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<title>kernel/lib/asn1_decoder.c, branch linux-4.1.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-4.1.y</id>
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<updated>2018-01-17T17:55:22Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ASN.1: check for error from ASN1_OP_END__ACT actions</title>
<updated>2018-01-17T17:55:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-08T15:13:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c75c77e330f1d619a1e505620fa3d4ebca9b4b8e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 81a7be2cd69b412ab6aeacfe5ebf1bb6e5bce955 ]

asn1_ber_decoder() was ignoring errors from actions associated with the
opcodes ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_ACT, ASN1_OP_END_SET_ACT,
ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF_ACT, and ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF_ACT.  In practice, this
meant the pkcs7_note_signed_info() action (since that was the only user
of those opcodes).  Fix it by checking for the error, just like the
decoder does for actions associated with the other opcodes.

This bug allowed users to leak slab memory by repeatedly trying to add a
specially crafted "pkcs7_test" key (requires CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY).

In theory, this bug could also be used to bypass module signature
verification, by providing a PKCS#7 message that is misparsed such that
a signature's -&gt;authattrs do not contain its -&gt;msgdigest.  But it
doesn't seem practical in normal cases, due to restrictions on the
format of the -&gt;authattrs.

Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: fix NULL pointer dereference during ASN.1 parsing [ver #2]</title>
<updated>2017-12-07T02:20:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-07T22:29:02Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:33156b4899ee8ffeeca6151b5888a3453c53f42e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 624f5ab8720b3371367327a822c267699c1823b8 ]

syzkaller reported a NULL pointer dereference in asn1_ber_decoder().  It
can be reproduced by the following command, assuming
CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY=y:

        keyctl add pkcs7_test desc '' @s

The bug is that if the data buffer is empty, an integer underflow occurs
in the following check:

        if (unlikely(dp &gt;= datalen - 1))
                goto data_overrun_error;

This results in the NULL data pointer being dereferenced.

Fix it by checking for 'datalen - dp &lt; 2' instead.

Also fix the similar check for 'dp &gt;= datalen - n' later in the same
function.  That one possibly could result in a buffer overread.

The NULL pointer dereference was reproducible using the "pkcs7_test" key
type but not the "asymmetric" key type because the "asymmetric" key type
checks for a 0-length payload before calling into the ASN.1 decoder but
the "pkcs7_test" key type does not.

The bug report was:

    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
    IP: asn1_ber_decoder+0x17f/0xe60 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233
    PGD 7b708067 P4D 7b708067 PUD 7b6ee067 PMD 0
    Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
    Modules linked in:
    CPU: 0 PID: 522 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8 #7
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.3-20171021_125229-anatol 04/01/2014
    task: ffff9b6b3798c040 task.stack: ffff9b6b37970000
    RIP: 0010:asn1_ber_decoder+0x17f/0xe60 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233
    RSP: 0018:ffff9b6b37973c78 EFLAGS: 00010216
    RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000021c
    RDX: ffffffff814a04ed RSI: ffffb1524066e000 RDI: ffffffff910759e0
    RBP: ffff9b6b37973d60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff9b6b3caa4180
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000002
    R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
    FS:  00007f10ed1f2700(0000) GS:ffff9b6b3ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000007b6f3000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
    Call Trace:
     pkcs7_parse_message+0xee/0x240 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c:139
     verify_pkcs7_signature+0x33/0x180 certs/system_keyring.c:216
     pkcs7_preparse+0x41/0x70 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c:63
     key_create_or_update+0x180/0x530 security/keys/key.c:855
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0xbf/0x250 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
    RIP: 0033:0x4585c9
    RSP: 002b:00007f10ed1f1bd8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f8
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f10ed1f2700 RCX: 00000000004585c9
    RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020008ffb RDI: 0000000020008000
    RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00007fff1b2260ae
    R13: 00007fff1b2260af R14: 00007f10ed1f2700 R15: 0000000000000000
    Code: dd ca ff 48 8b 45 88 48 83 e8 01 4c 39 f0 0f 86 a8 07 00 00 e8 53 dd ca ff 49 8d 46 01 48 89 85 58 ff ff ff 48 8b 85 60 ff ff ff &lt;42&gt; 0f b6 0c 30 89 c8 88 8d 75 ff ff ff 83 e0 1f 89 8d 28 ff ff
    RIP: asn1_ber_decoder+0x17f/0xe60 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233 RSP: ffff9b6b37973c78
    CR2: 0000000000000000

Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: fix out-of-bounds read during ASN.1 parsing</title>
<updated>2017-12-07T02:19:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-02T00:47:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5a3b40184c18e8bf3797d5850ffab9026f2f304c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2eb9eabf1e868fda15808954fb29b0f105ed65f1 ]

syzkaller with KASAN reported an out-of-bounds read in
asn1_ber_decoder().  It can be reproduced by the following command,
assuming CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y:

    keyctl add asymmetric desc $'\x30\x30' @s

The bug is that the length of an ASN.1 data value isn't validated in the
case where it is encoded using the short form, causing the decoder to
read past the end of the input buffer.  Fix it by validating the length.

The bug report was:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in asn1_ber_decoder+0x10cb/0x1730 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233
    Read of size 1 at addr ffff88003cccfa02 by task syz-executor0/6818

    CPU: 1 PID: 6818 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7-00008-g5f479447d983 #2
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
     __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
     dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b lib/dump_stack.c:52
     print_address_description+0x79/0x2a0 mm/kasan/report.c:252
     kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
     kasan_report+0x236/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
     __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
     asn1_ber_decoder+0x10cb/0x1730 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233
     x509_cert_parse+0x1db/0x650 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:89
     x509_key_preparse+0x64/0x7a0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
     asymmetric_key_preparse+0xcb/0x1a0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
     key_create_or_update+0x347/0xb20 security/keys/key.c:855
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0x1cd/0x340 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
    RIP: 0033:0x447c89
    RSP: 002b:00007fca7a5d3bd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f8
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fca7a5d46cc RCX: 0000000000447c89
    RDX: 0000000020006f4a RSI: 0000000020006000 RDI: 0000000020001ff5
    RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: fffffffffffffffd R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fca7a5d49c0 R15: 00007fca7a5d4700

Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/asn1_decoder.c: kernel-doc warning fix</title>
<updated>2014-06-04T23:54:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Fabian Frederick</name>
<email>fabf@skynet.be</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-04T23:12:01Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:548bbff9818c7ddd325b47face1c9bf9a53ad0c7</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick &lt;fabf@skynet.be&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux</title>
<updated>2012-12-19T15:55:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-19T15:55:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7a684c452e2589f3ddd7e2d466b4f747d3715ad9</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull module update from Rusty Russell:
 "Nothing all that exciting; a new module-from-fd syscall for those who
  want to verify the source of the module (ChromeOS) and/or use standard
  IMA on it or other security hooks."

* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux:
  MODSIGN: Fix kbuild output when using default extra_certificates
  MODSIGN: Avoid using .incbin in C source
  modules: don't hand 0 to vmalloc.
  module: Remove a extra null character at the top of module-&gt;strtab.
  ASN.1: Use the ASN1_LONG_TAG and ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH constants
  ASN.1: Define indefinite length marker constant
  moduleparam: use __UNIQUE_ID()
  __UNIQUE_ID()
  MODSIGN: Add modules_sign make target
  powerpc: add finit_module syscall.
  ima: support new kernel module syscall
  add finit_module syscall to asm-generic
  ARM: add finit_module syscall to ARM
  security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook
  module: add flags arg to sys_finit_module()
  module: add syscall to load module from fd
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ASN.1: Use the ASN1_LONG_TAG and ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH constants</title>
<updated>2012-12-14T02:36:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-05T01:25:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:99cca91e370ab9224755365dda98b78eb5a5417f</id>
<content type='text'>
Use the ASN1_LONG_TAG and ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH constants in the ASN.1
general decoder instead of the equivalent numbers.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ASN.1: Fix an indefinite length skip error</title>
<updated>2012-12-05T00:57:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-22T14:05:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f3537f91f9be2ce5fcbaa1aa6d787ad0436daec6</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix an error in asn1_find_indefinite_length() whereby small definite length
elements of size 0x7f are incorrecly classified as non-small.  Without this
fix, an error will be given as the length of the length will be perceived as
being very much greater than the maximum supported size.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>X.509: Fix indefinite length element skip error handling</title>
<updated>2012-10-10T09:36:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-04T13:21:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dbadc17683e6c673a69b236c0f041b931cc55c42</id>
<content type='text'>
asn1_find_indefinite_length() returns an error indicator of -1, which the
caller asn1_ber_decoder() places in a size_t (which is usually unsigned) and
then checks to see whether it is less than 0 (which it can't be).  This can
lead to the following warning:

	lib/asn1_decoder.c:320 asn1_ber_decoder()
		warn: unsigned 'len' is never less than zero.

Instead, asn1_find_indefinite_length() update the caller's idea of the data
cursor and length separately from returning the error code.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder</title>
<updated>2012-10-08T03:20:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-24T16:11:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:42d5ec27f873c654a68f7f865dcd7737513e9508</id>
<content type='text'>
Add an ASN.1 BER/DER/CER decoder.  This uses the bytecode from the ASN.1
compiler in the previous patch to inform it as to what to expect to find in the
encoded byte stream.  The output from the compiler also tells it what functions
to call on what tags, thus allowing the caller to retrieve information.

The decoder is called as follows:

	int asn1_decoder(const struct asn1_decoder *decoder,
			 void *context,
			 const unsigned char *data,
			 size_t datalen);

The decoder argument points to the bytecode from the ASN.1 compiler.  context
is the caller's context and is passed to the action functions.  data and
datalen define the byte stream to be decoded.

Note that the decoder is currently limited to datalen being less than 64K.
This reduces the amount of stack space used by the decoder because ASN.1 is a
nested construct.  Similarly, the decoder is limited to a maximum of 10 levels
of constructed data outside of a leaf node also in an effort to keep stack
usage down.

These restrictions can be raised if necessary.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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