<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/mm/page_poison.c, branch linux-6.1.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-6.1.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-6.1.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/'/>
<updated>2021-04-30T18:20:36Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>mm: page_poison: print page info when corruption is caught</title>
<updated>2021-04-30T18:20:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sergei Trofimovich</name>
<email>slyfox@gentoo.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-30T05:55:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=f58bd538e6a2deb2bcdfe527d9ed45643348a4e6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f58bd538e6a2deb2bcdfe527d9ed45643348a4e6</id>
<content type='text'>
When page_poison detects page corruption it's useful to see who freed a
page recently to have a guess where write-after-free corruption happens.

After this change corruption report has extra page data.
Example report from real corruption (includes only page_pwner part):

    pagealloc: memory corruption
    e00000014cd61d10: 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 1d d2 ff ff 0f 00 60  ........0......`
    e00000014cd61d20: b0 1d d2 ff ff 0f 00 60 90 fe 1c 00 08 00 00 20  .......`.......
    ...
    CPU: 1 PID: 220402 Comm: cc1plus Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5-00107-g9720c6f59ecf #245
    Hardware name: hp server rx3600, BIOS 04.03 04/08/2008
    ...
    Call Trace:
     [&lt;a000000100015210&gt;] show_stack+0x90/0xc0
     [&lt;a000000101163390&gt;] dump_stack+0x150/0x1c0
     [&lt;a0000001003f1e90&gt;] __kernel_unpoison_pages+0x410/0x440
     [&lt;a0000001003c2460&gt;] get_page_from_freelist+0x1460/0x2ca0
     [&lt;a0000001003c6be0&gt;] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3c0/0x660
     [&lt;a0000001003ed690&gt;] alloc_pages_vma+0xb0/0x500
     [&lt;a00000010037deb0&gt;] __handle_mm_fault+0x1230/0x1fe0
     [&lt;a00000010037ef70&gt;] handle_mm_fault+0x310/0x4e0
     [&lt;a00000010005dc70&gt;] ia64_do_page_fault+0x1f0/0xb80
     [&lt;a00000010000ca00&gt;] ia64_leave_kernel+0x0/0x270
    page_owner tracks the page as freed
    page allocated via order 0, migratetype Movable,
      gfp_mask 0x100dca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE|__GFP_ZERO), pid 37, ts 8173444098740
     __reset_page_owner+0x40/0x200
     free_pcp_prepare+0x4d0/0x600
     free_unref_page+0x20/0x1c0
     __put_page+0x110/0x1a0
     migrate_pages+0x16d0/0x1dc0
     compact_zone+0xfc0/0x1aa0
     proactive_compact_node+0xd0/0x1e0
     kcompactd+0x550/0x600
     kthread+0x2c0/0x2e0
     call_payload+0x50/0x80

Here we can see that page was freed by page migration but something
managed to write to it afterwards.

[slyfox@gentoo.org: s/dump_page_owner/dump_page/, per Vlastimil]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210407230800.1086854-1-slyfox@gentoo.org

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210404141735.2152984-1-slyfox@gentoo.org
Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich &lt;slyfox@gentoo.org&gt;
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: fix conflict with page poisoning</title>
<updated>2021-04-09T21:54:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Konovalov</name>
<email>andreyknvl@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-09T20:27:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=06b1f85588948bd4c772845e5d6891b8f6082248'/>
<id>urn:sha1:06b1f85588948bd4c772845e5d6891b8f6082248</id>
<content type='text'>
When page poisoning is enabled, it accesses memory that is marked as
poisoned by KASAN, which leas to false-positive KASAN reports.

Suppress the reports by adding KASAN annotations to unpoison_page()
(poison_page() already has them).

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2dc799014d31ac13fd97bd906bad33e16376fc67.1617118501.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan, mm: reset tags when accessing metadata</title>
<updated>2020-12-22T20:55:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Konovalov</name>
<email>andreyknvl@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-22T20:02:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=aa1ef4d7b3f67f7f17aa4aa34f5ec513c7e4db6c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aa1ef4d7b3f67f7f17aa4aa34f5ec513c7e4db6c</id>
<content type='text'>
Kernel allocator code accesses metadata for slab objects, that may lie
out-of-bounds of the object itself, or be accessed when an object is
freed.  Such accesses trigger tag faults and lead to false-positive
reports with hardware tag-based KASAN.

Software KASAN modes disable instrumentation for allocator code via
KASAN_SANITIZE Makefile macro, and rely on kasan_enable/disable_current()
annotations which are used to ignore KASAN reports.

With hardware tag-based KASAN neither of those options are available, as
it doesn't use compiler instrumetation, no tag faults are ignored, and MTE
is disabled after the first one.

Instead, reset tags when accessing metadata (currently only for SLUB).

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a0f3cefbc49f34c843b664110842de4db28179d0.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Branislav Rankov &lt;Branislav.Rankov@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov &lt;eugenis@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kevin Brodsky &lt;kevin.brodsky@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, page_poison: remove CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY</title>
<updated>2020-12-15T20:13:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlastimil Babka</name>
<email>vbabka@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-15T03:13:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=8f424750baaafcef229791882e879da01c9473b5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8f424750baaafcef229791882e879da01c9473b5</id>
<content type='text'>
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY skips the check on page alloc whether the
poison pattern was corrupted, suggesting a use-after-free.  The motivation
to introduce it in commit 8823b1dbc05f ("mm/page_poison.c: enable
PAGE_POISONING as a separate option") was to simply sanitize freed pages,
optimally together with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO.

These days we have an init_on_free=1 boot option, which makes this use
case of page poisoning redundant.  For sanitizing, writing zeroes is
sufficient, there is pretty much no benefit from writing the 0xAA poison
pattern to freed pages, without checking it back on alloc.  Thus, remove
this option and suggest init_on_free instead in the main config's help.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113104033.22907-5-vbabka@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mateusz Nosek &lt;mateusznosek0@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, page_poison: use static key more efficiently</title>
<updated>2020-12-15T20:13:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlastimil Babka</name>
<email>vbabka@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-15T03:13:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=8db26a3d47354ce7271a8cab03cd65b9d3d610b9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8db26a3d47354ce7271a8cab03cd65b9d3d610b9</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 11c9c7edae06 ("mm/page_poison.c: replace bool variable with static
key") changed page_poisoning_enabled() to a static key check.  However,
the function is not inlined, so each check still involves a function call
with overhead not eliminated when page poisoning is disabled.

Analogically to how debug_pagealloc is handled, this patch converts
page_poisoning_enabled() back to boolean check, and introduces
page_poisoning_enabled_static() for fast paths.  Both functions are
inlined.

The function kernel_poison_pages() is also called unconditionally and does
the static key check inside.  Remove it from there and put it to callers.
Also split it to two functions kernel_poison_pages() and
kernel_unpoison_pages() instead of the confusing bool parameter.

Also optimize the check that enables page poisoning instead of
debug_pagealloc for architectures without proper debug_pagealloc support.
Move the check to init_mem_debugging_and_hardening() to enable a single
static key instead of having two static branches in
page_poisoning_enabled_static().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113104033.22907-3-vbabka@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mateusz Nosek &lt;mateusznosek0@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/page_poison.c: replace bool variable with static key</title>
<updated>2020-10-16T18:11:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mateusz Nosek</name>
<email>mateusznosek0@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-16T03:07:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=11c9c7edae06da789abfdeefe5123162a3f1c7dc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:11c9c7edae06da789abfdeefe5123162a3f1c7dc</id>
<content type='text'>
Variable 'want_page_poisoning' is a switch deciding if page poisoning
should be enabled.  This patch changes it to be static key.

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Nosek &lt;mateusznosek0@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi &lt;n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com&gt;
Cc: Oscar Salvador &lt;OSalvador@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921152931.938-1-mateusznosek0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/page_poison.c: fix a typo in a comment</title>
<updated>2019-09-24T22:54:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe JAILLET</name>
<email>christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-23T22:34:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=dbf7684e29d171180346b25d2a124c2a0adf563e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dbf7684e29d171180346b25d2a124c2a0adf563e</id>
<content type='text'>
s/posioned/poisoned/

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190721180908.6534-1-christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET &lt;christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>page_poison: play nicely with KASAN</title>
<updated>2019-03-06T05:07:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Qian Cai</name>
<email>cai@lca.pw</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-05T23:41:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=4117992df66a26fa33908b4969e04801534baab1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4117992df66a26fa33908b4969e04801534baab1</id>
<content type='text'>
KASAN does not play well with the page poisoning (CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING).
It triggers false positives in the allocation path:

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memchr_inv+0x2ea/0x330
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88881f800000 by task swapper/0
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #54
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xe0/0x19a
   print_address_description.cold.2+0x9/0x28b
   kasan_report.cold.3+0x7a/0xb5
   __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20
   memchr_inv+0x2ea/0x330
   kernel_poison_pages+0x103/0x3d5
   get_page_from_freelist+0x15e7/0x4d90

because KASAN has not yet unpoisoned the shadow page for allocation
before it checks memchr_inv() but only found a stale poison pattern.

Also, false positives in free path,

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kernel_poison_pages+0x29e/0x3d5
  Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8888112cc000 by task swapper/0/1
  CPU: 5 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #55
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xe0/0x19a
   print_address_description.cold.2+0x9/0x28b
   kasan_report.cold.3+0x7a/0xb5
   check_memory_region+0x22d/0x250
   memset+0x28/0x40
   kernel_poison_pages+0x29e/0x3d5
   __free_pages_ok+0x75f/0x13e0

due to KASAN adds poisoned redzones around slab objects, but the page
poisoning needs to poison the whole page.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190114233405.67843-1-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai &lt;cai@lca.pw&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mst/vhost</title>
<updated>2018-11-01T21:42:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-01T21:42:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=b5b1de3537e2cd8f52971224a1be24bb3ce34a65'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b5b1de3537e2cd8f52971224a1be24bb3ce34a65</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull virtio/vhost updates from Michael Tsirkin:
 "Fixes and tweaks:

   - virtio balloon page hinting support

   - vhost scsi control queue

   - misc fixes"

* tag 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mst/vhost:
  MAINTAINERS: remove reference to bogus vsock file
  vhost/scsi: Use common handling code in request queue handler
  vhost/scsi: Extract common handling code from control queue handler
  vhost/scsi: Respond to control queue operations
  vhost/scsi: truncate T10 PI iov_iter to prot_bytes
  virtio-balloon: VIRTIO_BALLOON_F_PAGE_POISON
  mm/page_poison: expose page_poisoning_enabled to kernel modules
  virtio-balloon: VIRTIO_BALLOON_F_FREE_PAGE_HINT
  kvm_config: add CONFIG_VIRTIO_MENU
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>memblock: rename free_all_bootmem to memblock_free_all</title>
<updated>2018-10-31T15:54:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Rapoport</name>
<email>rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-30T22:09:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=c6ffc5ca8fb311a89cb6de5c31b6511308ddac8d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c6ffc5ca8fb311a89cb6de5c31b6511308ddac8d</id>
<content type='text'>
The conversion is done using

sed -i 's@free_all_bootmem@memblock_free_all@' \
    $(git grep -l free_all_bootmem)

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536927045-23536-26-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Zankel &lt;chris@zankel.net&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: Greentime Hu &lt;green.hu@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Guan Xuetao &lt;gxt@pku.edu.cn&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" &lt;jejb@parisc-linux.org&gt;
Cc: Jonas Bonn &lt;jonas@southpole.se&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Ley Foon Tan &lt;lftan@altera.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Salter &lt;msalter@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Matt Turner &lt;mattst88@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Michal Simek &lt;monstr@monstr.eu&gt;
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt &lt;palmer@sifive.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Burton &lt;paul.burton@mips.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Kuo &lt;rkuo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@libc.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Serge Semin &lt;fancer.lancer@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
