<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/security/selinux/include, branch linux-5.1.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.1.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.1.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/'/>
<updated>2019-04-29T15:34:58Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>selinux: use kernel linux/socket.h for genheaders and mdp</title>
<updated>2019-04-29T15:34:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paulo Alcantara</name>
<email>paulo@paulo.ac</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-25T00:55:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=dfbd199a7cfe3e3cd8531e1353cdbd7175bfbc5e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dfbd199a7cfe3e3cd8531e1353cdbd7175bfbc5e</id>
<content type='text'>
When compiling genheaders and mdp from a newer host kernel, the
following error happens:

    In file included from scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:18:
    ./security/selinux/include/classmap.h:238:2: error: #error New
    address family defined, please update secclass_map.  #error New
    address family defined, please update secclass_map.  ^~~~~
    make[3]: *** [scripts/Makefile.host:107:
    scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders] Error 1 make[2]: ***
    [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux/genheaders] Error 2
    make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux] Error 2
    make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....

Instead of relying on the host definition, include linux/socket.h in
classmap.h to have PF_MAX.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara &lt;paulo@paulo.ac&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
[PM: manually merge in mdp.c, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2019-03-12T21:08:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-12T21:08:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=7b47a9e7c8f672b6fb0b77fca11a63a8a77f5a91'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7b47a9e7c8f672b6fb0b77fca11a63a8a77f5a91</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro:
 "The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the
  old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point
  conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some
  are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series
  outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing
  stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted
  filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the
  next cycle fodder.

  It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is
  probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the
  commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting
  the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better
  to fix it up after -rc1 instead.

  That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which
  should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size
  increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to
  shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next
  cycle"

* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits)
  afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount
  afs: Add fs_context support
  vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log
  vfs: Implement logging through fs_context
  vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API
  vfs: Remove kern_mount_data()
  hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context
  cpuset: Use fs_context
  kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context
  cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context
  cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper
  cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions
  cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context
  cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing
  cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing
  cgroup: take options parsing into -&gt;parse_monolithic()
  cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree()
  cgroup: start switching to fs_context
  ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context
  proc: Add fs_context support to procfs
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit</title>
<updated>2019-03-07T20:20:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-07T20:20:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=be37f21a08ce65c7632c7f45e1755a4b07f278a0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:be37f21a08ce65c7632c7f45e1755a4b07f278a0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.

  Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
  bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.

  Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
  and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
  all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
  capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
  filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.

  All changes pass the audit-testsuite.  Please merge for v5.1"

* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: mark expected switch fall-through
  audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
  audit: join tty records to their syscall
  audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
  audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
  audit: ignore fcaps on umount
  audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
  audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
  audit: add support for fcaps v3
  audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
  audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
  audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
  audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux</title>
<updated>2019-03-07T20:12:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-07T20:12:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=3ac96c30ccfa802501dd2f4941e4508ea54b0b8a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3ac96c30ccfa802501dd2f4941e4508ea54b0b8a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "Nine SELinux patches for v5.1, all bug fixes.

  As far as I'm concerned, nothing really jumps out as risky or special
  to me, but each commit has a decent description so you can judge for
  yourself. As usual, everything passes the selinux-testsuite; please
  merge for v5.1"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: fix avc audit messages
  selinux: replace BUG_ONs with WARN_ONs in avc.c
  selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs
  selinux: replace some BUG_ON()s with a WARN_ON()
  selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once
  selinux: do not override context on context mounts
  selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts
  selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link
  selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: Implement the new mount API LSM hooks</title>
<updated>2019-02-28T08:29:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-01T23:07:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=442155c1bd84f82bff2d05d0ec4d0090df17ecfa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:442155c1bd84f82bff2d05d0ec4d0090df17ecfa</id>
<content type='text'>
Implement the new mount API LSM hooks for SELinux.  At some point the old
hooks will need to be removed.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match</title>
<updated>2019-02-01T04:00:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Guy Briggs</name>
<email>rgb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-31T16:52:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=90462a5bd30c6ed91c6758e59537d047d7878ff9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:90462a5bd30c6ed91c6758e59537d047d7878ff9</id>
<content type='text'>
The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).

The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.

It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.

Remove it.

Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs</title>
<updated>2019-01-25T22:31:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-25T10:06:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=fede148324c34360ce8c30a9a5bdfac5574b2a59'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fede148324c34360ce8c30a9a5bdfac5574b2a59</id>
<content type='text'>
In case a file has an invalid context set, in an AVC record generated
upon access to such file, the target context is always reported as
unlabeled. This patch adds new optional fields to the AVC record
(srawcon and trawcon) that report the actual context string if it
differs from the one reported in scontext/tcontext. This is useful for
diagnosing SELinux denials involving invalid contexts.

To trigger an AVC that illustrates this situation:

    # setenforce 0
    # touch /tmp/testfile
    # setfattr -n security.selinux -v system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0 /tmp/testfile
    # runcon system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 cat /tmp/testfile

AVC before:

type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=1149 comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023 tclass=file permissive=1

AVC after:

type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=1149 comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023 tclass=file permissive=1 trawcon=system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0

Note that it is also possible to encounter this situation with the
'scontext' field - e.g. when a new policy is loaded while a process is
running, whose context is not valid in the new policy.

Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1135683

Cc: Daniel Walsh &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link</title>
<updated>2019-01-11T01:34:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-12T15:10:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=e46e01eebbbcf2ff6d28ee7cae9f117e9d1572c8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e46e01eebbbcf2ff6d28ee7cae9f117e9d1572c8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bda0be7ad9948 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
switched selinux_inode_follow_link() to use avc_has_perm_flags() and
pass down the MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag if called during RCU walk.  However,
the only test of MAY_NOT_BLOCK occurs during slow_avc_audit()
and only if passing an inode as audit data (LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE).  Since
selinux_inode_follow_link() passes a dentry directly, passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK
here serves no purpose.  Switch selinux_inode_follow_link() to use
avc_has_perm() and drop avc_has_perm_flags() since there are no other
users.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk</title>
<updated>2019-01-11T01:32:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-12T15:10:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=3a28cff3bd4bf43f02be0c4e7933aebf3dc8197e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3a28cff3bd4bf43f02be0c4e7933aebf3dc8197e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0dc1ba24f7fff6 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe")
results in no audit messages at all if in permissive mode because the
cache is updated during the rcu walk and thus no denial occurs on
the subsequent ref walk.  Fix this by not updating the cache when
performing a non-blocking permission check.  This only affects search
and symlink read checks during rcu walk.

Fixes: 0dc1ba24f7fff6 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe")
Reported-by: BMK &lt;bmktuwien@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-20T19:55:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=ecd5f82e05ddd9b06c258167ec7467ac79741d77'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ecd5f82e05ddd9b06c258167ec7467ac79741d77</id>
<content type='text'>
Move management of the kern_ipc_perm-&gt;security and
msg_msg-&gt;security blobs out of the individual security
modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead
of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and
the space is allocated there.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
