<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/include/net/sctp/sm.h, branch linux-4.1.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-4.1.y</id>
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<updated>2014-11-24T09:28:48Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>new helper: memcpy_from_msg()</title>
<updated>2014-11-24T09:28:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-07T01:25:44Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks</title>
<updated>2014-10-14T16:46:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-09T20:55:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9de7922bc709eee2f609cd01d98aaedc4cf5ea74</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:

skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
 end:0x440 dev:&lt;NULL&gt;
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 [&lt;ffffffff8144fb1c&gt;] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffffa01ea1c3&gt;] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffa01eadaf&gt;] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffff8152d025&gt;] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffffa01e0038&gt;] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffa01e3751&gt;] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffff8147645d&gt;] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffffa01e6b22&gt;] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffa01e8393&gt;] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffa01ee986&gt;] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffa01fcc42&gt;] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffa01d5123&gt;] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
 [&lt;ffffffff8148bdc9&gt;] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
 [&lt;ffffffff81496d10&gt;] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [&lt;ffffffff8148bf86&gt;] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
 [&lt;ffffffff81496d10&gt;] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [&lt;ffffffff81496ded&gt;] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
 [&lt;ffffffff81497078&gt;] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
 [&lt;ffffffff8149653d&gt;] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
 [&lt;ffffffff81496ac5&gt;] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
 [&lt;ffffffff8145c88b&gt;] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
 [&lt;ffffffff81460588&gt;] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60

This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------&gt;
  &lt;----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------&gt;
  &lt;-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------&gt;

... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...

  1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
  2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)

... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.

The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.

In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.

When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...

  length = ntohs(asconf_param-&gt;param_hdr.length);
  asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;

... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.

Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Fix FSF address in file headers</title>
<updated>2013-12-06T17:37:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Kirsher</name>
<email>jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-12-06T14:28:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4b2f13a25133b115eb56771bd4a8e71a82aea968</id>
<content type='text'>
Several files refer to an old address for the Free Software Foundation
in the file header comment.  Resolve by replacing the address with
the URL &lt;http://www.gnu.org/licenses/&gt; so that we do not have to keep
updating the header comments anytime the address changes.

CC: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
CC: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher &lt;jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: trivial: update bug report in header comment</title>
<updated>2013-08-09T18:33:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-08-06T19:18:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=477143e3fece3dc12629bb1ebd7b47e8e6e72b2b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:477143e3fece3dc12629bb1ebd7b47e8e6e72b2b</id>
<content type='text'>
With the restructuring of the lksctp.org site, we only allow bug
reports through the SCTP mailing list linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org,
not via SF, as SF is only used for web hosting and nothing more.
While at it, also remove the obvious statement that bugs will be
fixed and incooperated into the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: trivial: update mailing list address</title>
<updated>2013-07-25T00:53:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-23T12:51:47Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:91705c61b52029ab5da67a15a23eef08667bf40e</id>
<content type='text'>
The SCTP mailing list address to send patches or questions
to is linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org and not
lksctp-developers@lists.sourceforge.net anymore. Therefore,
update all occurences.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: send abort chunk when max_retrans exceeded</title>
<updated>2012-11-20T20:50:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Neil Horman</name>
<email>nhorman@tuxdriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-11-20T10:14:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:de4594a51c904ddcd6c3a6cdd100f7c1d94d3239</id>
<content type='text'>
In the event that an association exceeds its max_retrans attempts, we should
send an ABORT chunk indicating that we are closing the assocation as a result.
Because of the nature of the error, its unlikely to be received, but its a nice
clean way to close the association if it does make it through, and it will give
anyone watching via tcpdump a clue as to what happened.

Change notes:
v2)
	* Removed erroneous changes from sctp_make_violation_parmlen

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
CC: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
CC: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Push struct net down into all of the state machine functions</title>
<updated>2012-08-15T06:30:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-08-07T07:28:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:24cb81a6a91288fcba19548944729ea906eb5e2a</id>
<content type='text'>
There are a handle of state machine functions primarily those dealing
with processing INIT packets where there is neither a valid endpoint nor
a valid assoication from which to derive a struct net.  Therefore add
struct net * to the parameter list of sctp_state_fn_t and update all of
the state machine functions.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Push struct net down to sctp_chunk_event_lookup</title>
<updated>2012-08-15T06:30:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-08-07T07:25:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:55e26eb95a5345a5796babac98de6d6c42771df1</id>
<content type='text'>
This trickles up through sctp_sm_lookup_event up to sctp_do_sm
and up further into sctp_primitiv_NAME before the code reaches
places where struct net can be reliably found.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: implement event notification SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT</title>
<updated>2011-04-21T17:35:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Yongjun</name>
<email>yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-04-17T17:29:03Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e1cdd553d482ceb083fac5e544e8702fccefbfd6</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch implement event notification SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT.
SCTP Socket API Extensions:

  6.1.9. SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT

  When the SCTP stack has no more user data to send or retransmit, this
  notification is given to the user. Also, at the time when a user app
  subscribes to this event, if there is no data to be sent or
  retransmit, the stack will immediately send up this notification.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: make heartbeat information in sctp_make_heartbeat()</title>
<updated>2011-04-20T08:51:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Yongjun</name>
<email>yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-04-19T21:31:47Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:92c73af58e9f1b487322ce25a7a67889c9d91343</id>
<content type='text'>
Make heartbeat information in sctp_make_heartbeat() instead
of make it in sctp_sf_heartbeat() directly for common using.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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