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<title>kernel/include/net/sctp/sctp.h, branch linux-3.17.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-3.17.y</id>
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<updated>2014-11-21T17:23:16Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: fix panic on duplicate ASCONF chunks</title>
<updated>2014-11-21T17:23:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-09T20:55:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dd8aaf1f380e008044857d7d2293e8e2824772b8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b69040d8e39f20d5215a03502a8e8b4c6ab78395 upstream.

When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------&gt;
  &lt;----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------&gt;
  &lt;-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b -----------------&gt;

... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!

The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.

Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():

While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54b1
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.

Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk-&gt;list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.

Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@fedoraproject.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: fix ABI mismatch through sctp_assoc_to_state helper</title>
<updated>2014-08-30T03:31:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-28T13:28:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:38ab1fa981d543e1b00f4ffbce4ddb480cd2effe</id>
<content type='text'>
Since SCTP day 1, that is, 19b55a2af145 ("Initial commit") from lksctp
tree, the official &lt;netinet/sctp.h&gt; header carries a copy of enum
sctp_sstat_state that looks like (compared to the current in-kernel
enumeration):

  User definition:                     Kernel definition:

  enum sctp_sstat_state {              typedef enum {
    SCTP_EMPTY             = 0,          &lt;removed&gt;
    SCTP_CLOSED            = 1,          SCTP_STATE_CLOSED            = 0,
    SCTP_COOKIE_WAIT       = 2,          SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_WAIT       = 1,
    SCTP_COOKIE_ECHOED     = 3,          SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED     = 2,
    SCTP_ESTABLISHED       = 4,          SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED       = 3,
    SCTP_SHUTDOWN_PENDING  = 5,          SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING  = 4,
    SCTP_SHUTDOWN_SENT     = 6,          SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_SENT     = 5,
    SCTP_SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED = 7,          SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED = 6,
    SCTP_SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT = 8,          SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT = 7,
  };                                   } sctp_state_t;

This header was later on also placed into the uapi, so that user space
programs can compile without having &lt;netinet/sctp.h&gt;, but the shipped
with &lt;linux/sctp.h&gt; instead.

While RFC6458 under 8.2.1.Association Status (SCTP_STATUS) says that
sstat_state can range from SCTP_CLOSED to SCTP_SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT, we
nevertheless have a what it appears to be dummy SCTP_EMPTY state from
the very early days.

While it seems to do just nothing, commit 0b8f9e25b0aa ("sctp: remove
completely unsed EMPTY state") did the right thing and removed this dead
code. That however, causes an off-by-one when the user asks the SCTP
stack via SCTP_STATUS API and checks for the current socket state thus
yielding possibly undefined behaviour in applications as they expect
the kernel to tell the right thing.

The enumeration had to be changed however as based on the current socket
state, we access a function pointer lookup-table through this. Therefore,
I think the best way to deal with this is just to add a helper function
sctp_assoc_to_state() to encapsulate the off-by-one quirk.

Reported-by: Tristan Su &lt;sooqing@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 0b8f9e25b0aa ("sctp: remove completely unsed EMPTY state")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Fixup v4mapped behaviour to comply with Sock API</title>
<updated>2014-08-01T04:49:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Gunthorpe</name>
<email>jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-30T18:40:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:299ee123e19889d511092347f5fc14db0f10e3a6</id>
<content type='text'>
The SCTP socket extensions API document describes the v4mapping option as
follows:

8.1.15.  Set/Clear IPv4 Mapped Addresses (SCTP_I_WANT_MAPPED_V4_ADDR)

   This socket option is a Boolean flag which turns on or off the
   mapping of IPv4 addresses.  If this option is turned on, then IPv4
   addresses will be mapped to V6 representation.  If this option is
   turned off, then no mapping will be done of V4 addresses and a user
   will receive both PF_INET6 and PF_INET type addresses on the socket.
   See [RFC3542] for more details on mapped V6 addresses.

This description isn't really in line with what the code does though.

Introduce addr_to_user (renamed addr_v4map), which should be called
before any sockaddr is passed back to user space. The new function
places the sockaddr into the correct format depending on the
SCTP_I_WANT_MAPPED_V4_ADDR option.

Audit all places that touched v4mapped and either sanely construct
a v4 or v6 address then call addr_to_user, or drop the
unnecessary v4mapped check entirely.

Audit all places that call addr_to_user and verify they are on a sycall
return path.

Add a custom getname that formats the address properly.

Several bugs are addressed:
 - SCTP_I_WANT_MAPPED_V4_ADDR=0 often returned garbage for
   addresses to user space
 - The addr_len returned from recvmsg was not correct when
   returning AF_INET on a v6 socket
 - flowlabel and scope_id were not zerod when promoting
   a v4 to v6
 - Some syscalls like bind and connect behaved differently
   depending on v4mapped

Tested bind, getpeername, getsockname, connect, and recvmsg for proper
behaviour in v4mapped = 1 and 0 cases.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: implement rfc6458, 5.3.6. SCTP_NXTINFO cmsg support</title>
<updated>2014-07-16T21:40:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Geir Ola Vaagland</name>
<email>geirola@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-12T18:30:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2347c80ff127b94ddaa675e2b78ab4cef46dc905</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch implements section 5.3.6. of RFC6458, that is, support
for 'SCTP Next Receive Information Structure' (SCTP_NXTINFO) which
is placed into ancillary data cmsghdr structure for each recvmsg()
call, if this information is already available when delivering the
current message.

This option can be enabled/disabled via setsockopt(2) on SOL_SCTP
level by setting an int value with 1/0 for SCTP_RECVNXTINFO in
user space applications as per RFC6458, section 8.1.30.

The sctp_nxtinfo structure is defined as per RFC as below ...

  struct sctp_nxtinfo {
    uint16_t nxt_sid;
    uint16_t nxt_flags;
    uint32_t nxt_ppid;
    uint32_t nxt_length;
    sctp_assoc_t nxt_assoc_id;
  };

... and provided under cmsg_level IPPROTO_SCTP, cmsg_type
SCTP_NXTINFO, while cmsg_data[] contains struct sctp_nxtinfo.

Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.

Signed-off-by: Geir Ola Vaagland &lt;geirola@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: improve timer slack calculation for transport HBs</title>
<updated>2014-07-03T01:44:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-30T11:52:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=8f61059a96c2a29c1cc5a39dfe23d06ef5b4b065'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8f61059a96c2a29c1cc5a39dfe23d06ef5b4b065</id>
<content type='text'>
RFC4960, section 8.3 says:

  On an idle destination address that is allowed to heartbeat,
  it is recommended that a HEARTBEAT chunk is sent once per RTO
  of that destination address plus the protocol parameter
  'HB.interval', with jittering of +/- 50% of the RTO value,
  and exponential backoff of the RTO if the previous HEARTBEAT
  is unanswered.

Currently, we calculate jitter via sctp_jitter() function first,
and then add its result to the current RTO for the new timeout:

  TMO = RTO + (RAND() % RTO) - (RTO / 2)
              `------------------------^-=&gt; sctp_jitter()

Instead, we can just simplify all this by directly calculating:

  TMO = (RTO / 2) + (RAND() % RTO)

With the help of prandom_u32_max(), we don't need to open code
our own global PRNG, but can instead just make use of the per
CPU implementation of prandom with better quality numbers. Also,
we can now spare us the conditional for divide by zero check
since no div or mod operation needs to be used. Note that
prandom_u32_max() won't emit the same result as a mod operation,
but we really don't care here as we only want to have a random
number scaled into RTO interval.

Note, exponential RTO backoff is handeled elsewhere, namely in
sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Fix use after free by removing length arg from sk_data_ready callbacks.</title>
<updated>2014-04-11T20:15:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-11T20:15:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=676d23690fb62b5d51ba5d659935e9f7d9da9f8e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:676d23690fb62b5d51ba5d659935e9f7d9da9f8e</id>
<content type='text'>
Several spots in the kernel perform a sequence like:

	skb_queue_tail(&amp;sk-&gt;s_receive_queue, skb);
	sk-&gt;sk_data_ready(sk, skb-&gt;len);

But at the moment we place the SKB onto the socket receive queue it
can be consumed and freed up.  So this skb-&gt;len access is potentially
to freed up memory.

Furthermore, the skb-&gt;len can be modified by the consumer so it is
possible that the value isn't accurate.

And finally, no actual implementation of this callback actually uses
the length argument.  And since nobody actually cared about it's
value, lots of call sites pass arbitrary values in such as '0' and
even '1'.

So just remove the length argument from the callback, that way there
is no confusion whatsoever and all of these use-after-free cases get
fixed as a side effect.

Based upon a patch by Eric Dumazet and his suggestion to audit this
issue tree-wide.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: remove macros sctp_bh_[un]lock_sock</title>
<updated>2014-01-22T02:41:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>wangweidong</name>
<email>wangweidong1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-21T07:44:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=5bc1d1b4a261a865cbde65b1561748df5b9c724b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5bc1d1b4a261a865cbde65b1561748df5b9c724b</id>
<content type='text'>
Redefined bh_[un]lock_sock to sctp_bh[un]lock_sock for user
space friendly code which we haven't use in years, so removing them.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong &lt;wangweidong1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: remove macros sctp_{lock|release}_sock</title>
<updated>2014-01-22T02:41:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>wangweidong</name>
<email>wangweidong1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-21T07:44:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=048ed4b6266144fdee55089c9eef55b0c1d42ba1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:048ed4b6266144fdee55089c9eef55b0c1d42ba1</id>
<content type='text'>
Redefined {lock|release}_sock to sctp_{lock|release}_sock for user space friendly
code which we haven't use in years, so removing them.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong &lt;wangweidong1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: remove macros sctp_read_[un]lock</title>
<updated>2014-01-22T02:40:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>wangweidong</name>
<email>wangweidong1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-21T07:44:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=1b0de194f11450d1c1e164bf2826fe80a38e1f62'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1b0de194f11450d1c1e164bf2826fe80a38e1f62</id>
<content type='text'>
Redefined read_[un]lock to sctp_read_[un]lock for user space
friendly code which we haven't use in years, and the macros
we never used, so removing them.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong &lt;wangweidong1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: remove macros sctp_write_[un]_lock</title>
<updated>2014-01-22T02:40:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>wangweidong</name>
<email>wangweidong1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-21T07:44:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=387602dfdc3332f786f6195c74d53f9e8f7af402'/>
<id>urn:sha1:387602dfdc3332f786f6195c74d53f9e8f7af402</id>
<content type='text'>
Redefined write_[un]lock to sctp_write_[un]lock for user space
friendly code which we haven't use in years, so removing them.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong &lt;wangweidong1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
