kernel/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c, branch linux-6.2.y

tcp: Add tracepoint for tcp_set_ca_state

2022-04-08T03:33:15Z

The congestion status of a tcp flow may be updated since there is congestion between tcp sender and receiver. It makes sense to add tracepoint for congestion status set function to summate cc status duration and evaluate the performance of network and congestion algorithm. the backgound of this patch is below. Link: https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/pull/3899 Signed-off-by: Ping Gan Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220406010956.19656-1-jacky_gam_2001@163.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

tcp: add accessors to read/set tp->snd_cwnd

2022-04-06T19:05:41Z

We had various bugs over the years with code breaking the assumption that tp->snd_cwnd is greater than zero. Lately, syzbot reported the WARN_ON_ONCE(!tp->prior_cwnd) added in commit 8b8a321ff72c ("tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction") can trigger, and without a repro we would have to spend considerable time finding the bug. Instead of complaining too late, we want to catch where and when tp->snd_cwnd is set to an illegal value. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Suggested-by: Yuchung Cheng Cc: Neal Cardwell Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405233538.947344-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

tcp: unexport tcp_ca_get_key_by_name and tcp_ca_get_name_by_key

2022-03-12T06:51:40Z

Both functions are only used by core networking code. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310143229.895319-1-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

net: Only allow init netns to set default tcp cong to a restricted algo

2021-05-04T18:58:28Z

tcp_set_default_congestion_control() is netns-safe in that it writes to &net->ipv4.tcp_congestion_control, but it also sets ca->flags |= TCP_CONG_NON_RESTRICTED which is not namespaced. This has the unintended side-effect of changing the global net.ipv4.tcp_allowed_congestion_control sysctl, despite the fact that it is read-only: 97684f0970f6 ("net: Make tcp_allowed_congestion_control readonly in non-init netns") Resolve this netns "leak" by only allowing the init netns to set the default algorithm to one that is restricted. This restriction could be removed if tcp_allowed_congestion_control were namespace-ified in the future. This bug was uncovered with https://github.com/JonathonReinhart/linux-netns-sysctl-verify Fixes: 6670e1524477 ("tcp: Namespace-ify sysctl_tcp_default_congestion_control") Signed-off-by: Jonathon Reinhart Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tcp: Set INET_ECN_xmit configuration in tcp_reinit_congestion_control

2020-11-21T02:09:47Z

When setting congestion control via a BPF program it is seen that the SYN/ACK for packets within a given flow will not include the ECT0 flag. A bit of simple printk debugging shows that when this is configured without BPF we will see the value INET_ECN_xmit value initialized in tcp_assign_congestion_control however when we configure this via BPF the socket is in the closed state and as such it isn't configured, and I do not see it being initialized when we transition the socket into the listen state. The result of this is that the ECT0 bit is configured based on whatever the default state is for the socket. Any easy way to reproduce this is to monitor the following with tcpdump: tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs -t bpf_tcp_ca Without this patch the SYN/ACK will follow whatever the default is. If dctcp all SYN/ACK packets will have the ECT0 bit set, and if it is not then ECT0 will be cleared on all SYN/ACK packets. With this patch applied the SYN/ACK bit matches the value seen on the other packets in the given stream. Fixes: 91b5b21c7c16 ("bpf: Add support for changing congestion control") Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

tcp: Simplify tcp_set_congestion_control() load=false case

2020-09-11T03:53:01Z

Simplify tcp_set_congestion_control() by removing the initialization code path for the !load case. There are only two call sites for tcp_set_congestion_control(). The EBPF call site is the only one that passes load=false; it also passes cap_net_admin=true. Because of that, the exact same behavior can be achieved by removing the special if (!load) branch of the logic. Both before and after this commit, the EBPF case will call bpf_try_module_get(), and if that succeeds then call tcp_reinit_congestion_control() or if that fails then return EBUSY. Note that this returns the logic to a structure very similar to the structure before: commit 91b5b21c7c16 ("bpf: Add support for changing congestion control") except that the CAP_NET_ADMIN status is passed in as a function argument. This clean-up was suggested by Martin KaFai Lau. Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Lawrence Brakmo Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: Yuchung Cheng Cc: Kevin Yang

tcp: simplify tcp_set_congestion_control(): Always reinitialize

2020-09-11T03:53:01Z

Now that the previous patches ensure that all call sites for tcp_set_congestion_control() want to initialize congestion control, we can simplify tcp_set_congestion_control() by removing the reinit argument and the code to support it. Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Acked-by: Kevin Yang Cc: Lawrence Brakmo

tcp: Only init congestion control if not initialized already

2020-09-11T03:53:01Z

Change tcp_init_transfer() to only initialize congestion control if it has not been initialized already. With this new approach, we can arrange things so that if the EBPF code sets the congestion control by calling setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) then tcp_init_transfer() will not re-initialize the CC module. This is an approach that has the following beneficial properties: (1) This allows CC module customizations made by the EBPF called in tcp_init_transfer() to persist, and not be wiped out by a later call to tcp_init_congestion_control() in tcp_init_transfer(). (2) Does not flip the order of EBPF and CC init, to avoid causing bugs for existing code upstream that depends on the current order. (3) Does not cause 2 initializations for for CC in the case where the EBPF called in tcp_init_transfer() wants to set the CC to a new CC algorithm. (4) Allows follow-on simplifications to the code in net/core/filter.c and net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c, which currently both have some complexity to special-case CC initialization to avoid double CC initialization if EBPF sets the CC. Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Acked-by: Kevin Yang Cc: Lawrence Brakmo

tcp: make sure listeners don't initialize congestion-control state

2020-07-09T20:07:45Z

syzkaller found its way into setsockopt with TCP_CONGESTION "cdg". tcp_cdg_init() does a kcalloc to store the gradients. As sk_clone_lock just copies all the memory, the allocated pointer will be copied as well, if the app called setsockopt(..., TCP_CONGESTION) on the listener. If now the socket will be destroyed before the congestion-control has properly been initialized (through a call to tcp_init_transfer), we will end up freeing memory that does not belong to that particular socket, opening the door to a double-free: [ 11.413102] ================================================================== [ 11.414181] BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0 [ 11.415329] [ 11.415560] CPU: 3 PID: 4884 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2 #80 [ 11.416544] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 11.418148] Call Trace: [ 11.418534] [ 11.418834] dump_stack+0x7d/0xb0 [ 11.419297] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x210 [ 11.422079] kasan_report_invalid_free+0x51/0x80 [ 11.423433] __kasan_slab_free+0x15e/0x170 [ 11.424761] kfree+0x8c/0x230 [ 11.425157] tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0 [ 11.425872] tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0 [ 11.426493] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0 [ 11.427093] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0xb29/0x1100 [ 11.427731] tcp_get_cookie_sock+0xc3/0x4a0 [ 11.429457] cookie_v4_check+0x13d0/0x2500 [ 11.433189] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x60e/0x780 [ 11.433727] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2869/0x2e10 [ 11.437143] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x23/0x190 [ 11.437810] ip_local_deliver+0x294/0x350 [ 11.439566] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x15d/0x1a0 [ 11.441995] process_backlog+0x1b1/0x6b0 [ 11.443148] net_rx_action+0x37e/0xc40 [ 11.445361] __do_softirq+0x18c/0x61a [ 11.445881] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20 [ 11.446409] [ 11.446716] do_softirq_own_stack+0x34/0x40 [ 11.447259] do_softirq.part.0+0x26/0x30 [ 11.447827] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x46/0x50 [ 11.448406] ip_finish_output2+0x60f/0x1bc0 [ 11.450109] __ip_queue_xmit+0x71c/0x1b60 [ 11.451861] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1727/0x3bb0 [ 11.453789] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x3070/0x4d3a [ 11.456810] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2ad/0x780 [ 11.457995] __release_sock+0x14b/0x2c0 [ 11.458529] release_sock+0x4a/0x170 [ 11.459005] __inet_stream_connect+0x467/0xc80 [ 11.461435] inet_stream_connect+0x4e/0xa0 [ 11.462043] __sys_connect+0x204/0x270 [ 11.465515] __x64_sys_connect+0x6a/0xb0 [ 11.466088] do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70 [ 11.466617] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 11.467341] RIP: 0033:0x7f56046dc469 [ 11.467844] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 11.468282] RSP: 002b:00007f5604dccdd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a [ 11.469326] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000068bf00 RCX: 00007f56046dc469 [ 11.470379] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 11.471311] RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 11.472286] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 11.473341] R13: 000000000041427c R14: 00007f5604dcd5c0 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 11.474321] [ 11.474527] Allocated by task 4884: [ 11.475031] save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 11.475548] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 [ 11.476182] tcp_cdg_init+0xf0/0x150 [ 11.476744] tcp_init_congestion_control+0x9b/0x3a0 [ 11.477435] tcp_set_congestion_control+0x270/0x32f [ 11.478088] do_tcp_setsockopt.isra.0+0x521/0x1a00 [ 11.478744] __sys_setsockopt+0xff/0x1e0 [ 11.479259] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0x150 [ 11.479895] do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70 [ 11.480395] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 11.481097] [ 11.481321] Freed by task 4872: [ 11.481783] save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 11.482230] __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170 [ 11.482839] kfree+0x8c/0x230 [ 11.483240] tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0 [ 11.483948] tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0 [ 11.484502] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0 [ 11.485144] tcp_close+0x932/0xfe0 [ 11.485642] inet_release+0xc1/0x1c0 [ 11.486131] __sock_release+0xc0/0x270 [ 11.486697] sock_close+0xc/0x10 [ 11.487145] __fput+0x277/0x780 [ 11.487632] task_work_run+0xeb/0x180 [ 11.488118] __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x15a/0x160 [ 11.488834] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x70 [ 11.489326] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Wei Wang fixed a part of these CDG-malloc issues with commit c12014440750 ("tcp: memset ca_priv data to 0 properly"). This patch here fixes the listener-scenario: We make sure that listeners setting the congestion-control through setsockopt won't initialize it (thus CDG never allocates on listeners). For those who use AF_UNSPEC to reuse a socket, tcp_disconnect() is changed to cleanup afterwards. (The issue can be reproduced at least down to v4.4.x.) Cc: Wei Wang Cc: Eric Dumazet Fixes: 2b0a8c9eee81 ("tcp: add CDG congestion control") Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf

2020-01-09T16:46:18Z

This patch makes "struct tcp_congestion_ops" to be the first user of BPF STRUCT_OPS. It allows implementing a tcp_congestion_ops in bpf. The BPF implemented tcp_congestion_ops can be used like regular kernel tcp-cc through sysctl and setsockopt. e.g. [root@arch-fb-vm1 bpf]# sysctl -a | egrep congestion net.ipv4.tcp_allowed_congestion_control = reno cubic bpf_cubic net.ipv4.tcp_available_congestion_control = reno bic cubic bpf_cubic net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control = bpf_cubic There has been attempt to move the TCP CC to the user space (e.g. CCP in TCP). The common arguments are faster turn around, get away from long-tail kernel versions in production...etc, which are legit points. BPF has been the continuous effort to join both kernel and userspace upsides together (e.g. XDP to gain the performance advantage without bypassing the kernel). The recent BPF advancements (in particular BTF-aware verifier, BPF trampoline, BPF CO-RE...) made implementing kernel struct ops (e.g. tcp cc) possible in BPF. It allows a faster turnaround for testing algorithm in the production while leveraging the existing (and continue growing) BPF feature/framework instead of building one specifically for userspace TCP CC. This patch allows write access to a few fields in tcp-sock (in bpf_tcp_ca_btf_struct_access()). The optional "get_info" is unsupported now. It can be added later. One possible way is to output the info with a btf-id to describe the content. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Acked-by: Yonghong Song Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200109003508.3856115-1-kafai@fb.com