<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/security/keys, branch linux-6.16.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-6.16.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-6.16.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/'/>
<updated>2025-06-11T18:57:14Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Invert FINAL_PUT bit</title>
<updated>2025-06-11T18:57:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-28T12:18:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=488ef3560196ee10fc1c5547e1574a87068c3494'/>
<id>urn:sha1:488ef3560196ee10fc1c5547e1574a87068c3494</id>
<content type='text'>
Invert the FINAL_PUT bit so that test_bit_acquire and clear_bit_unlock
can be used instead of smp_mb.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'v6.15-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6</title>
<updated>2025-03-29T17:01:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-29T17:01:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=e5e0e6bebef3a21081fd1057c40468d4cff1a60d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e5e0e6bebef3a21081fd1057c40468d4cff1a60d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
 "API:
   - Remove legacy compression interface
   - Improve scatterwalk API
   - Add request chaining to ahash and acomp
   - Add virtual address support to ahash and acomp
   - Add folio support to acomp
   - Remove NULL dst support from acomp

  Algorithms:
   - Library options are fuly hidden (selected by kernel users only)
   - Add Kerberos5 algorithms
   - Add VAES-based ctr(aes) on x86
   - Ensure LZO respects output buffer length on compression
   - Remove obsolete SIMD fallback code path from arm/ghash-ce

  Drivers:
   - Add support for PCI device 0x1134 in ccp
   - Add support for rk3588's standalone TRNG in rockchip
   - Add Inside Secure SafeXcel EIP-93 crypto engine support in eip93
   - Fix bugs in tegra uncovered by multi-threaded self-test
   - Fix corner cases in hisilicon/sec2

  Others:
   - Add SG_MITER_LOCAL to sg miter
   - Convert ubifs, hibernate and xfrm_ipcomp from legacy API to acomp"

* tag 'v6.15-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (187 commits)
  crypto: testmgr - Add multibuffer acomp testing
  crypto: acomp - Fix synchronous acomp chaining fallback
  crypto: testmgr - Add multibuffer hash testing
  crypto: hash - Fix synchronous ahash chaining fallback
  crypto: arm/ghash-ce - Remove SIMD fallback code path
  crypto: essiv - Replace memcpy() + NUL-termination with strscpy()
  crypto: api - Call crypto_alg_put in crypto_unregister_alg
  crypto: scompress - Fix incorrect stream freeing
  crypto: lib/chacha - remove unused arch-specific init support
  crypto: remove obsolete 'comp' compression API
  crypto: compress_null - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation
  crypto: cavium/zip - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation
  crypto: zstd - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation
  crypto: lzo - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation
  crypto: lzo-rle - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation
  crypto: lz4hc - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation
  crypto: lz4 - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation
  crypto: deflate - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation
  crypto: 842 - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation
  crypto: nx - Migrate to scomp API
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: Fix UAF in key_put()</title>
<updated>2025-03-22T13:36:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-19T15:57:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=75845c6c1a64483e9985302793dbf0dfa5f71e32'/>
<id>urn:sha1:75845c6c1a64483e9985302793dbf0dfa5f71e32</id>
<content type='text'>
Once a key's reference count has been reduced to 0, the garbage collector
thread may destroy it at any time and so key_put() is not allowed to touch
the key after that point.  The most key_put() is normally allowed to do is
to touch key_gc_work as that's a static global variable.

However, in an effort to speed up the reclamation of quota, this is now
done in key_put() once the key's usage is reduced to 0 - but now the code
is looking at the key after the deadline, which is forbidden.

Fix this by using a flag to indicate that a key can be gc'd now rather than
looking at the key's refcount in the garbage collector.

Fixes: 9578e327b2b4 ("keys: update key quotas in key_put()")
Reported-by: syzbot+6105ffc1ded71d194d6d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/673b6aec.050a0220.87769.004a.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: syzbot+6105ffc1ded71d194d6d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: lib/Kconfig - hide library options</title>
<updated>2025-03-21T09:33:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-14T16:05:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=edc8e80bf862a7282da017e7f16e63b52585c793'/>
<id>urn:sha1:edc8e80bf862a7282da017e7f16e63b52585c793</id>
<content type='text'>
Any driver that needs these library functions should already be selecting
the corresponding Kconfig symbols, so there is no real point in making
these visible.

The original patch that made these user selectable described problems
with drivers failing to select the code they use, but for consistency
it's better to always use 'select' on a symbol than to mix it with
'depends on'.

Fixes: e56e18985596 ("lib/crypto: add prompts back to crypto libraries")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: const qualify ctl_tables where applicable</title>
<updated>2025-01-28T12:48:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joel Granados</name>
<email>joel.granados@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-01-28T12:48:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=1751f872cc97f992ed5c4c72c55588db1f0021e1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1751f872cc97f992ed5c4c72c55588db1f0021e1</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the const qualifier to all the ctl_tables in the tree except for
watchdog_hardlockup_sysctl, memory_allocation_profiling_sysctls,
loadpin_sysctl_table and the ones calling register_net_sysctl (./net,
drivers/inifiniband dirs). These are special cases as they use a
registration function with a non-const qualified ctl_table argument or
modify the arrays before passing them on to the registration function.

Constifying ctl_table structs will prevent the modification of
proc_handler function pointers as the arrays would reside in .rodata.
This is made possible after commit 78eb4ea25cd5 ("sysctl: treewide:
constify the ctl_table argument of proc_handlers") constified all the
proc_handlers.

Created this by running an spatch followed by a sed command:
Spatch:
    virtual patch

    @
    depends on !(file in "net")
    disable optional_qualifier
    @

    identifier table_name != {
      watchdog_hardlockup_sysctl,
      iwcm_ctl_table,
      ucma_ctl_table,
      memory_allocation_profiling_sysctls,
      loadpin_sysctl_table
    };
    @@

    + const
    struct ctl_table table_name [] = { ... };

sed:
    sed --in-place \
      -e "s/struct ctl_table .table = &amp;uts_kern/const struct ctl_table *table = \&amp;uts_kern/" \
      kernel/utsname_sysctl.c

Reviewed-by: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt; # for kernel/trace/
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt; # SCSI
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt; # xfs
Acked-by: Jani Nikula &lt;jani.nikula@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Corey Minyard &lt;cminyard@mvista.com&gt;
Acked-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bill O'Donnell &lt;bodonnel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ashutosh Dixit &lt;ashutosh.dixit@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;anna.schumaker@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados &lt;joel.granados@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix improper sg use with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y</title>
<updated>2025-01-21T09:25:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Gstir</name>
<email>david@sigma-star.at</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-13T21:27:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=e8d9fab39d1f87b52932646b2f1e7877aa3fc0f4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e8d9fab39d1f87b52932646b2f1e7877aa3fc0f4</id>
<content type='text'>
With vmalloc stack addresses enabled (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y) DCP trusted
keys can crash during en- and decryption of the blob encryption key via
the DCP crypto driver. This is caused by improperly using sg_init_one()
with vmalloc'd stack buffers (plain_key_blob).

Fix this by always using kmalloc() for buffers we give to the DCP crypto
driver.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 0e28bf61a5f9 ("KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key")
Signed-off-by: David Gstir &lt;david@sigma-star.at&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix NULL dereference in AEAD crypto operation</title>
<updated>2024-11-04T19:24:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Gstir</name>
<email>david@sigma-star.at</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-29T11:34:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=04de7589e0a95167d803ecadd115235ba2c14997'/>
<id>urn:sha1:04de7589e0a95167d803ecadd115235ba2c14997</id>
<content type='text'>
When sealing or unsealing a key blob we currently do not wait for
the AEAD cipher operation to finish and simply return after submitting
the request. If there is some load on the system we can exit before
the cipher operation is done and the buffer we read from/write to
is already removed from the stack. This will e.g. result in NULL
pointer dereference errors in the DCP driver during blob creation.

Fix this by waiting for the AEAD cipher operation to finish before
resuming the seal and unseal calls.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 0e28bf61a5f9 ("KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key")
Reported-by: Parthiban N &lt;parthiban@linumiz.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/254d3bb1-6dbc-48b4-9c08-77df04baee2f@linumiz.com/
Signed-off-by: David Gstir &lt;david@sigma-star.at&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security/keys: fix slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permission</title>
<updated>2024-11-04T19:24:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Chen Ridong</name>
<email>chenridong@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-08T12:46:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=4a74da044ec9ec8679e6beccc4306b936b62873f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4a74da044ec9ec8679e6beccc4306b936b62873f</id>
<content type='text'>
KASAN reports an out of bounds read:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __kuid_val include/linux/uidgid.h:36
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in uid_eq include/linux/uidgid.h:63 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permission+0x394/0x410
security/keys/permission.c:54
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88813c3ab618 by task stress-ng/4362

CPU: 2 PID: 4362 Comm: stress-ng Not tainted 5.10.0-14930-gafbffd6c3ede #15
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:82 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x107/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:123
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:400
 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 mm/kasan/report.c:560
 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 mm/kasan/report.c:585
 __kuid_val include/linux/uidgid.h:36 [inline]
 uid_eq include/linux/uidgid.h:63 [inline]
 key_task_permission+0x394/0x410 security/keys/permission.c:54
 search_nested_keyrings+0x90e/0xe90 security/keys/keyring.c:793

This issue was also reported by syzbot.

It can be reproduced by following these steps(more details [1]):
1. Obtain more than 32 inputs that have similar hashes, which ends with the
   pattern '0xxxxxxxe6'.
2. Reboot and add the keys obtained in step 1.

The reproducer demonstrates how this issue happened:
1. In the search_nested_keyrings function, when it iterates through the
   slots in a node(below tag ascend_to_node), if the slot pointer is meta
   and node-&gt;back_pointer != NULL(it means a root), it will proceed to
   descend_to_node. However, there is an exception. If node is the root,
   and one of the slots points to a shortcut, it will be treated as a
   keyring.
2. Whether the ptr is keyring decided by keyring_ptr_is_keyring function.
   However, KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE is 0x2UL, the same as
   ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SUBTYPE_MASK.
3. When 32 keys with the similar hashes are added to the tree, the ROOT
   has keys with hashes that are not similar (e.g. slot 0) and it splits
   NODE A without using a shortcut. When NODE A is filled with keys that
   all hashes are xxe6, the keys are similar, NODE A will split with a
   shortcut. Finally, it forms the tree as shown below, where slot 6 points
   to a shortcut.

                      NODE A
              +------&gt;+---+
      ROOT    |       | 0 | xxe6
      +---+   |       +---+
 xxxx | 0 | shortcut  :   : xxe6
      +---+   |       +---+
 xxe6 :   :   |       |   | xxe6
      +---+   |       +---+
      | 6 |---+       :   : xxe6
      +---+           +---+
 xxe6 :   :           | f | xxe6
      +---+           +---+
 xxe6 | f |
      +---+

4. As mentioned above, If a slot(slot 6) of the root points to a shortcut,
   it may be mistakenly transferred to a key*, leading to a read
   out-of-bounds read.

To fix this issue, one should jump to descend_to_node if the ptr is a
shortcut, regardless of whether the node is root or not.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/1cfa878e-8c7b-4570-8606-21daf5e13ce7@huaweicloud.com/

[jarkko: tweaked the commit message a bit to have an appropriate closes
 tag.]
Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Reported-by: syzbot+5b415c07907a2990d1a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000cbb7860611f61147@google.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong &lt;chenridong@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>move asm/unaligned.h to linux/unaligned.h</title>
<updated>2024-10-02T21:23:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-01T19:35:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=5f60d5f6bbc12e782fac78110b0ee62698f3b576'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5f60d5f6bbc12e782fac78110b0ee62698f3b576</id>
<content type='text'>
asm/unaligned.h is always an include of asm-generic/unaligned.h;
might as well move that thing to linux/unaligned.h and include
that - there's nothing arch-specific in that header.

auto-generated by the following:

for i in `git grep -l -w asm/unaligned.h`; do
	sed -i -e "s/asm\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
for i in `git grep -l -w asm-generic/unaligned.h`; do
	sed -i -e "s/asm-generic\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
git mv include/asm-generic/unaligned.h include/linux/unaligned.h
git mv tools/include/asm-generic/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
sed -i -e "/unaligned.h/d" include/asm-generic/Kbuild
sed -i -e "s/__ASM_GENERIC/__LINUX/" include/linux/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key</title>
<updated>2024-08-15T19:01:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Gstir</name>
<email>david@sigma-star.at</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-17T11:28:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=0e28bf61a5f9ab30be3f3b4eafb8d097e39446bb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0e28bf61a5f9ab30be3f3b4eafb8d097e39446bb</id>
<content type='text'>
Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in
the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply
convert this field to hex and send it to userspace.

With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK)
in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload.
BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob
field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text.
Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead
of the encrypted BEK to userspace.

This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and
then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases
are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key
blob and then just use it without exporting it again.

Fix this by performing BEK decryption and encryption in a dedicated
buffer. Further always wipe the plain text BEK buffer to prevent leaking
the key via uninitialized memory.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 2e8a0f40a39c ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys")
Signed-off-by: David Gstir &lt;david@sigma-star.at&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
