<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/tools/testing/selftests/bpf, branch linux-6.2.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-6.2.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-6.2.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/'/>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:11:14Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>selftests/bpf: Fix leaked bpf_link in get_stackid_cannot_attach</title>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:11:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Song Liu</name>
<email>song@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-12T21:04:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=3a17b21488f0bdb1c79a741689c700ff6c8703b1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3a17b21488f0bdb1c79a741689c700ff6c8703b1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c1e07a80cf23d3a6e96172bc9a73bfa912a9fcbc ]

skel-&gt;links.oncpu is leaked in one case. This causes test perf_branches
fails when it runs after get_stackid_cannot_attach:

./test_progs -t get_stackid_cannot_attach,perf_branches
84      get_stackid_cannot_attach:OK
test_perf_branches_common:PASS:test_perf_branches_load 0 nsec
test_perf_branches_common:PASS:attach_perf_event 0 nsec
test_perf_branches_common:PASS:set_affinity 0 nsec
check_good_sample:FAIL:output not valid no valid sample from prog
146/1   perf_branches/perf_branches_hw:FAIL
146/2   perf_branches/perf_branches_no_hw:OK
146     perf_branches:FAIL

All error logs:
test_perf_branches_common:PASS:test_perf_branches_load 0 nsec
test_perf_branches_common:PASS:attach_perf_event 0 nsec
test_perf_branches_common:PASS:set_affinity 0 nsec
check_good_sample:FAIL:output not valid no valid sample from prog
146/1   perf_branches/perf_branches_hw:FAIL
146     perf_branches:FAIL
Summary: 1/1 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED

Fix this by adding the missing bpf_link__destroy().

Fixes: 346938e9380c ("selftests/bpf: Add get_stackid_cannot_attach")
Signed-off-by: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230412210423.900851-3-song@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests/bpf: Use read_perf_max_sample_freq() in perf_event_stackmap</title>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:11:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Song Liu</name>
<email>song@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-12T21:04:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ad1f84d8602bcfe076aff6ed2acc190322dc589e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit de6d014a09bf12a9a8959d60c0a1d4a41d394a89 ]

Currently, perf_event sample period in perf_event_stackmap is set too low
that the test fails randomly. Fix this by using the max sample frequency,
from read_perf_max_sample_freq().

Move read_perf_max_sample_freq() to testing_helpers.c. Replace the CHECK()
with if-printf, as CHECK is not available in testing_helpers.c.

Fixes: 1da4864c2b20 ("selftests/bpf: Add callchain_stackid")
Signed-off-by: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230412210423.900851-2-song@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests/bpf: Wait for receive in cg_storage_multi test</title>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:11:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>YiFei Zhu</name>
<email>zhuyifei@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-05T19:33:54Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:21b94f26f79fcefe263cebeca64c753ad1f2008c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5af607a861d43ffff830fc1890033e579ec44799 ]

In some cases the loopback latency might be large enough, causing
the assertion on invocations to be run before ingress prog getting
executed. The assertion would fail and the test would flake.

This can be reliably reproduced by arbitrarily increasing the
loopback latency (thanks to [1]):
  tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: htb default 12
  tc class add dev lo parent 1:1 classid 1:12 htb rate 20kbps ceil 20kbps
  tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:12 netem delay 100ms

Fix this by waiting on the receive end, instead of instantly
returning to the assert. The call to read() will wait for the
default SO_RCVTIMEO timeout of 3 seconds provided by
start_server().

[1] https://gist.github.com/kstevens715/4598301

Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;martin.lau@linux.dev&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9c5c8b7e-1d89-a3af-5400-14fde81f4429@linux.dev/
Fixes: 3573f384014f ("selftests/bpf: Test CGROUP_STORAGE behavior on shared egress + ingress")
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu &lt;zhuyifei@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230405193354.1956209-1-zhuyifei@google.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;martin.lau@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests: xsk: Deflakify STATS_RX_DROPPED test</title>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:11:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kal Conley</name>
<email>kal.conley@dectris.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-03T12:03:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a7a8727ba2a2c80f9f4998db064285d890d93f17</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 68e7322142f5e731af222892d384d311835db0f1 ]

Fix flaky STATS_RX_DROPPED test. The receiver calls getsockopt after
receiving the last (valid) packet which is not the final packet sent in
the test (valid and invalid packets are sent in alternating fashion with
the final packet being invalid). Since the last packet may or may not
have been dropped already, both outcomes must be allowed.

This issue could also be fixed by making sure the last packet sent is
valid. This alternative is left as an exercise to the reader (or the
benevolent maintainers of this file).

This problem was quite visible on certain setups. On one machine this
failure was observed 50% of the time.

Also, remove a redundant assignment of pkt_stream-&gt;nb_pkts. This field
is already initialized by __pkt_stream_alloc.

Fixes: 27e934bec35b ("selftests: xsk: make stat tests not spin on getsockopt")
Signed-off-by: Kal Conley &lt;kal.conley@dectris.com&gt;
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson &lt;magnus.karlsson@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230403120400.31018-1-kal.conley@dectris.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;martin.lau@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests: xsk: Disable IPv6 on VETH1</title>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:11:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kal Conley</name>
<email>kal.conley@dectris.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-05T08:29:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c4b128d1714370990902458f57a98ec385b4d108</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f2b50f17268390567bc0e95642170d88f336c8f4 ]

This change fixes flakiness in the BIDIRECTIONAL test:

    # [is_pkt_valid] expected length [60], got length [90]
    not ok 1 FAIL: SKB BUSY-POLL BIDIRECTIONAL

When IPv6 is enabled, the interface will periodically send MLDv1 and
MLDv2 packets. These packets can cause the BIDIRECTIONAL test to fail
since it uses VETH0 for RX.

For other tests, this was not a problem since they only receive on VETH1
and IPv6 was already disabled on VETH0.

Fixes: a89052572ebb ("selftests/bpf: Xsk selftests framework")
Signed-off-by: Kal Conley &lt;kal.conley@dectris.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230405082905.6303-1-kal.conley@dectris.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;martin.lau@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests: xsk: Use correct UMEM size in testapp_invalid_desc</title>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:11:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kal Conley</name>
<email>kal.conley@dectris.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-03T14:50:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=44abc93fab91e73a67694e4b802d4617a9f886f1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:44abc93fab91e73a67694e4b802d4617a9f886f1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7a2050df244e2c9a4e90882052b7907450ad10ed ]

Avoid UMEM_SIZE macro in testapp_invalid_desc which is incorrect when
the frame size is not XSK_UMEM__DEFAULT_FRAME_SIZE. Also remove the
macro since it's no longer being used.

Fixes: 909f0e28207c ("selftests: xsk: Add tests for 2K frame size")
Signed-off-by: Kal Conley &lt;kal.conley@dectris.com&gt;
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson &lt;magnus.karlsson@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230403145047.33065-2-kal.conley@dectris.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;martin.lau@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Add basic bpf_rb_{root,node} support</title>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:11:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Marchevsky</name>
<email>davemarchevsky@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-14T00:40:10Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1d0675957d35ac5e514073481beda62e4e1e2ec5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9c395c1b99bd23f74bc628fa000480c49593d17f ]

This patch adds special BPF_RB_{ROOT,NODE} btf_field_types similar to
BPF_LIST_{HEAD,NODE}, adds the necessary plumbing to detect the new
types, and adds bpf_rb_root_free function for freeing bpf_rb_root in
map_values.

structs bpf_rb_root and bpf_rb_node are opaque types meant to
obscure structs rb_root_cached rb_node, respectively.

btf_struct_access will prevent BPF programs from touching these special
fields automatically now that they're recognized.

btf_check_and_fixup_fields now groups list_head and rb_root together as
"graph root" fields and {list,rb}_node as "graph node", and does same
ownership cycle checking as before. Note that this function does _not_
prevent ownership type mixups (e.g. rb_root owning list_node) - that's
handled by btf_parse_graph_root.

After this patch, a bpf program can have a struct bpf_rb_root in a
map_value, but not add anything to nor do anything useful with it.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky &lt;davemarchevsky@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214004017.2534011-2-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: f6a6a5a97628 ("bpf: Fix struct_meta lookup for bpf_obj_free_fields kfunc call")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Migrate release_on_unlock logic to non-owning ref semantics</title>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:11:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Marchevsky</name>
<email>davemarchevsky@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-12T09:27:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:02f920c502f37cf47a0ab73138aea750852b9c25</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6a3cd3318ff65622415e34e8ee39d76331e7c869 ]

This patch introduces non-owning reference semantics to the verifier,
specifically linked_list API kfunc handling. release_on_unlock logic for
refs is refactored - with small functional changes - to implement these
semantics, and bpf_list_push_{front,back} are migrated to use them.

When a list node is pushed to a list, the program still has a pointer to
the node:

  n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n));

  bpf_spin_lock(&amp;l);
  bpf_list_push_back(&amp;l, n);
  /* n still points to the just-added node */
  bpf_spin_unlock(&amp;l);

What the verifier considers n to be after the push, and thus what can be
done with n, are changed by this patch.

Common properties both before/after this patch:
  * After push, n is only a valid reference to the node until end of
    critical section
  * After push, n cannot be pushed to any list
  * After push, the program can read the node's fields using n

Before:
  * After push, n retains the ref_obj_id which it received on
    bpf_obj_new, but the associated bpf_reference_state's
    release_on_unlock field is set to true
    * release_on_unlock field and associated logic is used to implement
      "n is only a valid ref until end of critical section"
  * After push, n cannot be written to, the node must be removed from
    the list before writing to its fields
  * After push, n is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED

After:
  * After push, n's ref is released and ref_obj_id set to 0. NON_OWN_REF
    type flag is added to reg's type, indicating that it's a non-owning
    reference.
    * NON_OWN_REF flag and logic is used to implement "n is only a
      valid ref until end of critical section"
  * n can be written to (except for special fields e.g. bpf_list_node,
    timer, ...)

Summary of specific implementation changes to achieve the above:

  * release_on_unlock field, ref_set_release_on_unlock helper, and logic
    to "release on unlock" based on that field are removed

  * The anonymous active_lock struct used by bpf_verifier_state is
    pulled out into a named struct bpf_active_lock.

  * NON_OWN_REF type flag is introduced along with verifier logic
    changes to handle non-owning refs

  * Helpers are added to use NON_OWN_REF flag to implement non-owning
    ref semantics as described above
    * invalidate_non_owning_refs - helper to clobber all non-owning refs
      matching a particular bpf_active_lock identity. Replaces
      release_on_unlock logic in process_spin_lock.
    * ref_set_non_owning - set NON_OWN_REF type flag after doing some
      sanity checking
    * ref_convert_owning_non_owning - convert owning reference w/
      specified ref_obj_id to non-owning references. Set NON_OWN_REF
      flag for each reg with that ref_obj_id and 0-out its ref_obj_id

  * Update linked_list selftests to account for minor semantic
    differences introduced by this patch
    * Writes to a release_on_unlock node ref are not allowed, while
      writes to non-owning reference pointees are. As a result the
      linked_list "write after push" failure tests are no longer scenarios
      that should fail.
    * The test##missing_lock##op and test##incorrect_lock##op
      macro-generated failure tests need to have a valid node argument in
      order to have the same error output as before. Otherwise
      verification will fail early and the expected error output won't be seen.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky &lt;davemarchevsky@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230212092715.1422619-2-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: f6a6a5a97628 ("bpf: Fix struct_meta lookup for bpf_obj_free_fields kfunc call")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix __reg_bound_offset 64-&gt;32 var_off subreg propagation</title>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:11:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2023-03-22T21:30:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7510fd5f24a94a59eb61839077019af43d283420</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7be14c1c9030f73cc18b4ff23b78a0a081f16188 ]

Xu reports that after commit 3f50f132d840 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32
bounds tracking"), the following BPF program is rejected by the verifier:

   0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0)          ; R2_w=pkt(off=0,r=0,imm=0)
   1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +4)          ; R3_w=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0)
   2: (bf) r1 = r2
   3: (07) r1 += 1
   4: (2d) if r1 &gt; r3 goto pc+8
   5: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)           ; R1_w=scalar(umax=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff))
   6: (18) r0 = 0x7fffffffffffff10
   8: (0f) r1 += r0                      ; R1_w=scalar(umin=0x7fffffffffffff10,umax=0x800000000000000f)
   9: (18) r0 = 0x8000000000000000
  11: (07) r0 += 1
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2
  13: (b7) r0 = 0
  14: (95) exit

And the verifier log says:

  func#0 @0
  0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0)          ; R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R2_w=pkt(off=0,r=0,imm=0)
  1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +4)          ; R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R3_w=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0)
  2: (bf) r1 = r2                       ; R1_w=pkt(off=0,r=0,imm=0) R2_w=pkt(off=0,r=0,imm=0)
  3: (07) r1 += 1                       ; R1_w=pkt(off=1,r=0,imm=0)
  4: (2d) if r1 &gt; r3 goto pc+8          ; R1_w=pkt(off=1,r=1,imm=0) R3_w=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0)
  5: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)           ; R1_w=scalar(umax=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) R2_w=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0)
  6: (18) r0 = 0x7fffffffffffff10       ; R0_w=9223372036854775568
  8: (0f) r1 += r0                      ; R0_w=9223372036854775568 R1_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854775568,umax=9223372036854775823,s32_min=-240,s32_max=15)
  9: (18) r0 = 0x8000000000000000       ; R0_w=-9223372036854775808
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775807
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2         ; R0_w=-9223372036854775807 R1_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854775568,umax=9223372036854775809)
  13: (b7) r0 = 0                       ; R0_w=0
  14: (95) exit

  from 12 to 11: R0_w=-9223372036854775807 R1_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854775810,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xffffffff)) R2_w=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3_w=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775806
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2         ; R0_w=-9223372036854775806 R1_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854775810,umax=9223372036854775810,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xffffffff))
  13: safe

  [...]

  from 12 to 11: R0_w=-9223372036854775795 R1=scalar(umin=9223372036854775822,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xffffffff)) R2=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775794
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2         ; R0_w=-9223372036854775794 R1=scalar(umin=9223372036854775822,umax=9223372036854775822,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xffffffff))
  13: safe

  from 12 to 11: R0_w=-9223372036854775794 R1=scalar(umin=9223372036854775823,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xffffffff)) R2=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775793
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2         ; R0_w=-9223372036854775793 R1=scalar(umin=9223372036854775823,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xffffffff))
  13: safe

  from 12 to 11: R0_w=-9223372036854775793 R1=scalar(umin=9223372036854775824,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xffffffff)) R2=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775792
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2         ; R0_w=-9223372036854775792 R1=scalar(umin=9223372036854775824,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xffffffff))
  13: safe

  [...]

The 64bit umin=9223372036854775810 bound continuously bumps by +1 while
umax=9223372036854775823 stays as-is until the verifier complexity limit
is reached and the program gets finally rejected. During this simulation,
the umin also eventually surpasses umax. Looking at the first 'from 12
to 11' output line from the loop, R1 has the following state:

  R1_w=scalar(umin=0x8000000000000002 (9223372036854775810),
              umax=0x800000000000000f (9223372036854775823),
          var_off=(0x8000000000000000;
                           0xffffffff))

The var_off has technically not an inconsistent state but it's very
imprecise and far off surpassing 64bit umax bounds whereas the expected
output with refined known bits in var_off should have been like:

  R1_w=scalar(umin=0x8000000000000002 (9223372036854775810),
              umax=0x800000000000000f (9223372036854775823),
          var_off=(0x8000000000000000;
                                  0xf))

In the above log, var_off stays as var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xffffffff)
and does not converge into a narrower mask where more bits become known,
eventually transforming R1 into a constant upon umin=9223372036854775823,
umax=9223372036854775823 case where the verifier would have terminated and
let the program pass.

The __reg_combine_64_into_32() marks the subregister unknown and propagates
64bit {s,u}min/{s,u}max bounds to their 32bit equivalents iff they are within
the 32bit universe. The question came up whether __reg_combine_64_into_32()
should special case the situation that when 64bit {s,u}min bounds have
the same value as 64bit {s,u}max bounds to then assign the latter as
well to the 32bit reg-&gt;{s,u}32_{min,max}_value. As can be seen from the
above example however, that is just /one/ special case and not a /generic/
solution given above example would still not be addressed this way and
remain at an imprecise var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xffffffff).

The improvement is needed in __reg_bound_offset() to refine var32_off with
the updated var64_off instead of the prior reg-&gt;var_off. The reg_bounds_sync()
code first refines information about the register's min/max bounds via
__update_reg_bounds() from the current var_off, then in __reg_deduce_bounds()
from sign bit and with the potentially learned bits from bounds it'll
update the var_off tnum in __reg_bound_offset(). For example, intersecting
with the old var_off might have improved bounds slightly, e.g. if umax
was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), then new var_off will then
result in (0; 0x7f...fc). The intersected var64_off holds then the
universe which is a superset of var32_off. The point for the latter is
not to broaden, but to further refine known bits based on the intersection
of var_off with 32 bit bounds, so that we later construct the final var_off
from upper and lower 32 bits. The final __update_reg_bounds() can then
potentially still slightly refine bounds if more bits became known from the
new var_off.

After the improvement, we can see R1 converging successively:

  func#0 @0
  0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0)          ; R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R2_w=pkt(off=0,r=0,imm=0)
  1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +4)          ; R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R3_w=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0)
  2: (bf) r1 = r2                       ; R1_w=pkt(off=0,r=0,imm=0) R2_w=pkt(off=0,r=0,imm=0)
  3: (07) r1 += 1                       ; R1_w=pkt(off=1,r=0,imm=0)
  4: (2d) if r1 &gt; r3 goto pc+8          ; R1_w=pkt(off=1,r=1,imm=0) R3_w=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0)
  5: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)           ; R1_w=scalar(umax=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) R2_w=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0)
  6: (18) r0 = 0x7fffffffffffff10       ; R0_w=9223372036854775568
  8: (0f) r1 += r0                      ; R0_w=9223372036854775568 R1_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854775568,umax=9223372036854775823,s32_min=-240,s32_max=15)
  9: (18) r0 = 0x8000000000000000       ; R0_w=-9223372036854775808
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775807
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2         ; R0_w=-9223372036854775807 R1_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854775568,umax=9223372036854775809)
  13: (b7) r0 = 0                       ; R0_w=0
  14: (95) exit

  from 12 to 11: R0_w=-9223372036854775807 R1_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854775810,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xf),s32_min=0,s32_max=15,u32_max=15) R2_w=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3_w=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775806
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2         ; R0_w=-9223372036854775806 R1_w=-9223372036854775806
  13: safe

  from 12 to 11: R0_w=-9223372036854775806 R1_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854775811,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xf),s32_min=0,s32_max=15,u32_max=15) R2_w=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3_w=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775805
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2         ; R0_w=-9223372036854775805 R1_w=-9223372036854775805
  13: safe

  [...]

  from 12 to 11: R0_w=-9223372036854775798 R1=scalar(umin=9223372036854775819,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000008; 0x7),s32_min=8,s32_max=15,u32_min=8,u32_max=15) R2=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775797
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2         ; R0_w=-9223372036854775797 R1=-9223372036854775797
  13: safe

  from 12 to 11: R0_w=-9223372036854775797 R1=scalar(umin=9223372036854775820,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x800000000000000c; 0x3),s32_min=12,s32_max=15,u32_min=12,u32_max=15) R2=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775796
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2         ; R0_w=-9223372036854775796 R1=-9223372036854775796
  13: safe

  from 12 to 11: R0_w=-9223372036854775796 R1=scalar(umin=9223372036854775821,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x800000000000000c; 0x3),s32_min=12,s32_max=15,u32_min=12,u32_max=15) R2=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775795
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2         ; R0_w=-9223372036854775795 R1=-9223372036854775795
  13: safe

  from 12 to 11: R0_w=-9223372036854775795 R1=scalar(umin=9223372036854775822,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x800000000000000e; 0x1),s32_min=14,s32_max=15,u32_min=14,u32_max=15) R2=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775794
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2         ; R0_w=-9223372036854775794 R1=-9223372036854775794
  13: safe

  from 12 to 11: R0_w=-9223372036854775794 R1=-9223372036854775793 R2=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  11: (07) r0 += 1                      ; R0_w=-9223372036854775793
  12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2
  last_idx 12 first_idx 12
  parent didn't have regs=1 stack=0 marks: R0_rw=P-9223372036854775801 R1_r=scalar(umin=9223372036854775815,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xf),s32_min=0,s32_max=15,u32_max=15) R2=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  last_idx 11 first_idx 11
  regs=1 stack=0 before 11: (07) r0 += 1
  parent didn't have regs=1 stack=0 marks: R0_rw=P-9223372036854775805 R1_rw=scalar(umin=9223372036854775812,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xf),s32_min=0,s32_max=15,u32_max=15) R2_w=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3_w=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  last_idx 12 first_idx 0
  regs=1 stack=0 before 12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2
  regs=1 stack=0 before 11: (07) r0 += 1
  regs=1 stack=0 before 12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2
  regs=1 stack=0 before 11: (07) r0 += 1
  regs=1 stack=0 before 12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2
  regs=1 stack=0 before 11: (07) r0 += 1
  regs=1 stack=0 before 9: (18) r0 = 0x8000000000000000
  last_idx 12 first_idx 12
  parent didn't have regs=2 stack=0 marks: R0_rw=P-9223372036854775801 R1_r=Pscalar(umin=9223372036854775815,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xf),s32_min=0,s32_max=15,u32_max=15) R2=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  last_idx 11 first_idx 11
  regs=2 stack=0 before 11: (07) r0 += 1
  parent didn't have regs=2 stack=0 marks: R0_rw=P-9223372036854775805 R1_rw=Pscalar(umin=9223372036854775812,umax=9223372036854775823,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0xf),s32_min=0,s32_max=15,u32_max=15) R2_w=pkt(off=0,r=1,imm=0) R3_w=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  last_idx 12 first_idx 0
  regs=2 stack=0 before 12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2
  regs=2 stack=0 before 11: (07) r0 += 1
  regs=2 stack=0 before 12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2
  regs=2 stack=0 before 11: (07) r0 += 1
  regs=2 stack=0 before 12: (ad) if r0 &lt; r1 goto pc-2
  regs=2 stack=0 before 11: (07) r0 += 1
  regs=2 stack=0 before 9: (18) r0 = 0x8000000000000000
  regs=2 stack=0 before 8: (0f) r1 += r0
  regs=3 stack=0 before 6: (18) r0 = 0x7fffffffffffff10
  regs=2 stack=0 before 5: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
  13: safe

  from 4 to 13: safe
  verification time 322 usec
  stack depth 0
  processed 56 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 1 total_states 3 peak_states 3 mark_read 1

This also fixes up a test case along with this improvement where we match
on the verifier log. The updated log now has a refined var_off, too.

Fixes: 3f50f132d840 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking")
Reported-by: Xu Kuohai &lt;xukuohai@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230314203424.4015351-2-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230322213056.2470-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests/bpf: Fix a fd leak in an error path in network_helpers.c</title>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:11:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin KaFai Lau</name>
<email>martin.lau@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-03-16T00:07:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=971cbff45ef6021f7bf4edf4eae54a946b5c4400'/>
<id>urn:sha1:971cbff45ef6021f7bf4edf4eae54a946b5c4400</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 226efec2b0efad60d4a6c4b2c3a8710dafc4dc21 ]

In __start_server, it leaks a fd when setsockopt(SO_REUSEPORT) fails.
This patch fixes it.

Fixes: eed92afdd14c ("bpf: selftest: Test batching and bpf_(get|set)sockopt in bpf tcp iter")
Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;martin.lau@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230316000726.1016773-2-martin.lau@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
