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<title>kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm.h, branch linux-rolling-stable</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
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<updated>2024-04-09T21:14:57Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>evm: Store and detect metadata inode attributes changes</title>
<updated>2024-04-09T21:14:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-23T17:25:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a652aa59068bd78d96a1ab6ea7c0c4d3c79fb5e8</id>
<content type='text'>
On stacked filesystem the metadata inode may be different than the one
file data inode and therefore changes to it need to be detected
independently. Therefore, store the i_version, device number, and inode
number associated with the file metadata inode.

Implement a function to detect changes to the inode and if a change is
detected reset the evm_status. This function will be called by IMA when
IMA detects that the metadata inode is different from the file's inode.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Avoid -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warnings</title>
<updated>2024-04-08T11:55:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavoars@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-04T15:00:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:38aa3f5ac6d2de6b471ecb6e1cd878957ae7e8de</id>
<content type='text'>
-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end is coming in GCC-14, and we are getting
ready to enable it globally.

There is currently an object (`hdr)` in `struct ima_max_digest_data`
that contains a flexible structure (`struct ima_digest_data`):

 struct ima_max_digest_data {
        struct ima_digest_data hdr;
        u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
 } __packed;

So, in order to avoid ending up with a flexible-array member in the
middle of a struct, we use the `__struct_group()` helper to separate
the flexible array from the rest of the members in the flexible
structure:

struct ima_digest_data {
        __struct_group(ima_digest_data_hdr, hdr, __packed,

        ... the rest of the members

        );
        u8 digest[];
} __packed;

And similarly for `struct evm_ima_xattr_data`.

With the change described above, we can now declare an object of the
type of the tagged `struct ima_digest_data_hdr`, without embedding the
flexible array in the middle of another struct:

 struct ima_max_digest_data {
        struct ima_digest_data_hdr hdr;
        u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
 } __packed;

And similarly for `struct evm_digest` and `struct evm_xattr`.

We also use `container_of()` whenever we need to retrieve a pointer to
the flexible structure.

So, with these changes, fix the following warnings:

security/integrity/evm/evm.h:64:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/evm/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/evm/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/ima/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/ima/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/platform_certs/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/platform_certs/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/202
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavoars@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:31:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:75a323e604fc77c50c7ef2af6f0eeef221637642</id>
<content type='text'>
Define a new structure for EVM-specific metadata, called evm_iint_cache,
and embed it in the inode security blob. Introduce evm_iint_inode() to
retrieve metadata, and register evm_inode_alloc_security() for the
inode_alloc_security LSM hook, to initialize the structure (before
splitting metadata, this task was done by iint_init_always()).

Keep the non-NULL checks after calling evm_iint_inode() except in
evm_inode_alloc_security(), to take into account inodes for which
security_inode_alloc() was not called. When using shared metadata,
obtaining a NULL pointer from integrity_iint_find() meant that the file
wasn't in the IMA policy. Now, because IMA and EVM use disjoint metadata,
the EVM status has to be stored for every inode regardless of the IMA
policy.

Given that from now on EVM relies on its own metadata, remove the iint
parameter from evm_verifyxattr(). Also, directly retrieve the iint in
evm_verify_hmac(), called by both evm_verifyxattr() and
evm_verify_current_integrity(), since now there is no performance penalty
in retrieving EVM metadata (constant time).

Replicate the management of the IMA_NEW_FILE flag, by introducing
evm_post_path_mknod() and evm_file_release() to respectively set and clear
the newly introduced flag EVM_NEW_FILE, at the same time IMA does. Like for
IMA, select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when EVM is enabled, to ensure that files
are marked as new.

Unlike ima_post_path_mknod(), evm_post_path_mknod() cannot check if a file
must be appraised. Thus, it marks all affected files. Also, it does not
clear EVM_NEW_FILE depending on i_version, but that is not a problem
because IMA_NEW_FILE is always cleared when set in ima_check_last_writer().

Move the EVM-specific flag EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG to
security/integrity/evm/evm.h, since that definition is now unnecessary in
the common integrity layer.

Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, and
consequently decrement by one the number of xattrs to allocate in
security_inode_init_security().

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr</title>
<updated>2023-07-10T17:59:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-10T07:57:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c31288e56c1a7bb57a1be1f9f6f3faacbeddeff6</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, evm_inode_init_security() processes a single LSM xattr from the
array passed by security_inode_init_security(), and calculates the HMAC on
it and other inode metadata.

As the LSM infrastructure now can pass to EVM an array with multiple
xattrs, scan them until the terminator (xattr name NULL), and calculate the
HMAC on all of them.

Also, double check that the xattrs array terminator is the first non-filled
slot (obtained with lsm_get_xattr_slot()). Consumers of the xattrs array,
such as the initxattrs() callbacks, rely on the terminator.

Finally, change the name of the lsm_xattr parameter of evm_init_hmac() to
xattrs, to reflect the new type of information passed.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Clean up some variables</title>
<updated>2022-05-16T12:14:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-13T17:41:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4c41186ff394680cbde32a6a29e539f1e6036a47</id>
<content type='text'>
Make hmac_tfm static since it's not used anywhere else besides the file
it is in.

Remove declaration of hash_tfm since it doesn't exist.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Verify portable signatures against all protected xattrs</title>
<updated>2021-06-01T19:17:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-28T07:38:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8c7a703ec9787a1b45b024e9acd253328422dcbd</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, the evm_config_default_xattrnames array contains xattr names
only related to LSMs which are enabled in the kernel configuration.
However, EVM portable signatures do not depend on local information and a
vendor might include in the signature calculation xattrs that are not
enabled in the target platform.

Just including all xattrs names in evm_config_default_xattrnames is not a
safe approach, because a target system might have already calculated
signatures or HMACs based only on the enabled xattrs. After applying this
patch, EVM would verify those signatures and HMACs with all xattrs instead.
The non-enabled ones, which could possibly exist, would cause a
verification error.

Thus, this patch adds a new field named enabled to the xattr_list
structure, which is set to true if the LSM associated to a given xattr name
is enabled in the kernel configuration. The non-enabled xattrs are taken
into account only in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), if the passed security.evm
type is EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG.

The new function evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled() has been defined so that
IMA can include all protected xattrs and not only the enabled ones in the
measurement list, if the new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths or
xattrvalues have been included in the template format.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441</title>
<updated>2019-06-05T15:37:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-01T08:08:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel &lt;armijn@tjaldur.nl&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures</title>
<updated>2018-07-18T11:27:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>mjg59@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-08T21:57:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5feeb61183dde9d4f4026fd0d5801388c21d61a2</id>
<content type='text'>
SHA1 is reasonable in HMAC constructs, but it's desirable to be able to
use stronger hashes in digital signatures. Modify the EVM crypto code so
the hash type is imported from the digital signature and passed down to
the hash calculation code, and return the digest size to higher layers
for validation.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: turn evm_config_xattrnames into a list</title>
<updated>2018-05-18T19:34:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>mjg59@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-11T23:12:35Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:21af76631476030709f85f48e20bb9429a912b6f</id>
<content type='text'>
Use a list of xattrs rather than an array - this makes it easier to
extend the list at runtime.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.c</title>
<updated>2018-03-23T10:31:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hernán Gonzalez</name>
<email>hernan@vanguardiasur.com.ar</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-27T22:16:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1a82cee3e69d8dc89dc2e9995770e7cab0a4c9d8</id>
<content type='text'>
These variables are not used where they are was defined.  There is no
point in declaring them there as extern.  Move and constify them, saving
2 bytes.

Function                                     old     new   delta
init_desc                                    273     271      -2
Total: Before=2112094, After=2112092, chg -0.00%

Signed-off-by: Hernán Gonzalez &lt;hernan@vanguardiasur.com.ar&gt;
Tested-by: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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