<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c, branch linux-rolling-stable</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-rolling-stable</id>
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<updated>2026-02-26T22:59:14Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>evm: Use ordered xattrs list to calculate HMAC in evm_init_hmac()</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T22:59:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-20T14:53:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ede7b0f33c5a67d34be1389784716338db760015</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0496fc9cdc384f67be4413b1c6156eb64fccd5c4 ]

Commit 8e5d9f916a96 ("smack: deduplicate xattr setting in
smack_inode_init_security()") introduced xattr_dupval() to simplify setting
the xattrs to be provided by the SMACK LSM on inode creation, in the
smack_inode_init_security().

Unfortunately, moving lsm_get_xattr_slot() caused the SMACK64TRANSMUTE
xattr be added in the array of new xattrs before SMACK64. This causes the
HMAC of xattrs calculated by evm_init_hmac() for new files to diverge from
the one calculated by both evm_calc_hmac_or_hash() and evmctl.

evm_init_hmac() calculates the HMAC of the xattrs of new files based on the
order LSMs provide them, while evm_calc_hmac_or_hash() and evmctl calculate
the HMAC based on an ordered xattrs list.

Fix the issue by making evm_init_hmac() calculate the HMAC of new files
based on the ordered xattrs list too.

Fixes: 8e5d9f916a96 ("smack: deduplicate xattr setting in smack_inode_init_security()")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: fix typos and spelling errors</title>
<updated>2025-02-05T02:36:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tanya Agarwal</name>
<email>tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-01-23T19:37:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ceb5faef848b2fbb5d1e99617093cc9d4deb2b30</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix typos and spelling errors in integrity module comments that were
identified using the codespell tool.
No functional changes - documentation only.

Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal &lt;tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Store and detect metadata inode attributes changes</title>
<updated>2024-04-09T21:14:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-23T17:25:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a652aa59068bd78d96a1ab6ea7c0c4d3c79fb5e8</id>
<content type='text'>
On stacked filesystem the metadata inode may be different than the one
file data inode and therefore changes to it need to be detected
independently. Therefore, store the i_version, device number, and inode
number associated with the file metadata inode.

Implement a function to detect changes to the inode and if a change is
detected reset the evm_status. This function will be called by IMA when
IMA detects that the metadata inode is different from the file's inode.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Use the metadata inode to calculate metadata hash</title>
<updated>2024-04-09T21:14:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-23T17:25:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:faf994811e0548df854e5fd946f3094725fcd9b5</id>
<content type='text'>
Changes to file attributes (mode bits, uid, gid) on the lower layer are
not taken into account when d_backing_inode() is used when a file is
accessed on the overlay layer and this file has not yet been copied up.
This is because d_backing_inode() does not return the real inode of the
lower layer but instead returns the backing inode which in this case
holds wrong file attributes. Further, when CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_METACOPY is
enabled and a copy-up is triggered due to file metadata changes, then
the metadata are held by the backing inode while the data are still held
by the real inode. Therefore, use d_inode(d_real(dentry, D_REAL_METADATA))
to get to the file's metadata inode and use it to calculate the metadata
hash with.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:31:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:75a323e604fc77c50c7ef2af6f0eeef221637642</id>
<content type='text'>
Define a new structure for EVM-specific metadata, called evm_iint_cache,
and embed it in the inode security blob. Introduce evm_iint_inode() to
retrieve metadata, and register evm_inode_alloc_security() for the
inode_alloc_security LSM hook, to initialize the structure (before
splitting metadata, this task was done by iint_init_always()).

Keep the non-NULL checks after calling evm_iint_inode() except in
evm_inode_alloc_security(), to take into account inodes for which
security_inode_alloc() was not called. When using shared metadata,
obtaining a NULL pointer from integrity_iint_find() meant that the file
wasn't in the IMA policy. Now, because IMA and EVM use disjoint metadata,
the EVM status has to be stored for every inode regardless of the IMA
policy.

Given that from now on EVM relies on its own metadata, remove the iint
parameter from evm_verifyxattr(). Also, directly retrieve the iint in
evm_verify_hmac(), called by both evm_verifyxattr() and
evm_verify_current_integrity(), since now there is no performance penalty
in retrieving EVM metadata (constant time).

Replicate the management of the IMA_NEW_FILE flag, by introducing
evm_post_path_mknod() and evm_file_release() to respectively set and clear
the newly introduced flag EVM_NEW_FILE, at the same time IMA does. Like for
IMA, select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when EVM is enabled, to ensure that files
are marked as new.

Unlike ima_post_path_mknod(), evm_post_path_mknod() cannot check if a file
must be appraised. Thus, it marks all affected files. Also, it does not
clear EVM_NEW_FILE depending on i_version, but that is not a problem
because IMA_NEW_FILE is always cleared when set in ima_check_last_writer().

Move the EVM-specific flag EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG to
security/integrity/evm/evm.h, since that definition is now unnecessary in
the common integrity layer.

Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, and
consequently decrement by one the number of xattrs to allocate in
security_inode_init_security().

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr</title>
<updated>2023-07-10T17:59:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-10T07:57:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c31288e56c1a7bb57a1be1f9f6f3faacbeddeff6</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, evm_inode_init_security() processes a single LSM xattr from the
array passed by security_inode_init_security(), and calculates the HMAC on
it and other inode metadata.

As the LSM infrastructure now can pass to EVM an array with multiple
xattrs, scan them until the terminator (xattr name NULL), and calculate the
HMAC on all of them.

Also, double check that the xattrs array terminator is the first non-filled
slot (obtained with lsm_get_xattr_slot()). Consumers of the xattrs array,
such as the initxattrs() callbacks, rely on the terminator.

Finally, change the name of the lsm_xattr parameter of evm_init_hmac() to
xattrs, to reflect the new type of information passed.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Fix build warnings</title>
<updated>2023-06-06T12:51:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-06T07:41:12Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:996e0a97ebd7b11cb785794e2a83c20c1add9d92</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix build warnings (function parameters description) for
evm_read_protected_xattrs(), evm_set_key() and evm_verifyxattr().

Fixes: 7626676320f3 ("evm: provide a function to set the EVM key from the kernel") # v4.5+
Fixes: 8314b6732ae4 ("ima: Define new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths and xattrvalues") # v5.14+
Fixes: 2960e6cb5f7c ("evm: additional parameter to pass integrity cache entry 'iint'") # v3.2+
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'integrity-v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity</title>
<updated>2023-02-22T20:36:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-22T20:36:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:67e2dcff8b21923d48f5ca835773b2f005389e69</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity update from Mimi Zohar:
 "One doc and one code cleanup, and two bug fixes"

* tag 'integrity-v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook
  ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook
  evm: call dump_security_xattr() in all cases to remove code duplication
  ima: fix ima_delete_rules() kernel-doc warning
  ima: return IMA digest value only when IMA_COLLECTED flag is set
  ima: fix error handling logic when file measurement failed
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: call dump_security_xattr() in all cases to remove code duplication</title>
<updated>2023-01-31T17:47:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiu Jianfeng</name>
<email>xiujianfeng@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-31T02:00:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8250865c164e3ddb930953523c93b3c821bdd322</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently dump_security_xattr() is used to dump security xattr value
which is larger than 64 bytes, otherwise, pr_debug() is used. In order
to remove code duplication, refactor dump_security_xattr() and call it
in all cases.

Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng &lt;xiujianfeng@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap</title>
<updated>2023-01-19T08:24:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-13T11:49:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:39f60c1ccee72caa0104145b5dbf5d37cce1ea39</id>
<content type='text'>
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.

Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.

Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.

Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.

Acked-by: Dave Chinner &lt;dchinner@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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