<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/security/Kconfig, branch linux-5.1.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.1.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.1.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/'/>
<updated>2019-03-29T21:08:49Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Revive CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* for "make oldconfig"</title>
<updated>2019-03-29T21:08:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-29T19:36:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=2623c4fbe2ad1341ff2d1e12410d0afdae2490ca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2623c4fbe2ad1341ff2d1e12410d0afdae2490ca</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 70b62c25665f636c ("LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM") removed
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_{SELINUX,SMACK,TOMOYO,APPARMOR,DAC} from
security/Kconfig and changed CONFIG_LSM to provide a fixed ordering as a
default value. That commit expected that existing users (upgrading from
Linux 5.0 and earlier) will edit CONFIG_LSM value in accordance with
their CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* choice in their old kernel configs. But
since users might forget to edit CONFIG_LSM value, this patch revives
the choice (only for providing the default value for CONFIG_LSM) in order
to make sure that CONFIG_LSM reflects CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* from their
old kernel configs.

Note that since TOMOYO can be fully stacked against the other legacy
major LSMs, when it is selected, it explicitly disables the other LSMs
to avoid them also initializing since TOMOYO does not expect this
currently.

Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Fixes: 70b62c25665f636c ("LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM")
Co-developed-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig</title>
<updated>2019-03-01T17:52:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Vorel</name>
<email>pvorel@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-28T23:54:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b102c11e1a10e1328c9610665e45dd07bf4a3696</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove modules not using it (SELinux and SMACK aren't
the only ones not using it).

Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel &lt;pvorel@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls</title>
<updated>2019-01-25T19:22:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Micah Morton</name>
<email>mortonm@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-16T15:46:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:aeca4e2ca65c1aeacfbe520684e6421719d99417</id>
<content type='text'>
SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID
transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a
system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given
UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with
CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID
mappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls is
supported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set.

Signed-off-by: Micah Morton &lt;mortonm@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Yama: Initialize as ordered LSM</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-14T22:37:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=d6aed64b74b73b64278c059eacd59d87167aa968'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d6aed64b74b73b64278c059eacd59d87167aa968</id>
<content type='text'>
This converts Yama from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-14T22:26:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=70b62c25665f636c9f6c700b26af7df296b0887e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:70b62c25665f636c9f6c700b26af7df296b0887e</id>
<content type='text'>
This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-20T00:30:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=79f7865d844c7703e3dc0e2f5b9ed2f3a4f412e5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:79f7865d844c7703e3dc0e2f5b9ed2f3a4f412e5</id>
<content type='text'>
Provide a way to explicitly choose LSM initialization order via the new
"lsm=" comma-separated list of LSMs.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-09T21:27:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:13e735c0e953246bd531d342bb86acb5b1bf664a</id>
<content type='text'>
This provides a way to declare LSM initialization order via the new
CONFIG_LSM. Currently only non-major LSMs are recognized. This will
be expanded in future patches.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: surround Kconfig file paths with double quotes</title>
<updated>2018-12-21T15:25:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>yamada.masahiro@socionext.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-11T11:01:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8636a1f9677db4f883f29a072f401303acfc2edd</id>
<content type='text'>
The Kconfig lexer supports special characters such as '.' and '/' in
the parameter context. In my understanding, the reason is just to
support bare file paths in the source statement.

I do not see a good reason to complicate Kconfig for the room of
ambiguity.

The majority of code already surrounds file paths with double quotes,
and it makes sense since file paths are constant string literals.

Make it treewide consistent now.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang &lt;wsa@the-dreams.de&gt;
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "x86/mm/legacy: Populate the user page-table with user pgd's"</title>
<updated>2018-09-14T15:08:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joerg Roedel</name>
<email>jroedel@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-14T10:59:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=61a6bd83abf2f14b2a917b6a0279c88d299267af'/>
<id>urn:sha1:61a6bd83abf2f14b2a917b6a0279c88d299267af</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 1f40a46cf47c12d93a5ad9dccd82bd36ff8f956a.

It turned out that this patch is not sufficient to enable PTI on 32 bit
systems with legacy 2-level page-tables. In this paging mode the huge-page
PTEs are in the top-level page-table directory, where also the mirroring to
the user-space page-table happens. So every huge PTE exits twice, in the
kernel and in the user page-table.

That means that accessed/dirty bits need to be fetched from two PTEs in
this mode to be safe, but this is not trivial to implement because it needs
changes to generic code just for the sake of enabling PTI with 32-bit
legacy paging. As all systems that need PTI should support PAE anyway,
remove support for PTI when 32-bit legacy paging is used.

Fixes: 7757d607c6b3 ('x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32')
Reported-by: Meelis Roos &lt;mroos@linux.ee&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536922754-31379-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T15:45:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-15T15:45:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=8c479c2c0f9dc105c0afaa662a22f39383d4ce92'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8c479c2c0f9dc105c0afaa662a22f39383d4ce92</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull hardened usercopy updates from Kees Cook:
 "This cleans up a minor Kconfig issue and adds a kernel boot option for
  disabling hardened usercopy for distro users that may have corner-case
  performance issues (e.g. high bandwidth small-packet UDP traffic).

  Summary:

   - drop unneeded Kconfig "select BUG" (Kamal Mostafa)

   - add "hardened_usercopy=off" rare performance needs (Chris von
     Recklinghausen)"

* tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  usercopy: Allow boot cmdline disabling of hardening
  usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPY
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
