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authorLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>2022-04-08 18:09:10 +0800
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2022-06-14 18:41:28 +0200
commit3ca8a07f141fd8eec347a82bdfa4b94164f2bb97 (patch)
tree9acfd1e547aa7ac6428b1f39d2b52216b46c4a80
parent0b26fd8ea5a0639acaf7c670ae69c903a08fb101 (diff)
RISC-V: use memcpy for kexec_file mode
[ Upstream commit b7fb4d78a6ade6026d9e5cf438c2a46ab962e032 ] The pointer to buffer loading kernel binaries is in kernel space for kexec_fil mode, When copy_from_user copies data from pointer to a block of memory, it checkes that the pointer is in the user space range, on RISCV-V that is: static inline bool __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) { return size <= TASK_SIZE && addr <= TASK_SIZE - size; } and TASK_SIZE is 0x4000000000 for 64-bits, which now causes copy_from_user to reject the access of the field 'buf' of struct kexec_segment that is in range [CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET - VMALLOC_SIZE, CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET), is invalid user space pointer. This patch fixes this issue by skipping access_ok(), use mempcy() instead. Signed-off-by: Liao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220408100914.150110-3-lizhengyu3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c4
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
index cbef0fc73afa..df8e24559035 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
@@ -65,7 +65,9 @@ machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
if (image->segment[i].memsz <= sizeof(fdt))
continue;
- if (copy_from_user(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt)))
+ if (image->file_mode)
+ memcpy(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt));
+ else if (copy_from_user(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt)))
continue;
if (fdt_check_header(&fdt))