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Diffstat (limited to 'fs/btrfs/ioctl.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/btrfs/ioctl.c21
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
index 736a1b317070..f3d293297678 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
@@ -3984,6 +3984,25 @@ static long _btrfs_ioctl_set_received_subvol(struct file *file,
goto out;
}
+ received_uuid_changed = memcmp(root_item->received_uuid, sa->uuid,
+ BTRFS_UUID_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Before we attempt to add the new received uuid, check if we have room
+ * for it in case there's already an item. If the size of the existing
+ * item plus this root's ID (u64) exceeds the maximum item size, we can
+ * return here without the need to abort a transaction. If we don't do
+ * this check, the btrfs_uuid_tree_add() call below would fail with
+ * -EOVERFLOW and result in a transaction abort. Malicious users could
+ * exploit this to turn the fs into RO mode.
+ */
+ if (received_uuid_changed && !btrfs_is_empty_uuid(sa->uuid)) {
+ ret = btrfs_uuid_tree_check_overflow(fs_info, sa->uuid,
+ BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/*
* 1 - root item
* 2 - uuid items (received uuid + subvol uuid)
@@ -3999,8 +4018,6 @@ static long _btrfs_ioctl_set_received_subvol(struct file *file,
sa->rtime.sec = ct.tv_sec;
sa->rtime.nsec = ct.tv_nsec;
- received_uuid_changed = memcmp(root_item->received_uuid, sa->uuid,
- BTRFS_UUID_SIZE);
if (received_uuid_changed &&
!btrfs_is_empty_uuid(root_item->received_uuid)) {
ret = btrfs_uuid_tree_remove(trans, root_item->received_uuid,