c2e73226864a0e83de2770b6f34 ]
Back in commit 2a2b5932db6758 ("xfs: fix attr leaf header freemap.size
underflow"), Brian Foster observed that it's possible for a small
freemap at the end of the end of the xattr entries array to experience
a size underflow when subtracting the space consumed by an expansion of
the entries array. There are only three freemap entries, which means
that it is not a complete index of all free space in the leaf block.
This code can leave behind a zero-length freemap entry with a nonzero
base. Subsequent setxattr operations can increase the base up to the
point that it overlaps with another freemap entry. This isn't in and of
itself a problem because the code in _leaf_add that finds free space
ignores any freemap entry with zero size.
However, there's another bug in the freemap update code in _leaf_add,
which is that it fails to update a freemap entry that begins midway
through the xattr entry that was just appended to the array. That can
result in the freemap containing two entries with the same base but
different sizes (0 for the "pushed-up" entry, nonzero for the entry
that's actually tracking free space). A subsequent _leaf_add can then
allocate xattr namevalue entries on top of the entries array, leading to
data loss. But fixing that is for later.
For now, eliminate the possibility of confusion by zeroing out the base
of any freemap entry that has zero size. Because the freemap is not
intended to be a complete index of free space, a subsequent failure to
find any free space for a new xattr will trigger block compaction, which
regenerates the freemap.
It looks like this bug has been in the codebase for quite a long time.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.12
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f415 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f39854a3fb2f06dc69b81ada002b641ba5b4696b ]
I learned a few things this year: first, blk_status_to_errno can return
ENODATA for critical media errors; and second, the scrub code doesn't
mark data structures as corrupt on ENODATA or EIO.
Currently, scrub failing to capture these errors isn't all that
impactful -- the checking code will exit to userspace with EIO/ENODATA,
and xfs_scrub will log a complaint and exit with nonzero status. Most
people treat fsck tools failing as a sign that the fs is corrupt, but
online fsck should mark the metadata bad and keep moving.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.15
Fixes: 4700d22980d459 ("xfs: create helpers to record and deal with scrub problems")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit be6324a809dbda76d5fdb23720ad9b20e5c1905c ]
We search with offset (u64)-1 which should never match exactly.
Previously this was handled with BUG(). Now logs an error
and return -EUCLEAN.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Adarsh Das <adarshdas950@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 305ff6b3a03c230d3c07b61457e961406d979693 ]
The ceph_uninline_data function was missing proper snapshot context
handling for its OSD write operations. Both CEPH_OSD_OP_CREATE and
CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITE requests were passing NULL instead of the appropriate
snapshot context, which could lead to unnecessary object clone.
Reproducer:
../src/vstart.sh --new -x --localhost --bluestore
// turn on cephfs inline data
./bin/ceph fs set a inline_data true --yes-i-really-really-mean-it
// allow fs_a client to take snapshot
./bin/ceph auth caps client.fs_a mds 'allow rwps fsname=a' mon 'allow r fsname=a' osd 'allow rw tag cephfs data=a'
// mount cephfs with fuse, since kernel cephfs doesn't support inline write
ceph-fuse --id fs_a -m 127.0.0.1:40318 --conf ceph.conf -d /mnt/mycephfs/
// bump snapshot seq
mkdir /mnt/mycephfs/.snap/snap1
echo "foo" > /mnt/mycephfs/test
// umount and mount it again using kernel cephfs client
umount /mnt/mycephfs
mount -t ceph fs_a@.a=/ /mnt/mycephfs/ -o conf=./ceph.conf
echo "bar" >> /mnt/mycephfs/test
./bin/rados listsnaps -p cephfs.a.data $(printf "%x\n" $(stat -c %i /mnt/mycephfs/test)).00000000
will see this object does unnecessary clone
1000000000a.00000000 (seq:2):
cloneid snaps size overlap
2 2 4 []
head - 8
but it's expected to see
10000000000.00000000 (seq:2):
cloneid snaps size overlap
head - 8
since there's no snapshot between these 2 writes
clone happened because the first osd request CEPH_OSD_OP_CREATE doesn't
pass snap context so object is created with snap seq 0, but later data
writeback is equipped with snapshot context.
snap.seq(1) > object snap seq(0), so osd does object clone.
This fix properly acquiring the snapshot context before performing
write operations.
Signed-off-by: ethanwu <ethanwu@synology.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Tested-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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ntfs_read_run_nb_ra()
[ Upstream commit c5226b96c08a010ebef5fdf4c90572bcd89e4299 ]
When ntfs_read_run_nb_ra() is invoked with run == NULL the code later
assumes run is valid and may call run_get_entry(NULL, ...), and also
uses clen/idx without initializing them. Smatch reported uninitialized
variable warnings and this can lead to undefined behaviour. This patch
fixes it.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202512230646.v5hrYXL0-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3a6aba7f3cf2b46816e08548c254d98de9c74eba ]
Do not keep preallocated clusters for sparsed and compressed files.
Preserving preallocation in these cases causes fsx failures when running
with sparse files and preallocation enabled.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 06909b2549d631a47fcda249d34be26f7ca1711d ]
We found an infinite loop bug in the ntfs3 file system that can lead to a
Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition.
A malformed NTFS image can cause an infinite loop when an ATTR_LIST attribute
indicates a zero data size while the driver allocates memory for it.
When ntfs_load_attr_list() processes a resident ATTR_LIST with data_size set
to zero, it still allocates memory because of al_aligned(0). This creates an
inconsistent state where ni->attr_list.size is zero, but ni->attr_list.le is
non-null. This causes ni_enum_attr_ex to incorrectly assume that no attribute
list exists and enumerates only the primary MFT record. When it finds
ATTR_LIST, the code reloads it and restarts the enumeration, repeating
indefinitely. The mount operation never completes, hanging the kernel thread.
This patch adds validation to ensure that data_size is non-zero before memory
allocation. When a zero-sized ATTR_LIST is detected, the function returns
-EINVAL, preventing a DoS vulnerability.
Co-developed-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Jihoon Kwon <kjh010315@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jihoon Kwon <kjh010315@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaehun Gou <p22gone@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4b90f16e4bb5607fb35e7802eb67874038da4640 ]
We found an infinite loop bug in the ntfs3 file system that can lead to a
Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition.
A malformed NTFS image can cause an infinite loop when an attribute header
indicates an empty run list, while directory entries reference it as
containing actual data. In NTFS, setting evcn=-1 with svcn=0 is a valid way
to represent an empty run list, and run_unpack() correctly handles this by
checking if evcn + 1 equals svcn and returning early without parsing any run
data. However, this creates a problem when there is metadata inconsistency,
where the attribute header claims to be empty (evcn=-1) but the caller
expects to read actual data. When run_unpack() immediately returns success
upon seeing this condition, it leaves the runs_tree uninitialized with
run->runs as a NULL. The calling function attr_load_runs_range() assumes
that a successful return means that the runs were loaded and sets clen to 0,
expecting the next run_lookup_entry() call to succeed. Because runs_tree
remains uninitialized, run_lookup_entry() continues to fail, and the loop
increments vcn by zero (vcn += 0), leading to an infinite loop.
This patch adds a retry counter to detect when run_lookup_entry() fails
consecutively after attr_load_runs_vcn(). If the run is still not found on
the second attempt, it indicates corrupted metadata and returns -EINVAL,
preventing the Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability.
Co-developed-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Jihoon Kwon <kjh010315@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jihoon Kwon <kjh010315@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaehun Gou <p22gone@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1732053c8a6b360e2d5afb1b34fe9779398b072c ]
We found an infinite loop bug in the ntfs3 file system that can lead to a
Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition.
A malformed dentry in the ntfs3 filesystem can cause the kernel to hang
during the lookup operations. By setting the HAS_SUB_NODE flag in an
INDEX_ENTRY within a directory's INDEX_ALLOCATION block and manipulating the
VCN pointer, an attacker can cause the indx_find() function to repeatedly
read the same block, allocating 4 KB of memory each time. The kernel lacks
VCN loop detection and depth limits, causing memory exhaustion and an OOM
crash.
This patch adds a return value check for fnd_push() to prevent a memory
exhaustion vulnerability caused by infinite loops. When the index exceeds the
size of the fnd->nodes array, fnd_push() returns -EINVAL. The indx_find()
function checks this return value and stops processing, preventing further
memory allocation.
Co-developed-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Jihoon Kwon <kjh010315@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jihoon Kwon <kjh010315@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaehun Gou <p22gone@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1f8dd813a1c771b13c303f73d876164bc9b327cc ]
Fast commits only log operations that have dedicated replay support.
EXT4_IOC_GROUP_EXTEND grows the filesystem to the end of the last
block group and updates the same on-disk metadata without going
through the fast commit tracking paths.
In practice these operations are rare and usually followed by further
updates, but mixing them into a fast commit makes the overall
semantics harder to reason about and risks replay gaps if new call
sites appear.
Teach ext4 to mark the filesystem fast-commit ineligible when
EXT4_IOC_GROUP_EXTEND grows the filesystem.
This forces those transactions to fall back to a full commit,
ensuring that the group extension changes are captured by the normal
journal rather than partially encoded in fast commit TLVs.
This change should not affect common workloads but makes online
resize via GROUP_EXTEND safer and easier to reason about under fast
commit.
Testing:
1. prepare:
dd if=/dev/zero of=/root/fc_resize.img bs=1M count=0 seek=256
mkfs.ext4 -O fast_commit -F /root/fc_resize.img
mkdir -p /mnt/fc_resize && mount -t ext4 -o loop /root/fc_resize.img /mnt/fc_resize
2. Extended the filesystem to the end of the last block group using a
helper that calls EXT4_IOC_GROUP_EXTEND on the mounted filesystem
and checked fc_info:
./group_extend_helper /mnt/fc_resize
cat /proc/fs/ext4/loop0/fc_info
shows the "Resize" ineligible reason increased.
3. Fsynced a file on the resized filesystem and confirmed that the fast
commit ineligible counter incremented for the resize transaction:
touch /mnt/fc_resize/file
/root/fsync_file /mnt/fc_resize/file
sync
cat /proc/fs/ext4/loop0/fc_info
Signed-off-by: Li Chen <me@linux.beauty>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211115146.897420-6-me@linux.beauty
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 89b4336fd5ec78f51f9d3a1d100f3ffa3228e604 ]
Fast commits only log operations that have dedicated replay support.
Online resize via EXT4_IOC_GROUP_ADD updates the superblock and group
descriptor metadata without going through the fast commit tracking
paths.
In practice these operations are rare and usually followed by further
updates, but mixing them into a fast commit makes the overall
semantics harder to reason about and risks replay gaps if new call
sites appear.
Teach ext4 to mark the filesystem fast-commit ineligible when
ext4_ioctl_group_add() adds new block groups.
This forces those transactions to fall back to a full commit,
ensuring that the filesystem geometry updates are captured by the
normal journal rather than partially encoded in fast commit TLVs.
This change should not affect common workloads but makes online
resize via GROUP_ADD safer and easier to reason about under fast
commit.
Testing:
1. prepare:
dd if=/dev/zero of=/root/fc_resize.img bs=1M count=0 seek=256
mkfs.ext4 -O fast_commit -F /root/fc_resize.img
mkdir -p /mnt/fc_resize && mount -t ext4 -o loop /root/fc_resize.img /mnt/fc_resize
2. Ran a helper that issues EXT4_IOC_GROUP_ADD on the mounted
filesystem and checked the resize ineligible reason:
./group_add_helper /mnt/fc_resize
cat /proc/fs/ext4/loop0/fc_info
shows "Resize": > 0.
3. Fsynced a file on the resized filesystem and verified that the fast
commit stats report at least one ineligible commit:
touch /mnt/fc_resize/file
/root/fsync_file /mnt/fc_resize/file
sync
cat /proc/fs/ext4/loop0/fc_info
shows fc stats ineligible > 0.
Signed-off-by: Li Chen <me@linux.beauty>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211115146.897420-5-me@linux.beauty
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9218dc26fd922b09858ecd3666ed57dfd8098da8 ]
If nlink is maximal for a directory (-1) and inside that directory you
perform a rename for some child directory (not moving from the parent),
then the nlink of the first directory is first incremented and later
decremented. Normally this is fine, but when nlink = -1 this causes a
wrap around to 0, and then drop_nlink issues a warning.
After applying the patch syzbot no longer issues any warnings. I also
ran some basic fs tests to look for any regressions.
Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
Reported-by: syzbot+9131ddfd7870623b719f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=9131ddfd7870623b719f
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit eb0cfcf265714b419cc3549895a00632e76732ae ]
The jfsIOWait() thread calls try_to_freeze() but lacks set_freezable(),
causing it to remain non-freezable by default. This prevents proper
freezing during system suspend.
Add set_freezable() to make the thread freezable as intended.
Signed-off-by: Haotian Zhang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 05363abc7625cf18c96e67f50673cd07f11da5e9 ]
In persistent_ram_vmap(), vmap() may return NULL on failure.
If offset is non-zero, adding offset_in_page(start) causes the function
to return a non-NULL pointer even though the mapping failed.
persistent_ram_buffer_map() therefore incorrectly returns success.
Subsequent access to prz->buffer may dereference an invalid address
and cause crashes.
Add proper NULL checking for vmap() failures.
Signed-off-by: Ruipeng Qi <ruipengqi3@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203020358.3315299-1-ruipengqi3@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e411d74cc5ba290f85d0dd5e4d1df8f1d6d975d2 ]
In gfs2_fiemap(), we are calling iomap_fiemap() while holding the inode
glock. This can lead to recursive glock taking if the fiemap buffer is
memory mapped to the same inode and accessing it triggers a page fault.
Fix by disabling page faults for iomap_fiemap() and faulting in the
buffer by hand if necessary.
Fixes xfstest generic/742.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e97dcac3dc0bd37e4b56aaa6874b572a3a461102 ]
There is a missing ses->iface_lock in cifs_setup_session,
around ses->iface_last_update.
Signed-off-by: Henrique Carvalho <henrique.carvalho@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8c97a6ddc95690a938ded44b4e3202f03f15078c ]
The fs/minix implementation of the minix filesystem does not currently
support any other value for s_log_zone_size than 0. This is also the
only value supported in util-linux; see mkfs.minix.c line 511. In
addition, this patch adds some sanity checking for the other minix
superblock fields, and moves the minix_blocks_needed() checks for the
zmap and imap also to minix_check_super_block().
This also closes a related syzbot bug report.
Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251208153947.108343-1-jkoolstra@xs4all.nl
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reported-by: syzbot+5ad0824204c7bf9b67f2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5ad0824204c7bf9b67f2
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ed8889ca21b6ab37bc1435c4009ce37a79acb9e6 ]
Since commit af153bb63a33 ("vfs: catch invalid modes in may_open()")
requires any inode be one of S_IFDIR/S_IFLNK/S_IFREG/S_IFCHR/S_IFBLK/
S_IFIFO/S_IFSOCK type, use S_IFREG for special inodes.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+895c23f6917da440ed0d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=895c23f6917da440ed0d
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d0a07b1b-8b73-4002-8e29-e2bd56871262@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b68f91ef3b3fe82ad78c417de71b675699a8467c ]
try_to_free_buffers() can be called on folios with no buffers attached
when filemap_release_folio() is invoked on a folio belonging to a mapping
with AS_RELEASE_ALWAYS set but no release_folio operation defined.
In such cases, folio_needs_release() returns true because of the
AS_RELEASE_ALWAYS flag, but the folio has no private buffer data. This
causes try_to_free_buffers() to call drop_buffers() on a folio with no
buffers, leading to a null pointer dereference.
Adding a check in try_to_free_buffers() to return early if the folio has no
buffers attached, with WARN_ON_ONCE() to alert about the misconfiguration.
This provides defensive hardening.
Signed-off-by: Deepakkumar Karn <dkarn@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211131211.308021-1-dkarn@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9a8c4ad44721da4c48e1ff240ac76286c82837fe ]
The xfstests' test-case generic/498 leaves HFS+ volume
in corrupted state:
sudo ./check generic/498
FSTYP -- hfsplus
PLATFORM -- Linux/x86_64 hfsplus-testing-0001 6.18.0-rc1+ #18 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Thu Dec 4 12:24:45 PST 2025
MKFS_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51
MOUNT_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51 /mnt/scratch
generic/498 _check_generic_filesystem: filesystem on /dev/loop51 is inconsistent
(see XFSTESTS-2/xfstests-dev/results//generic/498.full for details)
Ran: generic/498
Failures: generic/498
Failed 1 of 1 tests
sudo fsck.hfsplus -d /dev/loop51
** /dev/loop51
Using cacheBlockSize=32K cacheTotalBlock=1024 cacheSize=32768K.
Executing fsck_hfs (version 540.1-Linux).
** Checking non-journaled HFS Plus Volume.
The volume name is untitled
** Checking extents overflow file.
** Checking catalog file.
Invalid leaf record count
(It should be 16 instead of 2)
** Checking multi-linked files.
CheckHardLinks: found 1 pre-Leopard file inodes.
** Checking catalog hierarchy.
** Checking extended attributes file.
** Checking volume bitmap.
** Checking volume information.
Verify Status: VIStat = 0x0000, ABTStat = 0x0000 EBTStat = 0x0000
CBTStat = 0x8000 CatStat = 0x00000000
** Repairing volume.
** Rechecking volume.
** Checking non-journaled HFS Plus Volume.
The volume name is untitled
** Checking extents overflow file.
** Checking catalog file.
** Checking multi-linked files.
CheckHardLinks: found 1 pre-Leopard file inodes.
** Checking catalog hierarchy.
** Checking extended attributes file.
** Checking volume bitmap.
** Checking volume information.
** The volume untitled was repaired successfully.
The generic/498 test executes such steps on final phase:
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/A
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/B
mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/A/C
touch $SCRATCH_MNT/B/foo
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/B/foo
ln $SCRATCH_MNT/B/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/A/C/foo
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/A
"Simulate a power failure and mount the filesystem
to check that what we explicitly fsync'ed exists."
_flakey_drop_and_remount
The FSCK tool complains about "Invalid leaf record count".
HFS+ b-tree header contains leaf_count field is updated
by hfs_brec_insert() and hfs_brec_remove(). The hfs_brec_insert()
is involved into hard link creation process. However,
modified in-core leaf_count field is stored into HFS+
b-tree header by hfs_btree_write() method. But,
unfortunately, hfs_btree_write() hasn't been called
by hfsplus_cat_write_inode() and hfsplus_file_fsync()
stores not fully consistent state of the Catalog File's
b-tree.
This patch adds calling hfs_btree_write() method in
the hfsplus_cat_write_inode() with the goal of
storing consistent state of Catalog File's b-tree.
Finally, it makes FSCK tool happy.
sudo ./check generic/498
FSTYP -- hfsplus
PLATFORM -- Linux/x86_64 hfsplus-testing-0001 6.18.0-rc1+ #22 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Sat Dec 6 17:01:31 PST 2025
MKFS_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51
MOUNT_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51 /mnt/scratch
generic/498 33s ... 31s
Ran: generic/498
Passed all 1 tests
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
cc: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251207035821.3863657-1-slava@dubeyko.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ecb7c2484cfc83a93658907580035a8adf1e0a92 ]
If btrfs_search_slot_for_read() returns 1, it means we did not find any
key greater than or equals to the key we asked for, meaning we have
reached the end of the tree and therefore the path is not valid. If
this happens we need to break out of the loop and stop, instead of
continuing and accessing an invalid path.
Fixes: 5223cc60b40a ("btrfs: drop the path before adding qgroup items when enabling qgroups")
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b2bc7c44ed1779fc9eaab9a186db0f0d01439622 ]
In the 'DeleteIndexEntryRoot' case of the 'do_action' function, the
entry size ('esize') is retrieved from the log record without adequate
bounds checking.
Specifically, the code calculates the end of the entry ('e2') using:
e2 = Add2Ptr(e1, esize);
It then calculates the size for memmove using 'PtrOffset(e2, ...)',
which subtracts the end pointer from the buffer limit. If 'esize' is
maliciously large, 'e2' exceeds the used buffer size. This results in
a negative offset which, when cast to size_t for memmove, interprets
as a massive unsigned integer, leading to a heap buffer overflow.
This commit adds a check to ensure that the entry size ('esize') strictly
fits within the remaining used space of the index header before performing
memory operations.
Fixes: b46acd6a6a62 ("fs/ntfs3: Add NTFS journal")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 27b75ca4e51e3e4554dc85dbf1a0246c66106fd3 ]
When processing valid within the range [valid : pos), if valid cannot
be retrieved correctly, for example, if the retrieved valid value is
always the same, this can trigger a potential infinite loop, similar
to the hung problem reported by syzbot [1].
Adding a check for the valid value within the loop body, and terminating
the loop and returning -EINVAL if the value is the same as the current
value, can prevent this.
[1]
INFO: task syz.4.21:6056 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Call Trace:
rwbase_write_lock+0x14f/0x750 kernel/locking/rwbase_rt.c:244
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1027 [inline]
ntfs_file_write_iter+0xe6/0x870 fs/ntfs3/file.c:1284
Fixes: 4342306f0f0d ("fs/ntfs3: Add file operations and implementation")
Reported-by: syzbot+bcf9e1868c1a0c7e04f1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=bcf9e1868c1a0c7e04f1
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1992330d90dd766fcf1730fd7bf2d6af65370ac4 ]
Syzbot reported a KMSAN uninit-value issue in ovl_fill_real.
This iusse's call chain is:
__do_sys_getdents64()
-> iterate_dir()
...
-> ext4_readdir()
-> fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer() // alloc
-> fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr // write without tail '\0'
-> dir_emit()
-> ovl_fill_real() // read by strcmp()
The string is used to store the decrypted directory entry name for an
encrypted inode. As shown in the call chain, fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr()
write it without null-terminate. However, ovl_fill_real() uses strcmp() to
compare the name against "..", which assumes a null-terminated string and
may trigger a KMSAN uninit-value warning when the buffer tail contains
uninit data.
Reported-by: syzbot+d130f98b2c265fae5297@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d130f98b2c265fae5297
Fixes: 4edb83bb1041 ("ovl: constant d_ino for non-merge dirs")
Signed-off-by: Qing Wang <wangqing7171@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260128132406.23768-2-amir73il@gmail.com
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 3574c322b1d0eb32dbd76b469cb08f9a67641599 upstream.
Currently we don't used mballoc optimized scanning (using max free
extent order and avg free extent order group lists) for inodes with
indirect block based format. This is confusing for users and I don't see
a good reason for that. Even with indirect block based inode format we
can spend big amount of time searching for free blocks for large
filesystems with fragmented free space. To add to the confusion before
commit 077d0c2c78df ("ext4: make mb_optimize_scan performance mount
option work with extents") optimized scanning was applied *only* to
indirect block based inodes so that commit appears as a performance
regression to some users. Just use optimized scanning whenever it is
enabled by mount options.
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260114182836.14120-4-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ca81109d4a8f192dc1cbad4a1ee25246363c2833 upstream.
In ext4_ext_shift_extents(), if the extent is NULL in the while loop, the
function returns immediately without releasing the path obtained via
ext4_find_extent(), leading to a memory leak.
Fix this by jumping to the out label to ensure the path is properly
released.
Fixes: a18ed359bdddc ("ext4: always check ext4_ext_find_extent result")
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251225084800.905701-1-zilin@seu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8b4b19a2f96348d70bfa306ef7d4a13b0bcbea79 upstream.
Caching extents during the splitting process is risky, as it may result
in stale extents remaining in the status tree. Moreover, in most cases,
the corresponding extent block entries are likely already cached before
the split happens, making caching here not particularly useful.
Assume we have an unwritten extent, and then DIO writes the first half.
[UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU] on-disk extent U: unwritten extent
[UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU] extent status tree
|<- ->| ----> dio write this range
First, when ext4_split_extent_at() splits this extent, it truncates the
existing extent and then inserts a new one. During this process, this
extent status entry may be shrunk, and calls to ext4_find_extent() and
ext4_cache_extents() may occur, which could potentially insert the
truncated range as a hole into the extent status tree. After the split
is completed, this hole is not replaced with the correct status.
[UUUUUUU|UUUUUUUU] on-disk extent U: unwritten extent
[UUUUUUU|HHHHHHHH] extent status tree H: hole
Then, the outer calling functions will not correct this remaining hole
extent either. Finally, if we perform a delayed buffer write on this
latter part, it will re-insert the delayed extent and cause an error in
space accounting.
In adition, if the unwritten extent cache is not shrunk during the
splitting, ext4_cache_extents() also conflicts with existing extents
when caching extents. In the future, we will add checks when caching
extents, which will trigger a warning. Therefore, Do not cache extents
that are being split.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Message-ID: <20251129103247.686136-6-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 42e7c876b182da65723700f6bc507a8aecb10d3b ]
Commit 580f236737d1 ("NFS: Adjust the amount of readahead
performed by NFS readdir") reduces the amount of readahead names
caching done by the client.
The downside of this approach is READDIR now may suffer from
a slow-start issue, where initially it will fetch names that fit
in a single page, then in 2, 4, 8 until the maximum supported
transfer size (usually 1M).
This patch tries to take a balanced approach between mitigating
the slow-start issue still maintaining some efficiency gains.
Fixes: 580f236737d1 ("NFS: Adjust the amount of readahead performed by NFS readdir")
Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5248d8474e594d156bee1ed10339cc16e207a28b ]
It is possible to have a task get stuck on waiting on the
NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN in the following scenario
1. cpu a: waiter test NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN (1) and plh_outstanding (1)
2. cpu b: atomic_dec_and_test() -> clear bit -> wake up
3. cpu c: sets NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN again
4. cpu a: calls wait_on_bit() sleeps forever.
To expand on this we have say 2 outstanding pnfs write IO that get
ESTALE which causes both to call pnfs_destroy_layout() and set the
NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN bit but the 1st one doesn't call the
pnfs_put_layout_hdr() yet (as that would prevent the 2nd ESTALE write
from trying to call pnfs_destroy_layout()). If the 1st ESTALE write
is the one that initially sets the NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN so that new IO
on this file initiates new LAYOUTGET. Another new write would find
NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN set and phl_outstanding>0 (step 1) and would
wait_on_bit(). LAYOUTGET completes doing step 2. Now, the 2nd of
ESTALE writes is calling pnfs_destory_layout() and set the
NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN bit (step 3). Finally, the waiting write wakes up
to check the bit and goes back to sleep.
The problem revolves around the fact that if NFS_LAYOUT_INVALID_STID
was already set, it should not do the work of
pnfs_mark_layout_stateid_invalid(), thus NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN will not
be set more than once for an invalid layout.
Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Fixes: 880265c77ac4 ("pNFS: Avoid a live lock condition in pnfs_update_layout()")
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4a93d1ee2d0206970b6eb13fbffe07938cd95948 ]
When we download a file without rdma offload or get
a large directly enumeration from the server,
the server might want to send up to smbd_max_fragmented_recv_size
bytes, but if it is too large all our recv buffers
might already be moved to the recv_io.reassembly.list
and we're no longer able to grant recv credits.
The maximum fragmented upper-layer payload receive size supported
Assume max_payload_per_credit is
smbd_max_receive_size - 24 = 1340
The maximum number would be
smbd_receive_credit_max * max_payload_per_credit
1340 * 255 = 341700 (0x536C4)
The minimum value from the spec is 131072 (0x20000)
For now we use the logic we used in ksmbd before:
(1364 * 255) / 2 = 173910 (0x2A756)
Fixes: 03bee01d6215 ("CIFS: SMBD: Add SMB Direct protocol initial values and constants")
Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Cc: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 76149d53502cf17ef3ae454ff384551236fba867 ]
When reading /proc/[pid]/stat, do_task_stat() accesses task->real_parent
without proper RCU protection, which leads to:
cpu 0 cpu 1
----- -----
do_task_stat
var = task->real_parent
release_task
call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct)
task_tgid_nr_ns(var)
rcu_read_lock <--- Too late to protect task->real_parent!
task_pid_ptr <--- UAF!
rcu_read_unlock
This patch uses task_ppid_nr_ns() instead of task_tgid_nr_ns() to add
proper RCU protection for accessing task->real_parent.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260128083007.3173016-1-alexjlzheng@tencent.com
Fixes: 06fffb1267c9 ("do_task_stat: don't take rcu_read_lock()")
Signed-off-by: Jinliang Zheng <alexjlzheng@tencent.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Cc: ruippan <ruippan@tencent.com>
Cc: Usama Arif <usamaarif642@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8cafcb881364af5ef3a8b9fed4db254054033d8a ]
Corrupted FAT images can leave a directory inode with an incorrect
i_nlink (e.g. 2 even though subdirectories exist). rmdir then
unconditionally calls drop_nlink(dir) and can drive i_nlink to 0,
triggering the WARN_ON in drop_nlink().
Add a sanity check in vfat_rmdir() and msdos_rmdir(): only drop the
parent link count when it is at least 3, otherwise report a filesystem
error.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260101111148.1437-1-zhiyuzhang999@gmail.com
Fixes: 9a53c3a783c2 ("[PATCH] r/o bind mounts: unlink: monitor i_nlink")
Signed-off-by: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/aVN06OKsKxZe6-Kv@casper.infradead.org/T/#t
Tested-by: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999@gmail.com>
Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f9c206cdc4266caad6a9a7f46341420a10f03ccb ]
During v4 request compound arg decoding, some ops (e.g. SETATTR)
can trigger idmap lookup upcalls. When those upcall responses get
delayed beyond the allowed time limit, cache_check() will mark the
request for deferral and cause it to be dropped.
This prevents nfs4svc_encode_compoundres from being executed, and
thus the session slot flag NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE never gets cleared.
Subsequent client requests will fail with NFSERR_JUKEBOX, given
that the slot will be marked as in-use, making the SEQUENCE op
fail.
Fix this by making sure that the RQ_USEDEFERRAL flag is always
clear during nfs4svc_decode_compoundargs(), since no v4 request
should ever be deferred.
Fixes: 2f425878b6a7 ("nfsd: don't use the deferral service, return NFS4ERR_DELAY")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Iliopoulos <ailiop@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5669645c052f235726a85f443769b6fc02f66762 ]
persistent_ram_save_old() can be called multiple times for the same
persistent_ram_zone (e.g., via ramoops_pstore_read -> ramoops_get_next_prz
for PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG records).
Currently, the function only allocates prz->old_log when it is NULL,
but it unconditionally updates prz->old_log_size to the current buffer
size and then performs memcpy_fromio() using this new size. If the
buffer size has grown since the first allocation (which can happen
across different kernel boot cycles), this leads to:
1. A heap buffer overflow (OOB write) in the memcpy_fromio() calls
2. A subsequent OOB read when ramoops_pstore_read() accesses the buffer
using the incorrect (larger) old_log_size
The KASAN splat would look similar to:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ramoops_pstore_read+0x...
Read of size N at addr ... by task ...
The conditions are likely extremely hard to hit:
0. Crash with a ramoops write of less-than-record-max-size bytes.
1. Reboot: ramoops registers, pstore_get_records(0) reads old crash,
allocates old_log with size X
2. Crash handler registered, timer started (if pstore_update_ms >= 0)
3. Oops happens (non-fatal, system continues)
4. pstore_dump() writes oops via ramoops_pstore_write() size Y (>X)
5. pstore_new_entry = 1, pstore_timer_kick() called
6. System continues running (not a panic oops)
7. Timer fires after pstore_update_ms milliseconds
8. pstore_timefunc() → schedule_work() → pstore_dowork() → pstore_get_records(1)
9. ramoops_get_next_prz() → persistent_ram_save_old()
10. buffer_size() returns Y, but old_log is X bytes
11. Y > X: memcpy_fromio() overflows heap
Requirements:
- a prior crash record exists that did not fill the record size
(almost impossible since the crash handler writes as much as it
can possibly fit into the record, capped by max record size and
the kmsg buffer almost always exceeds the max record size)
- pstore_update_ms >= 0 (disabled by default)
- Non-fatal oops (system survives)
Free and reallocate the buffer when the new size differs from the
previously allocated size. This ensures old_log always has sufficient
space for the data being copied.
Fixes: 201e4aca5aa1 ("pstore/ram: Should update old dmesg buffer before reading")
Signed-off-by: Sai Ritvik Tanksalkar <stanksal@purdue.edu>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260201132240.2948732-1-stanksal@purdue.edu
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4ad357e39b2ecd5da7bcc7e840ee24d179593cd5 ]
The "if (dio->error)" in iomap_dio_bio_iter exists to stop submitting
more bios when a completion already return an error. Commit cfe057f7db1f
("iomap_dio_actor(): fix iov_iter bugs") made it revert the iov by
"copied", which is very wrong given that we've already consumed that
range and submitted a bio for it.
Fixes: cfe057f7db1f ("iomap_dio_actor(): fix iov_iter bugs")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ebbbc4bfad4cb355d17c671223d0814ee3ef4eda ]
Zero out @err_iov and @err_buftype before retrying SMB2_open() to
prevent an UAF bug if @data != NULL, otherwise a double free.
Fixes: e3a43633023e ("smb/client: fix memory leak in smb2_open_file()")
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2892312.1770306653@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3a1f4264daed4b419c325a7fe35e756cada3cf82 ]
When the incompat flag EXTENT_TREE_V2 is set, we unconditionally add the
block group tree to the switch_commits list before calling
switch_commit_roots, as we do for the tree root and the chunk root.
However, the block group tree uses normal root dirty tracking and in any
transaction that does an allocation and dirties a block group, the block
group root will already be linked to a list by the dirty_list field and
this use of list_add_tail() is invalid and corrupts the prev/next
members of block_group_root->dirty_list.
This is apparent on a subsequent list_del on the prev if we enable
CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST:
[32.1571] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[32.1572] list_del corruption. next->prev should beffff958890202538, but was ffff9588992bd538. (next=ffff958890201538)
[32.1575] WARNING: lib/list_debug.c:65 at 0x0, CPU#3: sync/607
[32.1583] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 607 Comm: sync Not tainted 6.18.0 #24PREEMPT(none)
[32.1585] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014
[32.1587] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x108/0x120
[32.1593] RSP: 0018:ffffaa288287fdd0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[32.1594] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff95889326e800 RCX:ffff958890201538
[32.1596] RDX: ffff9588992bd538 RSI: ffff958890202538 RDI:ffffffff82a41e00
[32.1597] RBP: ffff958890202538 R08: ffffffff828fc1e8 R09:00000000ffffefff
[32.1599] R10: ffffffff8288c200 R11: ffffffff828e4200 R12:ffff958890201538
[32.1601] R13: ffff95889326e958 R14: ffff958895c24000 R15:ffff958890202538
[32.1603] FS: 00007f0c28eb5740(0000) GS:ffff958af2bd2000(0000)knlGS:0000000000000000
[32.1605] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[32.1607] CR2: 00007f0c28e8a3cc CR3: 0000000109942005 CR4:0000000000370ef0
[32.1609] Call Trace:
[32.1610] <TASK>
[32.1611] switch_commit_roots+0x82/0x1d0 [btrfs]
[32.1615] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x968/0x1550 [btrfs]
[32.1618] ? btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier+0x23/0x60 [btrfs]
[32.1621] __iterate_supers+0xe8/0x190
[32.1622] ? __pfx_sync_fs_one_sb+0x10/0x10
[32.1623] ksys_sync+0x63/0xb0
[32.1624] __do_sys_sync+0xe/0x20
[32.1625] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x450
[32.1626] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[32.1627] RIP: 0033:0x7f0c28d05d2b
[32.1632] RSP: 002b:00007ffc9d988048 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:00000000000000a2
[32.1634] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc9d988228 RCX:00007f0c28d05d2b
[32.1636] RDX: 00007f0c28e02301 RSI: 00007ffc9d989b21 RDI:00007f0c28dba90d
[32.1637] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09:0000000000000000
[32.1639] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:000055b96572cb80
[32.1641] R13: 000055b96572b19f R14: 00007f0c28dfa434 R15:000055b96572b034
[32.1643] </TASK>
[32.1644] irq event stamp: 0
[32.1644] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[32.1646] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff81298817>]copy_process+0xb37/0x2260
[32.1648] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff81298817>]copy_process+0xb37/0x2260
[32.1650] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[32.1652] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Furthermore, this list corruption eventually (when we happen to add a
new block group) results in getting the switch_commits and
dirty_cowonly_roots lists mixed up and attempting to call update_root
on the tree root which can't be found in the tree root, resulting in a
transaction abort:
[87.8269] BTRFS critical (device nvme1n1): unable to find root key (1 0 0) in tree 1
[87.8272] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[87.8274] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -117)
[87.8275] WARNING: fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:153 at 0x0, CPU#4: sync/703
[87.8285] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 703 Comm: sync Not tainted 6.18.0 #25 PREEMPT(none)
[87.8287] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014
[87.8289] RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_root+0x296/0x790 [btrfs]
[87.8295] RSP: 0018:ffffa58d035dfd60 EFLAGS: 00010282
[87.8297] RAX: ffff9a59126ddb68 RBX: ffff9a59126dc000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[87.8299] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffff8b RDI: ffffffffc0b28270
[87.8301] RBP: ffff9a5904aec000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffefff
[87.8303] R10: ffffffff9ac8c200 R11: ffffffff9ace4200 R12: 0000000000000001
[87.8305] R13: ffff9a59041740e8 R14: ffff9a5904aec1f7 R15: ffff9a590fdefaf0
[87.8307] FS: 00007f54cde6b740(0000) GS:ffff9a5b5a81c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[87.8309] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[87.8310] CR2: 00007f54cde403cc CR3: 0000000112902004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
[87.8312] Call Trace:
[87.8313] <TASK>
[87.8314] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40
[87.8315] commit_cowonly_roots+0x1ad/0x250 [btrfs]
[87.8317] ? btrfs_commit_transaction+0x79b/0x1560 [btrfs]
[87.8320] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x8aa/0x1560 [btrfs]
[87.8322] ? btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier+0x23/0x60 [btrfs]
[87.8325] __iterate_supers+0xf1/0x170
[87.8326] ? __pfx_sync_fs_one_sb+0x10/0x10
[87.8327] ksys_sync+0x63/0xb0
[87.8328] __do_sys_sync+0xe/0x20
[87.8329] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x450
[87.8330] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[87.8331] RIP: 0033:0x7f54cdd05d2b
[87.8336] RSP: 002b:00007fff1b58ff78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a2
[87.8338] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff1b590158 RCX: 00007f54cdd05d2b
[87.8340] RDX: 00007f54cde02301 RSI: 00007fff1b592b66 RDI: 00007f54cddba90d
[87.8342] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[87.8344] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e07ca96b80
[87.8346] R13: 000055e07ca9519f R14: 00007f54cddfa434 R15: 000055e07ca95034
[87.8348] </TASK>
[87.8348] irq event stamp: 0
[87.8349] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[87.8351] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff99698797>] copy_process+0xb37/0x21e0
[87.8353] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff99698797>] copy_process+0xb37/0x21e0
[87.8355] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[87.8357] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[87.8358] BTRFS: error (device nvme1n1 state A) in btrfs_update_root:153: errno=-117 Filesystem corrupted
[87.8360] BTRFS info (device nvme1n1 state EA): forced readonly
[87.8362] BTRFS warning (device nvme1n1 state EA): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
[87.8364] BTRFS: error (device nvme1n1 state EA) in cleanup_transaction:2037: errno=-117 Filesystem corrupted
Since the block group tree was pulled out of the extent tree and uses
normal root dirty tracking, remove the offending extra list_add. This
fixes the list corruption and the resulting fs corruption.
Fixes: 14033b08a029 ("btrfs: don't save block group root into super block")
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 51b1fcf71c88c3c89e7dcf07869c5de837b1f428 ]
If we fail to delete the second qgroup relation item, we end up returning
success or -ENOENT in case the first item does not exist, instead of
returning the error from the second item deletion.
Fixes: 73798c465b66 ("btrfs: qgroup: Try our best to delete qgroup relations")
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit faddeb848305e79db89ee0479bb0e33380656321 ]
The inline data buffer head (dibh) is being released prematurely in
gfs2_iomap_begin() via release_metapath() while iomap->inline_data
still points to dibh->b_data. This causes a use-after-free when
iomap_write_end_inline() later attempts to write to the inline data
area.
The bug sequence:
1. gfs2_iomap_begin() calls gfs2_meta_inode_buffer() to read inode
metadata into dibh
2. Sets iomap->inline_data = dibh->b_data + sizeof(struct gfs2_dinode)
3. Calls release_metapath() which calls brelse(dibh), dropping refcount
to 0
4. kswapd reclaims the page (~39ms later in the syzbot report)
5. iomap_write_end_inline() tries to memcpy() to iomap->inline_data
6. KASAN detects use-after-free write to freed memory
Fix by storing dibh in iomap->private and incrementing its refcount
with get_bh() in gfs2_iomap_begin(). The buffer is then properly
released in gfs2_iomap_end() after the inline write completes,
ensuring the page stays alive for the entire iomap operation.
Note: A C reproducer is not available for this issue. The fix is based
on analysis of the KASAN report and code review showing the buffer head
is freed before use.
[agruenba: Take buffer head reference in gfs2_iomap_begin() to avoid
leaks in gfs2_iomap_get() and gfs2_iomap_alloc().]
Reported-by: syzbot+ea1cd4aa4d1e98458a55@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ea1cd4aa4d1e98458a55
Fixes: d0a22a4b03b8 ("gfs2: Fix iomap write page reclaim deadlock")
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 92099f0c92270c8c7a79e6bc6e0312ad248ea331 ]
Add a metapath_dibh() helper for extracting the inode's buffer head from
a metapath.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Stable-dep-of: faddeb848305 ("gfs2: Fix use-after-free in iomap inline data write path")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 589cff4975afe1a4eaaa1d961652f50b1628d78d ]
The init_fs symbol is defined in <linux/init_task.h> but was
not included in fs/fs_struct.c so fix by adding the include.
Fixes the following sparse warning:
fs/fs_struct.c:150:18: warning: symbol 'init_fs' was not declared. Should it be static?
Fixes: 3e93cd671813e ("Take fs_struct handling to new file")
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108115856.238027-1-ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d8a73cc46c8462a969a7516131feb3096f4c49d3 ]
When hfs_bnode_create() finds that a node is already hashed (which should
not happen in normal operation), it currently returns the existing node
without incrementing its reference count. This causes a reference count
inconsistency that leads to a kernel panic when the node is later freed
in hfs_bnode_put():
kernel BUG at fs/hfsplus/bnode.c:676!
BUG_ON(!atomic_read(&node->refcnt))
This scenario can occur when hfs_bmap_alloc() attempts to allocate a node
that is already in use (e.g., when node 0's bitmap bit is incorrectly
unset), or due to filesystem corruption.
Returning an existing node from a create path is not normal operation.
Fix this by returning ERR_PTR(-EEXIST) instead of the node when it's
already hashed. This properly signals the error condition to callers,
which already check for IS_ERR() return values.
Reported-by: syzbot+1c8ff72d0cd8a50dfeaa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1c8ff72d0cd8a50dfeaa
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/784415834694f39902088fa8946850fc1779a318.camel@ibm.com/
Fixes: 634725a92938 ("[PATCH] hfs: cleanup HFS+ prints")
Signed-off-by: Shardul Bankar <shardul.b@mpiricsoftware.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251229204938.1907089-1-shardul.b@mpiricsoftware.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 98ea0039dbfdd00e5cc1b9a8afa40434476c0955 ]
Some f2fs sysfs attributes suffer from out-of-bounds memory access and
incorrect handling of integer values whose size is not 4 bytes.
For example:
vm:~# echo 65537 > /sys/fs/f2fs/vde/carve_out
vm:~# cat /sys/fs/f2fs/vde/carve_out
65537
vm:~# echo 4294967297 > /sys/fs/f2fs/vde/atgc_age_threshold
vm:~# cat /sys/fs/f2fs/vde/atgc_age_threshold
1
carve_out maps to {struct f2fs_sb_info}->carve_out, which is a 8-bit
integer. However, the sysfs interface allows setting it to a value
larger than 255, resulting in an out-of-range update.
atgc_age_threshold maps to {struct atgc_management}->age_threshold,
which is a 64-bit integer, but its sysfs interface cannot correctly set
values larger than UINT_MAX.
The root causes are:
1. __sbi_store() treats all default values as unsigned int, which
prevents updating integers larger than 4 bytes and causes out-of-bounds
writes for integers smaller than 4 bytes.
2. f2fs_sbi_show() also assumes all default values are unsigned int,
leading to out-of-bounds reads and incorrect access to integers larger
than 4 bytes.
This patch introduces {struct f2fs_attr}->size to record the actual size
of the integer associated with each sysfs attribute. With this
information, sysfs read and write operations can correctly access and
update values according to their real data size, avoiding memory
corruption and truncation.
Fixes: b59d0bae6ca3 ("f2fs: add sysfs support for controlling the gc_thread")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jinbao Liu <liujinbao1@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[ adapted F2FS_STAT_ATTR macro to include .size field and used sprintf instead of sysfs_emit in the replaced baseline code ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ce2739e482bce8d2c014d76c4531c877f382aa54 ]
As syzbot reported an use-after-free issue in f2fs_write_end_io().
It is caused by below race condition:
loop device umount
- worker_thread
- loop_process_work
- do_req_filebacked
- lo_rw_aio
- lo_rw_aio_complete
- blk_mq_end_request
- blk_update_request
- f2fs_write_end_io
- dec_page_count
- folio_end_writeback
- kill_f2fs_super
- kill_block_super
- f2fs_put_super
: free(sbi)
: get_pages(, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
accessed sbi which is freed
In kill_f2fs_super(), we will drop all page caches of f2fs inodes before
call free(sbi), it guarantee that all folios should end its writeback, so
it should be safe to access sbi before last folio_end_writeback().
Let's relocate ckpt thread wakeup flow before folio_end_writeback() to
resolve this issue.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: e234088758fc ("f2fs: avoid wait if IO end up when do_checkpoint for better performance")
Reported-by: syzbot+b4444e3c972a7a124187@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b4444e3c972a7a124187
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[ folio => page ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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atomic commit and checkpoint writes
[ Upstream commit 7633a7387eb4d0259d6bea945e1d3469cd135bbc ]
During SPO tests, when mounting F2FS, an -EINVAL error was returned from
f2fs_recover_inode_page. The issue occurred under the following scenario
Thread A Thread B
f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write
- f2fs_do_sync_file // atomic = true
- f2fs_fsync_node_pages
: last_folio = inode folio
: schedule before folio_lock(last_folio) f2fs_write_checkpoint
- block_operations// writeback last_folio
- schedule before f2fs_flush_nat_entries
: set_fsync_mark(last_folio, 1)
: set_dentry_mark(last_folio, 1)
: folio_mark_dirty(last_folio)
- __write_node_folio(last_folio)
: f2fs_down_read(&sbi->node_write)//block
- f2fs_flush_nat_entries
: {struct nat_entry}->flag |= BIT(IS_CHECKPOINTED)
- unblock_operations
: f2fs_up_write(&sbi->node_write)
f2fs_write_checkpoint//return
: f2fs_do_write_node_page()
f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write//return
SPO
Thread A calls f2fs_need_dentry_mark(sbi, ino), and the last_folio has
already been written once. However, the {struct nat_entry}->flag did not
have the IS_CHECKPOINTED set, causing set_dentry_mark(last_folio, 1) and
write last_folio again after Thread B finishes f2fs_write_checkpoint.
After SPO and reboot, it was detected that {struct node_info}->blk_addr
was not NULL_ADDR because Thread B successfully write the checkpoint.
This issue only occurs in atomic write scenarios. For regular file
fsync operations, the folio must be dirty. If
block_operations->f2fs_sync_node_pages successfully submit the folio
write, this path will not be executed. Otherwise, the
f2fs_write_checkpoint will need to wait for the folio write submission
to complete, as sbi->nr_pages[F2FS_DIRTY_NODES] > 0. Therefore, the
situation where f2fs_need_dentry_mark checks that the {struct
nat_entry}->flag /wo the IS_CHECKPOINTED flag, but the folio write has
already been submitted, will not occur.
Therefore, for atomic file fsync, sbi->node_write should be acquired
through __write_node_folio to ensure that the IS_CHECKPOINTED flag
correctly indicates that the checkpoint write has been completed.
Fixes: 608514deba38 ("f2fs: set fsync mark only for the last dnode")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <shengyong1@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Jinbao Liu <liujinbao1@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[ folio => page ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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