kernel/security, branch linux-5.18.y

selinux: Add boundary check in put_entry()

2022-08-17T12:40:26Z

[ Upstream commit 15ec76fb29be31df2bccb30fc09875274cba2776 ] Just like next_entry(), boundary check is necessary to prevent memory out-of-bound access. Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

selinux: fix memleak in security_read_state_kernel()

2022-08-17T12:40:26Z

[ Upstream commit 73de1befcc53a7c68b0c5e76b9b5ac41c517760f ] In this function, it directly returns the result of __security_read_policy without freeing the allocated memory in *data, cause memory leak issue, so free the memory if __security_read_policy failed. Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

lockdown: Fix kexec lockdown bypass with ima policy

2022-07-29T15:27:55Z

commit 543ce63b664e2c2f9533d089a4664b559c3e6b5b upstream. The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot. This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through securityfs. If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param, lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot. To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to the kernel command line; then: $ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown $ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \ /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy $ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down") Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg Acked-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: John Haxby Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs

2022-07-23T10:56:56Z

commit f43b9876e857c739d407bc56df288b0ebe1a9164 upstream. Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts. NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov [cascardo: there is no CONFIG_OBJTOOL] [cascardo: objtool calling and option parsing has changed] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: Fix potential memory leak in ima_init_crypto()

2022-07-22T08:21:41Z

[ Upstream commit 067d2521874135267e681c19d42761c601d503d6 ] On failure to allocate the SHA1 tfm, IMA fails to initialize and exits without freeing the ima_algo_array. Add the missing kfree() for ima_algo_array to avoid the potential memory leak. Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie Fixes: 6d94809af6b0 ("ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ima: force signature verification when CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG is configured

2022-07-22T08:21:40Z

[ Upstream commit af16df54b89dee72df253abc5e7b5e8a6d16c11c ] Currently, an unsigned kernel could be kexec'ed when IMA arch specific policy is configured unless lockdown is enabled. Enforce kernel signature verification check in the kexec_file_load syscall when IMA arch specific policy is configured. Fixes: 99d5cadfde2b ("kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE") Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ima: Fix a potential integer overflow in ima_appraise_measurement

2022-07-22T08:21:26Z

[ Upstream commit d2ee2cfc4aa85ff6a2a3b198a3a524ec54e3d999 ] When the ima-modsig is enabled, the rc passed to evm_verifyxattr() may be negative, which may cause the integer overflow problem. Fixes: 39b07096364a ("ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures") Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Revert "evm: Fix memleak in init_desc"

2022-07-22T08:21:22Z

commit 51dd64bb99e4478fc5280171acd8e1b529eadaf7 upstream. This reverts commit ccf11dbaa07b328fa469415c362d33459c140a37. Commit ccf11dbaa07b ("evm: Fix memleak in init_desc") said there is memleak in init_desc. That may be incorrect, as we can see, tmp_tfm is saved in one of the two global variables hmac_tfm or evm_tfm[hash_algo], then if init_desc is called next time, there is no need to alloc tfm again, so in the error path of kmalloc desc or crypto_shash_init(desc), It is not a problem without freeing tmp_tfm. And also that commit did not reset the global variable to NULL after freeing tmp_tfm and this makes *tfm a dangling pointer which may cause a UAF issue. Reported-by: Guozihua (Scott) Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: free contexts previously transferred in selinux_add_opt()

2022-06-22T12:28:10Z

commit cad140d00899e7a9cb6fe93b282051df589e671c upstream. `selinux_add_opt()` stopped taking ownership of the passed context since commit 70f4169ab421 ("selinux: parse contexts for mount options early"). unreferenced object 0xffff888114dfd140 (size 64): comm "mount", pid 15182, jiffies 4295687028 (age 796.340s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 73 79 73 74 65 6d 5f 75 3a 6f 62 6a 65 63 74 5f system_u:object_ 72 3a 74 65 73 74 5f 66 69 6c 65 73 79 73 74 65 r:test_filesyste backtrace: [] kmemdup_nul+0x24/0x80 [] selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts+0x293/0x560 [] security_sb_eat_lsm_opts+0x58/0x80 [] generic_parse_monolithic+0x82/0x180 [] do_new_mount+0x1f5/0x550 [] path_mount+0x2ab/0x1570 [] __x64_sys_mount+0x20e/0x280 [] do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 unreferenced object 0xffff888108e71640 (size 64): comm "fsmount", pid 7607, jiffies 4295044974 (age 1601.016s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 73 79 73 74 65 6d 5f 75 3a 6f 62 6a 65 63 74 5f system_u:object_ 72 3a 74 65 73 74 5f 66 69 6c 65 73 79 73 74 65 r:test_filesyste backtrace: [] memdup_user+0x21/0x90 [] strndup_user+0x47/0xa0 [] __do_sys_fsconfig+0x485/0x9f0 [] do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 70f4169ab421 ("selinux: parse contexts for mount options early") Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Fix migratable logic

2022-06-14T16:45:17Z

commit dda5384313a40ecbaafd8a9a80f47483255e4c4d upstream. When creating (sealing) a new trusted key, migratable trusted keys have the FIXED_TPM and FIXED_PARENT attributes set, and non-migratable keys don't. This is backwards, and also causes creation to fail when creating a migratable key under a migratable parent. (The TPM thinks you are trying to seal a non-migratable blob under a migratable parent.) The following simple patch fixes the logic, and has been tested for all four combinations of migratable and non-migratable trusted keys and parent storage keys. With this logic, you will get a proper failure if you try to create a non-migratable trusted key under a migratable parent storage key, and all other combinations work correctly. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: e5fb5d2c5a03 ("security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable") Signed-off-by: David Safford Reviewed-by: Ahmad Fatoum Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman