<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/net/bluetooth, branch linux-5.1.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.1.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.1.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/'/>
<updated>2019-07-26T07:13:07Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Add SMP workaround Microsoft Surface Precision Mouse bug</title>
<updated>2019-07-26T07:13:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Szymon Janc</name>
<email>szymon.janc@codecoup.pl</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-18T22:47:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=9f1cdd0deca4063b46b90fef26ac870fdb0affa6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9f1cdd0deca4063b46b90fef26ac870fdb0affa6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1d87b88ba26eabd4745e158ecfd87c93a9b51dc2 upstream.

Microsoft Surface Precision Mouse provides bogus identity address when
pairing. It connects with Static Random address but provides Public
Address in SMP Identity Address Information PDU. Address has same
value but type is different. Workaround this by dropping IRK if ID
address discrepancy is detected.

&gt; HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19
      LE Connection Complete (0x01)
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 75
        Role: Master (0x00)
        Peer address type: Random (0x01)
        Peer address: E0:52:33:93:3B:21 (Static)
        Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028)
        Connection latency: 0 (0x0000)
        Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a)
        Master clock accuracy: 0x00

....

&gt; ACL Data RX: Handle 75 flags 0x02 dlen 12
      SMP: Identity Address Information (0x09) len 7
        Address type: Public (0x00)
        Address: E0:52:33:93:3B:21

Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc &lt;szymon.janc@codecoup.pl&gt;
Tested-by: Maarten Fonville &lt;maarten.fonville@gmail.com&gt;
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199461
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: validate BLE connection interval updates</title>
<updated>2019-07-26T07:12:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>csonsino</name>
<email>csonsino@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-12T21:00:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=572af11ec2252a9c57cc6ee5e247ebe04da18bb7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:572af11ec2252a9c57cc6ee5e247ebe04da18bb7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c49a8682fc5d298d44e8d911f4fa14690ea9485e ]

Problem: The Linux Bluetooth stack yields complete control over the BLE
connection interval to the remote device.

The Linux Bluetooth stack provides access to the BLE connection interval
min and max values through /sys/kernel/debug/bluetooth/hci0/
conn_min_interval and /sys/kernel/debug/bluetooth/hci0/conn_max_interval.
These values are used for initial BLE connections, but the remote device
has the ability to request a connection parameter update. In the event
that the remote side requests to change the connection interval, the Linux
kernel currently only validates that the desired value is within the
acceptable range in the Bluetooth specification (6 - 3200, corresponding to
7.5ms - 4000ms). There is currently no validation that the desired value
requested by the remote device is within the min/max limits specified in
the conn_min_interval/conn_max_interval configurations. This essentially
leads to Linux yielding complete control over the connection interval to
the remote device.

The proposed patch adds a verification step to the connection parameter
update mechanism, ensuring that the desired value is within the min/max
bounds of the current connection. If the desired value is outside of the
current connection min/max values, then the connection parameter update
request is rejected and the negative response is returned to the remote
device. Recall that the initial connection is established using the local
conn_min_interval/conn_max_interval values, so this allows the Linux
administrator to retain control over the BLE connection interval.

The one downside that I see is that the current default Linux values for
conn_min_interval and conn_max_interval typically correspond to 30ms and
50ms respectively. If this change were accepted, then it is feasible that
some devices would no longer be able to negotiate to their desired
connection interval values. This might be remedied by setting the default
Linux conn_min_interval and conn_max_interval values to the widest
supported range (6 - 3200 / 7.5ms - 4000ms). This could lead to the same
behavior as the current implementation, where the remote device could
request to change the connection interval value to any value that is
permitted by the Bluetooth specification, and Linux would accept the
desired value.

Signed-off-by: Carey Sonsino &lt;csonsino@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: hidp: NUL terminate a string in the compat ioctl</title>
<updated>2019-07-26T07:12:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-16T18:24:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=11f91596e0c385ae61ff2d1e2707e0d1a48c9d37'/>
<id>urn:sha1:11f91596e0c385ae61ff2d1e2707e0d1a48c9d37</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dcae9052ebb0c5b2614de620323d615fcbfda7f8 ]

This change is similar to commit a1616a5ac99e ("Bluetooth: hidp: fix
buffer overflow") but for the compat ioctl.  We take a string from the
user and forgot to ensure that it's NUL terminated.

I have also changed the strncpy() in to strscpy() in hidp_setup_hid().
The difference is the strncpy() doesn't necessarily NUL terminate the
destination string.  Either change would fix the problem but it's nice
to take a belt and suspenders approach and do both.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Check state in l2cap_disconnect_rsp</title>
<updated>2019-07-26T07:12:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matias Karhumaa</name>
<email>matias.karhumaa@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-21T10:07:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=9e8d3c92c59eabee227f9fd89715139a14e16dd8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9e8d3c92c59eabee227f9fd89715139a14e16dd8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 28261da8a26f4915aa257d12d506c6ba179d961f ]

Because of both sides doing L2CAP disconnection at the same time, it
was possible to receive L2CAP Disconnection Response with CID that was
already freed. That caused problems if CID was already reused and L2CAP
Connection Request with same CID was sent out. Before this patch kernel
deleted channel context regardless of the state of the channel.

Example where leftover Disconnection Response (frame #402) causes local
device to delete L2CAP channel which was not yet connected. This in
turn confuses remote device's stack because same CID is re-used without
properly disconnecting.

Btmon capture before patch:
** snip **
&gt; ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 8                #394 [hci1] 10.748949
      Channel: 65 len 4 [PSM 3 mode 0] {chan 2}
      RFCOMM: Disconnect (DISC) (0x43)
         Address: 0x03 cr 1 dlci 0x00
         Control: 0x53 poll/final 1
         Length: 0
         FCS: 0xfd
&lt; ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 8                #395 [hci1] 10.749062
      Channel: 65 len 4 [PSM 3 mode 0] {chan 2}
      RFCOMM: Unnumbered Ack (UA) (0x63)
         Address: 0x03 cr 1 dlci 0x00
         Control: 0x73 poll/final 1
         Length: 0
         FCS: 0xd7
&lt; ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 12               #396 [hci1] 10.749073
      L2CAP: Disconnection Request (0x06) ident 17 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Source CID: 65
&gt; HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5    #397 [hci1] 10.752391
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 43
        Count: 1
&gt; HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5    #398 [hci1] 10.753394
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 43
        Count: 1
&gt; ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 12               #399 [hci1] 10.756499
      L2CAP: Disconnection Request (0x06) ident 26 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Source CID: 65
&lt; ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 12               #400 [hci1] 10.756548
      L2CAP: Disconnection Response (0x07) ident 26 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Source CID: 65
&lt; ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 12               #401 [hci1] 10.757459
      L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 18 len 4
        PSM: 1 (0x0001)
        Source CID: 65
&gt; ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 12               #402 [hci1] 10.759148
      L2CAP: Disconnection Response (0x07) ident 17 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Source CID: 65
= bluetoothd: 00:1E:AB:4C:56:54: error updating services: Input/o..   10.759447
&gt; HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5    #403 [hci1] 10.759386
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 43
        Count: 1
&gt; ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 12               #404 [hci1] 10.760397
      L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 27 len 4
        PSM: 3 (0x0003)
        Source CID: 65
&lt; ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 16               #405 [hci1] 10.760441
      L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 27 len 8
        Destination CID: 65
        Source CID: 65
        Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
        Status: No further information available (0x0000)
&lt; ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 27               #406 [hci1] 10.760449
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 19 len 19
        Destination CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
          MTU: 1013
        Option: Retransmission and Flow Control (0x04) [mandatory]
          Mode: Basic (0x00)
          TX window size: 0
          Max transmit: 0
          Retransmission timeout: 0
          Monitor timeout: 0
          Maximum PDU size: 0
&gt; HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5    #407 [hci1] 10.761399
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 43
        Count: 1
&gt; ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 16               #408 [hci1] 10.762942
      L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 18 len 8
        Destination CID: 66
        Source CID: 65
        Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
        Status: No further information available (0x0000)
*snip*

Similar case after the patch:
*snip*
&gt; ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 8            #22702 [hci0] 1664.411056
      Channel: 65 len 4 [PSM 3 mode 0] {chan 3}
      RFCOMM: Disconnect (DISC) (0x43)
         Address: 0x03 cr 1 dlci 0x00
         Control: 0x53 poll/final 1
         Length: 0
         FCS: 0xfd
&lt; ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 8            #22703 [hci0] 1664.411136
      Channel: 65 len 4 [PSM 3 mode 0] {chan 3}
      RFCOMM: Unnumbered Ack (UA) (0x63)
         Address: 0x03 cr 1 dlci 0x00
         Control: 0x73 poll/final 1
         Length: 0
         FCS: 0xd7
&lt; ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 12           #22704 [hci0] 1664.411143
      L2CAP: Disconnection Request (0x06) ident 11 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Source CID: 65
&gt; HCI Event: Number of Completed Pac.. (0x13) plen 5  #22705 [hci0] 1664.414009
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 43
        Count: 1
&gt; HCI Event: Number of Completed Pac.. (0x13) plen 5  #22706 [hci0] 1664.415007
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 43
        Count: 1
&gt; ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 12           #22707 [hci0] 1664.418674
      L2CAP: Disconnection Request (0x06) ident 17 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Source CID: 65
&lt; ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 12           #22708 [hci0] 1664.418762
      L2CAP: Disconnection Response (0x07) ident 17 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Source CID: 65
&lt; ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 12           #22709 [hci0] 1664.421073
      L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 12 len 4
        PSM: 1 (0x0001)
        Source CID: 65
&gt; ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 12           #22710 [hci0] 1664.421371
      L2CAP: Disconnection Response (0x07) ident 11 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Source CID: 65
&gt; HCI Event: Number of Completed Pac.. (0x13) plen 5  #22711 [hci0] 1664.424082
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 43
        Count: 1
&gt; HCI Event: Number of Completed Pac.. (0x13) plen 5  #22712 [hci0] 1664.425040
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 43
        Count: 1
&gt; ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 12           #22713 [hci0] 1664.426103
      L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 18 len 4
        PSM: 3 (0x0003)
        Source CID: 65
&lt; ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 16           #22714 [hci0] 1664.426186
      L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 18 len 8
        Destination CID: 66
        Source CID: 65
        Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
        Status: No further information available (0x0000)
&lt; ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 27           #22715 [hci0] 1664.426196
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 13 len 19
        Destination CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
          MTU: 1013
        Option: Retransmission and Flow Control (0x04) [mandatory]
          Mode: Basic (0x00)
          TX window size: 0
          Max transmit: 0
          Retransmission timeout: 0
          Monitor timeout: 0
          Maximum PDU size: 0
&gt; ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 16           #22716 [hci0] 1664.428804
      L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 12 len 8
        Destination CID: 66
        Source CID: 65
        Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
        Status: No further information available (0x0000)
*snip*

Fix is to check that channel is in state BT_DISCONN before deleting the
channel.

This bug was found while fuzzing Bluez's OBEX implementation using
Synopsys Defensics.

Reported-by: Matti Kamunen &lt;matti.kamunen@synopsys.com&gt;
Reported-by: Ari Timonen &lt;ari.timonen@synopsys.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matias Karhumaa &lt;matias.karhumaa@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: 6lowpan: search for destination address in all peers</title>
<updated>2019-07-26T07:12:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josua Mayer</name>
<email>josua.mayer@jm0.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-06T15:54:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=0eb799964db313c8b13a39a0c291da91c416daf3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0eb799964db313c8b13a39a0c291da91c416daf3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b188b03270b7f8568fc714101ce82fbf5e811c5a ]

Handle overlooked case where the target address is assigned to a peer
and neither route nor gateway exist.

For one peer, no checks are performed to see if it is meant to receive
packets for a given address.

As soon as there is a second peer however, checks are performed
to deal with routes and gateways for handling complex setups with
multiple hops to a target address.
This logic assumed that no route and no gateway imply that the
destination address can not be reached, which is false in case of a
direct peer.

Acked-by: Jukka Rissanen &lt;jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Michael Scott &lt;mike@foundries.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josua Mayer &lt;josua.mayer@jm0.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Fix faulty expression for minimum encryption key size check</title>
<updated>2019-07-10T07:52:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matias Karhumaa</name>
<email>matias.karhumaa@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-02T14:35:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=382abb7e21fb7f14f48b75a9553d434c28010688'/>
<id>urn:sha1:382abb7e21fb7f14f48b75a9553d434c28010688</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eca94432934fe5f141d084f2e36ee2c0e614cc04 upstream.

Fix minimum encryption key size check so that HCI_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE is
also allowed as stated in the comment.

This bug caused connection problems with devices having maximum
encryption key size of 7 octets (56-bit).

Fixes: 693cd8ce3f88 ("Bluetooth: Fix regression with minimum encryption key size alignment")
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203997
Signed-off-by: Matias Karhumaa &lt;matias.karhumaa@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Fix regression with minimum encryption key size alignment</title>
<updated>2019-06-25T03:34:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcel Holtmann</name>
<email>marcel@holtmann.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-22T13:47:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=caf37f6d6a29827acae2ae415645e96dff5c25f1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:caf37f6d6a29827acae2ae415645e96dff5c25f1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 693cd8ce3f882524a5d06f7800dd8492411877b3 upstream.

When trying to align the minimum encryption key size requirement for
Bluetooth connections, it turns out doing this in a central location in
the HCI connection handling code is not possible.

Original Bluetooth version up to 2.0 used a security model where the
L2CAP service would enforce authentication and encryption.  Starting
with Bluetooth 2.1 and Secure Simple Pairing that model has changed into
that the connection initiator is responsible for providing an encrypted
ACL link before any L2CAP communication can happen.

Now connecting Bluetooth 2.1 or later devices with Bluetooth 2.0 and
before devices are causing a regression.  The encryption key size check
needs to be moved out of the HCI connection handling into the L2CAP
channel setup.

To achieve this, the current check inside hci_conn_security() has been
moved into l2cap_check_enc_key_size() helper function and then called
from four decisions point inside L2CAP to cover all combinations of
Secure Simple Pairing enabled devices and device using legacy pairing
and legacy service security model.

Fixes: d5bb334a8e17 ("Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections")
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203643
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections</title>
<updated>2019-06-25T03:34:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcel Holtmann</name>
<email>marcel@holtmann.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-24T20:19:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=640a7f2a52610efbfdffcb4a8b165da954e86a3c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:640a7f2a52610efbfdffcb4a8b165da954e86a3c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections"</title>
<updated>2019-06-15T09:53:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-13T07:28:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=b528880e8b0167c34cb36c1b4e6165192f76267c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b528880e8b0167c34cb36c1b4e6165192f76267c</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 07e38998a19d72b916c39a983c19134522ae806b which is
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

Lots of people have reported issues with this patch, and as there does
not seem to be a fix going into Linus's kernel tree any time soon,
revert the commit in the stable trees so as to get people's machines
working properly again.

Reported-by: Vasily Khoruzhick &lt;anarsoul@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Hans de Goede &lt;hdegoede@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jeremy Cline &lt;jeremy@jcline.org&gt;
Cc: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Ignore CC events not matching the last HCI command</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:43:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>João Paulo Rechi Vita</name>
<email>jprvita@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-02T02:01:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=a3d50fb7ce931f08a2c6194fdc4c9a56c9ed4153'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a3d50fb7ce931f08a2c6194fdc4c9a56c9ed4153</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f80c5dad7b6467b884c445ffea45985793b4b2d0 ]

This commit makes the kernel not send the next queued HCI command until
a command complete arrives for the last HCI command sent to the
controller. This change avoids a problem with some buggy controllers
(seen on two SKUs of QCA9377) that send an extra command complete event
for the previous command after the kernel had already sent a new HCI
command to the controller.

The problem was reproduced when starting an active scanning procedure,
where an extra command complete event arrives for the LE_SET_RANDOM_ADDR
command. When this happends the kernel ends up not processing the
command complete for the following commmand, LE_SET_SCAN_PARAM, and
ultimately behaving as if a passive scanning procedure was being
performed, when in fact controller is performing an active scanning
procedure. This makes it impossible to discover BLE devices as no device
found events are sent to userspace.

This problem is reproducible on 100% of the attempts on the affected
controllers. The extra command complete event can be seen at timestamp
27.420131 on the btmon logs bellow.

Bluetooth monitor ver 5.50
= Note: Linux version 5.0.0+ (x86_64)                                  0.352340
= Note: Bluetooth subsystem version 2.22                               0.352343
= New Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Primary,USB,hci0)               [hci0] 0.352344
= Open Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84                                 [hci0] 0.352345
= Index Info: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Qualcomm)                      [hci0] 0.352346
@ MGMT Open: bluetoothd (privileged) version 1.14             {0x0001} 0.352347
@ MGMT Open: btmon (privileged) version 1.14                  {0x0002} 0.352366
@ MGMT Open: btmgmt (privileged) version 1.14                {0x0003} 27.302164
@ MGMT Command: Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1       {0x0003} [hci0] 27.302310
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
&lt; HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6   #1 [hci0] 27.302496
        Address: 15:60:F2:91:B2:24 (Non-Resolvable)
&gt; HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #2 [hci0] 27.419117
      LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
&lt; HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7  #3 [hci0] 27.419244
        Type: Active (0x01)
        Interval: 11.250 msec (0x0012)
        Window: 11.250 msec (0x0012)
        Own address type: Random (0x01)
        Filter policy: Accept all advertisement (0x00)
&gt; HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #4 [hci0] 27.420131
      LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
&lt; HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2      #5 [hci0] 27.420259
        Scanning: Enabled (0x01)
        Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01)
&gt; HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #6 [hci0] 27.420969
      LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
&gt; HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #7 [hci0] 27.421983
      LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
@ MGMT Event: Command Complete (0x0001) plen 4        {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422059
      Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0002} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0001} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)

Signed-off-by: João Paulo Rechi Vita &lt;jprvita@endlessm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
