<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c, branch linux-4.3.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-4.3.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-4.3.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/'/>
<updated>2015-06-16T12:18:45Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: update builtin policies</title>
<updated>2015-06-16T12:18:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-12T00:48:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=24fd03c87695a76f0517df42a37e51b1597d2c8a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:24fd03c87695a76f0517df42a37e51b1597d2c8a</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch defines a builtin measurement policy "tcb", similar to the
existing "ima_tcb", but with additional rules to also measure files
based on the effective uid and to measure files opened with the "read"
mode bit set (eg. read, read-write).

Changing the builtin "ima_tcb" policy could potentially break existing
users.  Instead of defining a new separate boot command line option each
time the builtin measurement policy is modified, this patch defines a
single generic boot command line option "ima_policy=" to specify the
builtin policy and deprecates the use of the builtin ima_tcb policy.

[The "ima_policy=" boot command line option is based on Roberto Sassu's
"ima: added new policy type exec" patch.]

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: extend "mask" policy matching support</title>
<updated>2015-06-16T12:18:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T12:53:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=4351c294b8c1028077280f761e158d167b592974'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4351c294b8c1028077280f761e158d167b592974</id>
<content type='text'>
The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC.  This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes.  For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition</title>
<updated>2015-06-16T12:18:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T12:48:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7</id>
<content type='text'>
The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid).  In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.

Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: do not measure or appraise the NSFS filesystem</title>
<updated>2015-05-21T17:28:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-21T20:54:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=cd025f7f94108995383edddfb61fc8afea6c66a9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cd025f7f94108995383edddfb61fc8afea6c66a9</id>
<content type='text'>
Include don't appraise or measure rules for the NSFS filesystem
in the builtin ima_tcb and ima_appraise_tcb policies.

Changelog:
- Update documentation

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.19
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: skip measurement of cgroupfs files and update documentation</title>
<updated>2015-05-21T17:27:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>rsassu@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-11T15:13:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=6438de9f3fb5180d78a0422695d0b88c687757d3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6438de9f3fb5180d78a0422695d0b88c687757d3</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch adds a rule in the default measurement policy to skip inodes
in the cgroupfs filesystem. Measurements for this filesystem can be
avoided, as all the digests collected have the same value of the digest of
an empty file.

Furthermore, this patch updates the documentation of IMA policies in
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy to make it consistent with
the policies set in security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;rsassu@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: cleanup ima_init_policy() a little</title>
<updated>2015-05-13T10:07:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-07T09:22:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=5577857f8e26e9027271f10daf96361640907300'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5577857f8e26e9027271f10daf96361640907300</id>
<content type='text'>
It's a bit easier to read this if we split it up into two for loops.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: require signature based appraisal</title>
<updated>2014-11-18T04:12:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T15:01:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=c57782c13ecd7e7aca66cbf0139ad2a72317dc81'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c57782c13ecd7e7aca66cbf0139ad2a72317dc81</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch provides CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT kernel configuration
option to force IMA appraisal using signatures. This is useful, when EVM
key is not initialized yet and we want securely initialize integrity or
any other functionality.

It forces embedded policy to require signature. Signed initialization
script can initialize EVM key, update the IMA policy and change further
requirement of everything to be signed.

Changes in v3:
* kernel parameter fixed to configuration option in the patch description

Changes in v2:
* policy change of this patch separated from the key loading patch

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface</title>
<updated>2014-10-12T03:33:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-03T11:40:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=0716abbb58e3c47e04354c2502083854f49c34e5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0716abbb58e3c47e04354c2502083854f49c34e5</id>
<content type='text'>
The current implementation uses an atomic counter to provide exclusive
access to the sysfs 'policy' entry to update the IMA policy. While it is
highly unlikely, the usage of a counter might potentially allow another
process to overflow the counter, open the interface and insert additional
rules into the policy being loaded.

This patch replaces using an atomic counter with atomic bit operations
which is more reliable and a widely used method to provide exclusive access.

As bit operation keep the interface locked after successful update, it makes
it unnecessary to verify if the default policy was set or not during parsing
and interface closing. This patch also removes that code.

Changes in v3:
* move audit log message to ima_relead_policy() to report successful and
  unsuccessful result
* unnecessary comment removed

Changes in v2:
* keep interface locked after successful policy load as in original design
* remove sysfs entry as in original design

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines</title>
<updated>2014-10-12T03:29:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-03T11:40:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=7178784f0a94e2e6c668f587665fde41d405a23c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7178784f0a94e2e6c668f587665fde41d405a23c</id>
<content type='text'>
Empty policy lines cause parsing failures which is, especially
for new users, hard to spot. This patch prevents it.

Changes in v2:
* strip leading blanks and tabs in rules to prevent parsing failures

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: no need to allocate entry for comment</title>
<updated>2014-10-12T03:28:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-03T11:40:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=272a6e90ffee1dea39efd6fdf9592edc83a0738e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:272a6e90ffee1dea39efd6fdf9592edc83a0738e</id>
<content type='text'>
If a rule is a comment, there is no need to allocate an entry.
Move the checking for comments before allocating the entry.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
