diff options
| author | Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev> | 2025-10-13 13:40:10 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-01-11 15:18:19 +0100 |
| commit | dfc1613961828745165aec6552c3818fa14ab725 (patch) | |
| tree | 1d4945f5590b0d36e6613daf6f82d2e2c8ee1722 /crypto | |
| parent | 86f43090b3fcae5f203fe69fff682342ba15c57a (diff) | |
crypto: asymmetric_keys - prevent overflow in asymmetric_key_generate_id
[ Upstream commit df0845cf447ae1556c3440b8b155de0926cbaa56 ]
Use check_add_overflow() to guard against potential integer overflows
when adding the binary blob lengths and the size of an asymmetric_key_id
structure and return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW) accordingly. This prevents a
possible buffer overflow when copying data from potentially malicious
X.509 certificate fields that can be arbitrarily large, such as ASN.1
INTEGER serial numbers, issuer names, etc.
Fixes: 7901c1a8effb ("KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling")
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index 3e4f5a361612..9d144142e88e 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> #include <keys/system_keyring.h> @@ -152,12 +153,17 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_generate_id(const void *val_1, size_t len_2) { struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; - - kid = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + len_1 + len_2, - GFP_KERNEL); + size_t kid_sz; + size_t len; + + if (check_add_overflow(len_1, len_2, &len)) + return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW); + if (check_add_overflow(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id), len, &kid_sz)) + return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW); + kid = kmalloc(kid_sz, GFP_KERNEL); if (!kid) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - kid->len = len_1 + len_2; + kid->len = len; memcpy(kid->data, val_1, len_1); memcpy(kid->data + len_1, val_2, len_2); return kid; |