<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/security/tomoyo, branch linux-5.15.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.15.y</id>
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<updated>2025-03-13T11:50:18Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: don't emit warning in tomoyo_write_control()</title>
<updated>2025-03-13T11:50:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-16T10:38:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b2bd5857a0d6973ebbcb4d9831ddcaebbd257be1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3df7546fc03b8f004eee0b9e3256369f7d096685 ]

syzbot is reporting too large allocation warning at tomoyo_write_control(),
for one can write a very very long line without new line character. To fix
this warning, I use __GFP_NOWARN rather than checking for KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
for practically a valid line should be always shorter than 32KB where the
"too small to fail" memory-allocation rule applies.

One might try to write a valid line that is longer than 32KB, but such
request will likely fail with -ENOMEM. Therefore, I feel that separately
returning -EINVAL when a line is longer than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE is redundant.
There is no need to distinguish over-32KB and over-KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE.

Reported-by: syzbot+7536f77535e5210a5c76@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7536f77535e5210a5c76
Reported-by: Leo Stone &lt;leocstone@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241216021459.178759-2-leocstone@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: fallback to realpath if symlink's pathname does not exist</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:11:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-25T13:30:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:84a9d1356e76198431e6e9de84ffc7e528b9f70d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ada1986d07976d60bed5017aa38b7f7cf27883f7 upstream.

Alfred Agrell found that TOMOYO cannot handle execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH)
inside chroot environment where /dev and /proc are not mounted, for
commit 51f39a1f0cea ("syscalls: implement execveat() system call") missed
that TOMOYO tries to canonicalize argv[0] when the filename fed to the
executed program as argv[0] is supplied using potentially nonexistent
pathname.

Since "/dev/fd/&lt;fd&gt;" already lost symlink information used for obtaining
that &lt;fd&gt;, it is too late to reconstruct symlink's pathname. Although
&lt;filename&gt; part of "/dev/fd/&lt;fd&gt;/&lt;filename&gt;" might not be canonicalized,
TOMOYO cannot use tomoyo_realpath_nofollow() when /dev or /proc is not
mounted. Therefore, fallback to tomoyo_realpath_from_path() when
tomoyo_realpath_nofollow() failed.

Reported-by: Alfred Agrell &lt;blubban@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1082001
Fixes: 51f39a1f0cea ("syscalls: implement execveat() system call")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19+
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: fix UAF write bug in tomoyo_write_control()</title>
<updated>2024-03-06T14:38:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-01T13:04:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7d930a4da17958f869ef679ee0e4a8729337affc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2f03fc340cac9ea1dc63cbf8c93dd2eb0f227815 upstream.

Since tomoyo_write_control() updates head-&gt;write_buf when write()
of long lines is requested, we need to fetch head-&gt;write_buf after
head-&gt;io_sem is held.  Otherwise, concurrent write() requests can
cause use-after-free-write and double-free problems.

Reported-by: Sam Sun &lt;samsun1006219@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAEkJfYNDspuGxYx5kym8Lvp--D36CMDUErg4rxfWFJuPbbji8g@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: bd03a3e4c9a9 ("TOMOYO: Add policy namespace support.")
Cc:  &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # Linux 3.1+
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:54:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alfred Piccioni</name>
<email>alpic@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-19T09:09:09Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003 upstream.

Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to
other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is
done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*).

However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits
32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are
being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being
routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file
permissions.

This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back -
"/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */".

This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is
called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed
to support this hook.

Reviewing the three places where we are currently using
security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated
compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any
change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"")
Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni &lt;alpic@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: fix broken dependency on *.conf.default</title>
<updated>2023-02-01T07:27:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>masahiroy@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-07T07:47:41Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit eaf2213ba563b2d74a1f2c13a6b258273f689802 ]

If *.conf.default is updated, builtin-policy.h should be rebuilt,
but this does not work when compiled with O= option.

[Without this commit]

  $ touch security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
  $ make O=/tmp security/tomoyo/
  make[1]: Entering directory '/tmp'
    GEN     Makefile
    CALL    /home/masahiro/ref/linux/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
    DESCEND objtool
  make[1]: Leaving directory '/tmp'

[With this commit]

  $ touch security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
  $ make O=/tmp security/tomoyo/
  make[1]: Entering directory '/tmp'
    GEN     Makefile
    CALL    /home/masahiro/ref/linux/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
    DESCEND objtool
    POLICY  security/tomoyo/builtin-policy.h
    CC      security/tomoyo/common.o
    AR      security/tomoyo/built-in.a
  make[1]: Leaving directory '/tmp'

$(srctree)/ is essential because $(wildcard ) does not follow VPATH.

Fixes: f02dee2d148b ("tomoyo: Do not generate empty policy files")
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>TOMOYO: fix __setup handlers return values</title>
<updated>2022-04-08T12:23:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-22T21:45:33Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c2554b47644fd8f20c93a50d67aec819bdf1bae5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 39844b7e3084baecef52d1498b5fa81afa2cefa9 ]

__setup() handlers should return 1 if the parameter is handled.
Returning 0 causes the entire string to be added to init's
environment strings (limited to 32 strings), unnecessarily polluting it.

Using the documented strings "TOMOYO_loader=string1" and
"TOMOYO_trigger=string2" causes an Unknown parameter message:
  Unknown kernel command line parameters
    "BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5 TOMOYO_loader=string1 \
     TOMOYO_trigger=string2", will be passed to user space.

and these strings are added to init's environment string space:
  Run /sbin/init as init process
    with arguments:
     /sbin/init
    with environment:
     HOME=/
     TERM=linux
     BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5
     TOMOYO_loader=string1
     TOMOYO_trigger=string2

With this change, these __setup handlers act as expected,
and init's environment is not polluted with these strings.

Fixes: 0e4ae0e0dec63 ("TOMOYO: Make several options configurable.")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov &lt;i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kentaro Takeda &lt;takedakn@nttdata.co.jp&gt;
Cc: tomoyo-dev-en@lists.osdn.me
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: use hwight16() in tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok()</title>
<updated>2022-01-05T11:42:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-15T11:13:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:80176f65fa28898e7e20077e85989be479392cd2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f702e1107601230eec707739038a89018ea3468d ]

hwight16() is much faster. While we are at it, no need to include
"perm =" part into data_race() macro, for perm is a local variable
that cannot be accessed by other threads.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: Check exceeded quota early in tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok().</title>
<updated>2022-01-05T11:42:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Vyukov</name>
<email>dvyukov@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-14T09:45:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3fe6a63b5dbdc0864f01d3171046af03d34ee747</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 04e57a2d952bbd34bc45744e72be3eecdc344294 ]

If tomoyo is used in a testing/fuzzing environment in learning mode,
for lots of domains the quota will be exceeded and stay exceeded
for prolonged periods of time. In such cases it's pointless (and slow)
to walk the whole acl list again and again just to rediscover that
the quota is exceeded. We already have the TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED flag
that notes the overflow condition. Check it early to avoid the slowdown.

[penguin-kernel]
This patch causes a user visible change that the learning mode will not be
automatically resumed after the quota is increased. To resume the learning
mode, administrator will need to explicitly clear TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED
flag after increasing the quota. But I think that this change is generally
preferable, for administrator likely wants to optimize the acl list for
that domain before increasing the quota, or that domain likely hits the
quota again. Therefore, don't try to care to clear TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED
flag automatically when the quota for that domain changed.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/pagemap: add mmap_assert_locked() annotations to find_vma*()</title>
<updated>2021-09-03T16:58:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Luigi Rizzo</name>
<email>lrizzo@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-02T21:56:46Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
find_vma() and variants need protection when used.  This patch adds
mmap_assert_lock() calls in the functions.

To make sure the invariant is satisfied, we also need to add a
mmap_read_lock() around the get_user_pages_remote() call in
get_arg_page().  The lock is not strictly necessary because the mm has
been newly created, but the extra cost is limited because the same mutex
was also acquired shortly before in __bprm_mm_init(), so it is hot and
uncontended.

[penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp: TOMOYO needs the same protection which get_arg_page() needs]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/58bb6bf7-a57e-8a40-e74b-39584b415152@i-love.sakura.ne.jp

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210731175341.3458608-1-lrizzo@google.com
Signed-off-by: Luigi Rizzo &lt;lrizzo@google.com&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: fix doc warnings</title>
<updated>2021-06-15T15:01:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>ChenXiaoSong</name>
<email>chenxiaosong2@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-10T07:49:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:98eaa63e96273de075f3ce4eac0f18b33d28b84c</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix gcc W=1 warnings:

security/tomoyo/audit.c:331: warning: Function parameter or member 'matched_acl' not described in 'tomoyo_get_audit'
security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c:146: warning: Function parameter or member 'inode' not described in 'tomoyo_release'
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:122: warning: Function parameter or member 'path' not described in 'tomoyo_inode_getattr'
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:497: warning: Function parameter or member 'clone_flags' not described in 'tomoyo_task_alloc'
security/tomoyo/util.c:92: warning: Function parameter or member 'time64' not described in 'tomoyo_convert_time'

Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong &lt;chenxiaosong2@huawei.com&gt;
[ penguin-kernel: Also adjust spaces and similar warnings ]
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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