<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/security, branch linux-5.12.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.12.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.12.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/'/>
<updated>2021-07-19T08:01:28Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>smackfs: restrict bytes count in smk_set_cipso()</title>
<updated>2021-07-19T08:01:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-12T13:45:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=8f5c773a2871cf446e3f36b2834fb25bbb28512b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8f5c773a2871cf446e3f36b2834fb25bbb28512b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 49ec114a6e62d8d320037ce71c1aaf9650b3cafd upstream.

Oops, I failed to update subject line.

From 07571157c91b98ce1a4aa70967531e64b78e8346 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 22:25:06 +0900
Subject: smackfs: restrict bytes count in smk_set_cipso()

Commit 7ef4c19d245f3dc2 ("smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write
functions") missed that count &gt; SMK_CIPSOMAX check applies to only
format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT case.

Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+77c53db50c9fff774e8e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: use __GFP_NOWARN with GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC</title>
<updated>2021-07-19T08:00:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Minchan Kim</name>
<email>minchan@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-09T16:37:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=c90b7af7cf79b4c8413de354a9cdd661bb357c99'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c90b7af7cf79b4c8413de354a9cdd661bb357c99</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 648f2c6100cfa18e7dfe43bc0b9c3b73560d623c ]

In the field, we have seen lots of allocation failure from the call
path below.

06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Binder  : 31542_2: page allocation failure: order:0, mode:0x800(GFP_NOWAIT), nodemask=(null),cpuset=background,mems_allowed=0
...
...
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Call trace:
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : dump_backtrace.cfi_jt+0x0/0x8
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : dump_stack+0xc8/0x14c
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : warn_alloc+0x158/0x1c8
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x9d8/0xb80
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1c4/0x430
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : allocate_slab+0xb4/0x390
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : ___slab_alloc+0x12c/0x3a4
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : kmem_cache_alloc+0x358/0x5e4
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : avc_alloc_node+0x30/0x184
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : avc_update_node+0x54/0x4f0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : avc_has_extended_perms+0x1a4/0x460
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : selinux_file_ioctl+0x320/0x3d0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xec/0x1fc
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : el0_svc_common+0xc0/0x24c
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : el0_svc+0x28/0x88
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : el0_sync_handler+0x8c/0xf0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W         : el0_sync+0x1a4/0x1c0
..
..
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W SLUB    : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W cache   : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W node 0  : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB    : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache   : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0  : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB    : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache   : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0  : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB    : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache   : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0  : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB    : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache   : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0  : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB    : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache   : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0  : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB    : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache   : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0  : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB    : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache   : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W node 0  : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB    : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache   : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0

Based on [1], selinux is tolerate for failure of memory allocation.
Then, use __GFP_NOWARN together.

[1] 476accbe2f6e ("selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches")

Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim &lt;minchan@kernel.org&gt;
[PM: subj fix, line wraps, normalized commit refs]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: fix writing &lt;securityfs&gt;/evm overflow</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T14:59:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-26T22:13:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=0c436ecb3ae699644ca6a1a9468d6a2389234dc3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0c436ecb3ae699644ca6a1a9468d6a2389234dc3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 49219d9b8785ba712575c40e48ce0f7461254626 ]

EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX.
The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling
EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete.  Define and read an unsigned
int.

Fixes: f00d79750712 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T14:59:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-14T15:27:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=5b421ed9178aaf4b4c9bb4d1a3353e1717aa8a01'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5b421ed9178aaf4b4c9bb4d1a3353e1717aa8a01</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ed1b472fc15aeaa20ddeeb93fd25190014e50d17 ]

Files might come from a remote source and might have xattrs, including
security.ima. It should not be IMA task to decide whether security.ima
should be kept or not. This patch removes the removexattr() system
call in ima_inode_post_setattr().

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T14:59:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-14T15:27:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=b6ad4779d175d417d90758d06e4a92fe70431eb5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b6ad4779d175d417d90758d06e4a92fe70431eb5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9acc89d31f0c94c8e573ed61f3e4340bbd526d0c upstream.

EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to
temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary
to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is
cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is
calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs.

Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized
with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust
xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation.

Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T14:59:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-14T15:27:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=aca1501a43a940d5d27306627cdcfc63fa783a77'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aca1501a43a940d5d27306627cdcfc63fa783a77</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9eea2904292c2d8fa98df141d3bf7c41ec9dc1b5 upstream.

evm_inode_init_security() requires an HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on
initial xattrs provided by LSMs. However, it checks generically whether a
key has been loaded, including also public keys, which is not correct as
public keys are not suitable to calculate the HMAC.

Originally, support for signature verification was introduced to verify a
possibly immutable initial ram disk, when no new files are created, and to
switch to HMAC for the root filesystem. By that time, an HMAC key should
have been loaded and usable to calculate HMACs for new files.

More recently support for requiring an HMAC key was removed from the
kernel, so that signature verification can be used alone. Since this is a
legitimate use case, evm_inode_init_security() should not return an error
when no HMAC key has been loaded.

This patch fixes this problem by replacing the evm_key_loaded() check with
a check of the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized.

Fixes: 26ddabfe96b ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Snowberg</name>
<email>eric.snowberg@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-22T18:10:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=c59019dfed03d43dab79ca325fc83cb2b49a08c1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c59019dfed03d43dab79ca325fc83cb2b49a08c1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ebd9c2ae369a45bdd9f8615484db09be58fc242b ]

During boot the Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx,
is loaded into the blacklist keyring.  Systems booted with shim
have an equivalent Forbidden Signature Database called mokx.
Currently mokx is only used by shim and grub, the contents are
ignored by the kernel.

Add the ability to load mokx into the blacklist keyring during boot.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Suggested-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c33c8e3839a41e9654f41cc92c7231104931b1d7.camel@HansenPartnership.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-5-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428674320.677100.12637282414018170743.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433313205.902181.2502803393898221637.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529607422.163428.13530426573612578854.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Snowberg</name>
<email>eric.snowberg@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-22T18:10:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=7be8fb1494c65f57bb6a95743cfbd3312fe9bf52'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7be8fb1494c65f57bb6a95743cfbd3312fe9bf52</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 56c5812623f95313f6a46fbf0beee7fa17c68bbf ]

This fixes CVE-2020-26541.

The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now
revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure
Boot enabled.  The dbx is capable of containing any number of
EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
entries.

Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are
skipped.

Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring.
Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring
are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected.

[DH: Made the following changes:
 - Added to have a config option to enable the facility.  This allows a
   Kconfig solution to make sure that pkcs7_validate_trust() is
   enabled.[1][2]
 - Moved the functions out from the middle of the blacklist functions.
 - Added kerneldoc comments.]

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
cc: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@kernel.org&gt;
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901165143.10295-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # rfc
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200909172736.73003-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200911182230.62266-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428672051.677100.11064981943343605138.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433310942.902181.4901864302675874242.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529605075.163428.14625520893961300757.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bc2c24e3-ed68-2521-0bf4-a1f6be4a895d@infradead.org/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225125638.1841436-1-arnd@kernel.org/ [2]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak on object td</title>
<updated>2021-05-19T08:56:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Ian King</name>
<email>colin.king@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-30T11:37:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=3e24fbd37e72e8a67b74991970fecc82d14f57af'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3e24fbd37e72e8a67b74991970fecc82d14f57af</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 83a775d5f9bfda95b1c295f95a3a041a40c7f321 upstream.

Two error return paths are neglecting to free allocated object td,
causing a memory leak. Fix this by returning via the error return
path that securely kfree's td.

Fixes clang scan-build warning:
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c:496:10: warning: Potential
memory leak [unix.Malloc]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5df16caada3f ("KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value</title>
<updated>2021-05-14T08:52:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Huafei</name>
<email>lihuafei1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-03T03:28:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=33df5d11674c7dbf24c778d57753a7c41b12615b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:33df5d11674c7dbf24c778d57753a7c41b12615b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7990ccafaa37dc6d8bb095d4d7cd997e8903fd10 ]

In ima_restore_measurement_list(), hdr[HDR_PCR].data is pointing to a
buffer of type u8, which contains the dumped 32-bit pcr value.
Currently, only the least significant byte is used to restore the pcr
value. We should convert hdr[HDR_PCR].data to a pointer of type u32
before fetching the value to restore the correct pcr value.

Fixes: 47fdee60b47f ("ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers")
Signed-off-by: Li Huafei &lt;lihuafei1@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
