kernel/include, branch linux-5.14.y

PCI/MSI: Deal with devices lying about their MSI mask capability

2021-11-21T12:49:09Z

commit 2226667a145db2e1f314d7f57fd644fe69863ab9 upstream. It appears that some devices are lying about their mask capability, pretending that they don't have it, while they actually do. The net result is that now that we don't enable MSIs on such endpoint. Add a new per-device flag to deal with this. Further patches will make use of it, sadly. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211104180130.3825416-2-maz@kernel.org Cc: Bjorn Helgaas Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

block: Add a helper to validate the block size

2021-11-21T12:49:08Z

commit 570b1cac477643cbf01a45fa5d018430a1fddbce upstream. There are some duplicated codes to validate the block size in block drivers. This limitation actually comes from block layer, so this patch tries to add a new block layer helper for that. Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026144015.188-2-xieyongji@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "sched: Add wrapper for get_wchan() to keep task blocked"

2021-11-18T13:01:34Z

This reverts commit e9ede14c116f1a6246eee89d320d60a90a86b5d5 which is commit 42a20f86dc19f9282d974df0ba4d226c865ab9dd upstream. It has been reported to be causing problems, and is being reworked upstream and has been dropped from the current 5.15.y stable queue until it gets resolved. Reported-by: Chris Rankin Reported-by: Thorsten Leemhuis Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ed000478-2a60-0066-c337-a04bffc112b1@leemhuis.info Cc: Stephen Rothwell Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven Cc: Russell King (Oracle) Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

arch/cc: Introduce a function to check for confidential computing features

2021-11-17T10:04:52Z

commit 46b49b12f3fc5e1347dba37d4639e2165f447871 upstream. In preparation for other confidential computing technologies, introduce a generic helper function, cc_platform_has(), that can be used to check for specific active confidential computing attributes, like memory encryption. This is intended to eliminate having to add multiple technology-specific checks to the code (e.g. if (sev_active() || tdx_active() || ... ). [ bp: s/_CC_PLATFORM_H/_LINUX_CC_PLATFORM_H/g ] Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-3-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

PCI: Add PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PAYLOAD_* macros

2021-11-17T10:04:51Z

commit 460275f124fb072dca218a6b43b6370eebbab20d upstream. Define a macro PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PAYLOAD_* for every possible Max Payload Size in linux/pci_regs.h, in the same style as PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_READRQ_*. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211005180952.6812-2-kabel@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár Signed-off-by: Marek Behún Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi Reviewed-by: Marek Behún Reviewed-by: Bjorn Helgaas Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf, cgroups: Fix cgroup v2 fallback on v1/v2 mixed mode

2021-11-17T10:04:46Z

[ Upstream commit 8520e224f547cd070c7c8f97b1fc6d58cff7ccaa ] Fix cgroup v1 interference when non-root cgroup v2 BPF programs are used. Back in the days, commit bd1060a1d671 ("sock, cgroup: add sock->sk_cgroup") embedded per-socket cgroup information into sock->sk_cgrp_data and in order to save 8 bytes in struct sock made both mutually exclusive, that is, when cgroup v1 socket tagging (e.g. net_cls/net_prio) is used, then cgroup v2 falls back to the root cgroup in sock_cgroup_ptr() (&cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp). The assumption made was "there is no reason to mix the two and this is in line with how legacy and v2 compatibility is handled" as stated in bd1060a1d671. However, with Kubernetes more widely supporting cgroups v2 as well nowadays, this assumption no longer holds, and the possibility of the v1/v2 mixed mode with the v2 root fallback being hit becomes a real security issue. Many of the cgroup v2 BPF programs are also used for policy enforcement, just to pick _one_ example, that is, to programmatically deny socket related system calls like connect(2) or bind(2). A v2 root fallback would implicitly cause a policy bypass for the affected Pods. In production environments, we have recently seen this case due to various circumstances: i) a different 3rd party agent and/or ii) a container runtime such as [0] in the user's environment configuring legacy cgroup v1 net_cls tags, which triggered implicitly mentioned root fallback. Another case is Kubernetes projects like kind [1] which create Kubernetes nodes in a container and also add cgroup namespaces to the mix, meaning programs which are attached to the cgroup v2 root of the cgroup namespace get attached to a non-root cgroup v2 path from init namespace point of view. And the latter's root is out of reach for agents on a kind Kubernetes node to configure. Meaning, any entity on the node setting cgroup v1 net_cls tag will trigger the bypass despite cgroup v2 BPF programs attached to the namespace root. Generally, this mutual exclusiveness does not hold anymore in today's user environments and makes cgroup v2 usage from BPF side fragile and unreliable. This fix adds proper struct cgroup pointer for the cgroup v2 case to struct sock_cgroup_data in order to address these issues; this implicitly also fixes the tradeoffs being made back then with regards to races and refcount leaks as stated in bd1060a1d671, and removes the fallback, so that cgroup v2 BPF programs always operate as expected. [0] https://github.com/nestybox/sysbox/ [1] https://kind.sigs.k8s.io/ Fixes: bd1060a1d671 ("sock, cgroup: add sock->sk_cgroup") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev Acked-by: Tejun Heo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210913230759.2313-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net, neigh: Enable state migration between NUD_PERMANENT and NTF_USE

2021-11-17T10:04:46Z

[ Upstream commit 3dc20f4762c62d3b3f0940644881ed818aa7b2f5 ] Currently, it is not possible to migrate a neighbor entry between NUD_PERMANENT state and NTF_USE flag with a dynamic NUD state from a user space control plane. Similarly, it is not possible to add/remove NTF_EXT_LEARNED flag from an existing neighbor entry in combination with NTF_USE flag. This is due to the latter directly calling into neigh_event_send() without any meta data updates as happening in __neigh_update(). Thus, to enable this use case, extend the latter with a NEIGH_UPDATE_F_USE flag where we break the NUD_PERMANENT state in particular so that a latter neigh_event_send() is able to re-resolve a neighbor entry. Before fix, NUD_PERMANENT -> NUD_* & NTF_USE: # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a # ./ip/ip n 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a PERMANENT [...] # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn # ./ip/ip n 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a PERMANENT [...] As can be seen, despite the admin-triggered replace, the entry remains in the NUD_PERMANENT state. After fix, NUD_PERMANENT -> NUD_* & NTF_USE: # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a # ./ip/ip n 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a PERMANENT [...] # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn # ./ip/ip n 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a extern_learn REACHABLE [...] # ./ip/ip n 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a extern_learn STALE [...] # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a # ./ip/ip n 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a PERMANENT [...] After the fix, the admin-triggered replace switches to a dynamic state from the NTF_USE flag which triggered a new neighbor resolution. Likewise, we can transition back from there, if needed, into NUD_PERMANENT. Similar before/after behavior can be observed for below transitions: Before fix, NTF_USE -> NTF_USE | NTF_EXT_LEARNED -> NTF_USE: # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use # ./ip/ip n 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE [...] # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn # ./ip/ip n 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE [...] After fix, NTF_USE -> NTF_USE | NTF_EXT_LEARNED -> NTF_USE: # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use # ./ip/ip n 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE [...] # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn # ./ip/ip n 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a extern_learn REACHABLE [...] # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use # ./ip/ip n 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE [..] Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

posix-cpu-timers: Clear task::posix_cputimers_work in copy_process()

2021-11-17T10:04:45Z

commit ca7752caeaa70bd31d1714af566c9809688544af upstream. copy_process currently copies task_struct.posix_cputimers_work as-is. If a timer interrupt arrives while handling clone and before dup_task_struct completes then the child task will have: 1. posix_cputimers_work.scheduled = true 2. posix_cputimers_work.work queued. copy_process clears task_struct.task_works, so (2) will have no effect and posix_cpu_timers_work will never run (not to mention it doesn't make sense for two tasks to share a common linked list). Since posix_cpu_timers_work never runs, posix_cputimers_work.scheduled is never cleared. Since scheduled is set, future timer interrupts will skip scheduling work, with the ultimate result that the task will never receive timer expirations. Together, the complete flow is: 1. Task 1 calls clone(), enters kernel. 2. Timer interrupt fires, schedules task work on Task 1. 2a. task_struct.posix_cputimers_work.scheduled = true 2b. task_struct.posix_cputimers_work.work added to task_struct.task_works. 3. dup_task_struct() copies Task 1 to Task 2. 4. copy_process() clears task_struct.task_works for Task 2. 5. Future timer interrupts on Task 2 see task_struct.posix_cputimers_work.scheduled = true and skip scheduling work. Fix this by explicitly clearing contents of task_struct.posix_cputimers_work in copy_process(). This was never meant to be shared or inherited across tasks in the first place. Fixes: 1fb497dd0030 ("posix-cpu-timers: Provide mechanisms to defer timer handling to task_work") Reported-by: Rhys Hiltner Signed-off-by: Michael Pratt Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211101210615.716522-1-mpratt@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

seq_file: fix passing wrong private data

2021-11-17T10:04:43Z

[ Upstream commit 10a6de19cad6efb9b49883513afb810dc265fca2 ] DEFINE_PROC_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE() is supposed to be used to define a series of functions and variables to register proc file easily. And the users can use proc_create_data() to pass their own private data and get it via seq->private in the callback. Unfortunately, the proc file system use PDE_DATA() to get private data instead of inode->i_private. So fix it. Fortunately, there only one user of it which does not pass any private data, so this bug does not break any in-tree codes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211029032638.84884-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com Fixes: 97a32539b956 ("proc: convert everything to "struct proc_ops"") Signed-off-by: Muchun Song Cc: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Stephen Rothwell Cc: Florent Revest Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf, sockmap: sk_skb data_end access incorrect when src_reg = dst_reg

2021-11-17T10:04:42Z

[ Upstream commit b2c4618162ec615a15883a804cce7e27afecfa58 ] The current conversion of skb->data_end reads like this: ; data_end = (void*)(long)skb->data_end; 559: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r2 +200) ; r1 = skb->data 560: (61) r11 = *(u32 *)(r2 +112) ; r11 = skb->len 561: (0f) r1 += r11 562: (61) r11 = *(u32 *)(r2 +116) 563: (1f) r1 -= r11 But similar to the case in 84f44df664e9 ("bpf: sock_ops sk access may stomp registers when dst_reg = src_reg"), the code will read an incorrect skb->len when src == dst. In this case we end up generating this xlated code: ; data_end = (void*)(long)skb->data_end; 559: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +200) ; r1 = skb->data 560: (61) r11 = *(u32 *)(r1 +112) ; r11 = (skb->data)->len 561: (0f) r1 += r11 562: (61) r11 = *(u32 *)(r1 +116) 563: (1f) r1 -= r11 ... where line 560 is the reading 4B of (skb->data + 112) instead of the intended skb->len Here the skb pointer in r1 gets set to skb->data and the later deref for skb->len ends up following skb->data instead of skb. This fixes the issue similarly to the patch mentioned above by creating an additional temporary variable and using to store the register when dst_reg = src_reg. We name the variable bpf_temp_reg and place it in the cb context for sk_skb. Then we restore from the temp to ensure nothing is lost. Fixes: 16137b09a66f2 ("bpf: Compute data_end dynamically with JIT code") Signed-off-by: Jussi Maki Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211103204736.248403-6-john.fastabend@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin