diff options
| author | Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> | 2018-01-29 17:02:54 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> | 2018-03-19 18:58:36 +0000 |
| commit | ea524f029c3507acc7a42f68eaf4ac5a519bc41d (patch) | |
| tree | cc5e8a76602483a316f068a1c63533ffedbdc8fe /arch | |
| parent | 507089d2b9540f698a9b8648207da02edeedfcf0 (diff) | |
x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
commit c7f631cb07e7da06ac1d231ca178452339e32a94 upstream.
Quoting Linus:
I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check
near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be
mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e.
array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by:
cmp %limit, %ptr
sbb %mask, %mask
and %mask, %ptr
With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit
or NULL.
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417469.33451.11804043010080838495.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Drop changes to 32-bit implementation of __get_user_8
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 8 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S index 51f1504cddd9..559f676e8863 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_1) GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_DX) cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX 1: movzb (%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax ret @@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_2) GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_DX) cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX 2: movzwl -1(%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax ret @@ -66,6 +70,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_4) GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_DX) cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX 3: mov -3(%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax ret @@ -80,6 +86,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8) GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_DX) cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */ + and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX 4: movq -7(%_ASM_AX),%_ASM_DX xor %eax,%eax ret |