kernel/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c, branch linux-6.1.y

ocfs2: fix reflink preserve cleanup issue

2026-03-04T12:20:50Z

[ Upstream commit 5138c936c2c82c9be8883921854bc6f7e1177d8c ] commit c06c303832ec ("ocfs2: fix xattr array entry __counted_by error") doesn't handle all cases and the cleanup job for preserved xattr entries still has bug: - the 'last' pointer should be shifted by one unit after cleanup an array entry. - current code logic doesn't cleanup the first entry when xh_count is 1. Note, commit c06c303832ec is also a bug fix for 0fe9b66c65f3. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251210015725.8409-2-heming.zhao@suse.com Fixes: 0fe9b66c65f3 ("ocfs2: Add preserve to reflink.") Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Joseph Qi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Jun Piao Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ocfs2: remove entry once instead of null-ptr-dereference in ocfs2_xa_remove()

2024-11-14T12:15:19Z

commit 0b63c0e01fba40e3992bc627272ec7b618ccaef7 upstream. Syzkaller is able to provoke null-ptr-dereference in ocfs2_xa_remove(): [ 57.319872] (a.out,1161,7):ocfs2_xa_remove:2028 ERROR: status = -12 [ 57.320420] (a.out,1161,7):ocfs2_xa_cleanup_value_truncate:1999 ERROR: Partial truncate while removing xattr overlay.upper. Leaking 1 clusters and removing the entry [ 57.321727] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004 [...] [ 57.325727] RIP: 0010:ocfs2_xa_block_wipe_namevalue+0x2a/0xc0 [...] [ 57.331328] Call Trace: [ 57.331477] [...] [ 57.333511] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x3e5/0x740 [ 57.333778] ? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170 [ 57.334016] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x2b/0x30 [ 57.334263] ? __pfx_ocfs2_xa_block_wipe_namevalue+0x10/0x10 [ 57.334596] ? ocfs2_xa_block_wipe_namevalue+0x2a/0xc0 [ 57.334913] ocfs2_xa_remove_entry+0x23/0xc0 [ 57.335164] ocfs2_xa_set+0x704/0xcf0 [ 57.335381] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1a/0x40 [ 57.335620] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_unlock+0x16/0x20 [ 57.335915] ? trace_preempt_on+0x1e/0x70 [ 57.336153] ? start_this_handle+0x16c/0x500 [ 57.336410] ? preempt_count_sub+0x50/0x80 [ 57.336656] ? _raw_read_unlock+0x20/0x40 [ 57.336906] ? start_this_handle+0x16c/0x500 [ 57.337162] ocfs2_xattr_block_set+0xa6/0x1e0 [ 57.337424] __ocfs2_xattr_set_handle+0x1fd/0x5d0 [ 57.337706] ? ocfs2_start_trans+0x13d/0x290 [ 57.337971] ocfs2_xattr_set+0xb13/0xfb0 [ 57.338207] ? dput+0x46/0x1c0 [ 57.338393] ocfs2_xattr_trusted_set+0x28/0x30 [ 57.338665] ? ocfs2_xattr_trusted_set+0x28/0x30 [ 57.338948] __vfs_removexattr+0x92/0xc0 [ 57.339182] __vfs_removexattr_locked+0xd5/0x190 [ 57.339456] ? preempt_count_sub+0x50/0x80 [ 57.339705] vfs_removexattr+0x5f/0x100 [...] Reproducer uses faultinject facility to fail ocfs2_xa_remove() -> ocfs2_xa_value_truncate() with -ENOMEM. In this case the comment mentions that we can return 0 if ocfs2_xa_cleanup_value_truncate() is going to wipe the entry anyway. But the following 'rc' check is wrong and execution flow do 'ocfs2_xa_remove_entry(loc);' twice: * 1st: in ocfs2_xa_cleanup_value_truncate(); * 2nd: returning back to ocfs2_xa_remove() instead of going to 'out'. Fix this by skipping the 2nd removal of the same entry and making syzkaller repro happy. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241103193845.2940988-1-andrew.kanner@gmail.com Fixes: 399ff3a748cf ("ocfs2: Handle errors while setting external xattr values.") Signed-off-by: Andrew Kanner Reported-by: syzbot+386ce9e60fa1b18aac5b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/671e13ab.050a0220.2b8c0f.01d0.GAE@google.com/T/ Tested-by: syzbot+386ce9e60fa1b18aac5b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Jun Piao Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ocfs2: reserve space for inline xattr before attaching reflink tree

2024-10-17T13:21:56Z

commit 5ca60b86f57a4d9648f68418a725b3a7de2816b0 upstream. One of our customers reported a crash and a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem. The crash was due to the detection of corruption. Upon troubleshooting, the fsck -fn output showed the below corruption [EXTENT_LIST_FREE] Extent list in owner 33080590 claims 230 as the next free chain record, but fsck believes the largest valid value is 227. Clamp the next record value? n The stat output from the debugfs.ocfs2 showed the following corruption where the "Next Free Rec:" had overshot the "Count:" in the root metadata block. Inode: 33080590 Mode: 0640 Generation: 2619713622 (0x9c25a856) FS Generation: 904309833 (0x35e6ac49) CRC32: 00000000 ECC: 0000 Type: Regular Attr: 0x0 Flags: Valid Dynamic Features: (0x16) HasXattr InlineXattr Refcounted Extended Attributes Block: 0 Extended Attributes Inline Size: 256 User: 0 (root) Group: 0 (root) Size: 281320357888 Links: 1 Clusters: 141738 ctime: 0x66911b56 0x316edcb8 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.829349048 2024 atime: 0x66911d6b 0x7f7a28d -- Fri Jul 12 06:11:23.133669517 2024 mtime: 0x66911b56 0x12ed75d7 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.317552087 2024 dtime: 0x0 -- Wed Dec 31 17:00:00 1969 Refcount Block: 2777346 Last Extblk: 2886943 Orphan Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Bit: 14 Tree Depth: 1 Count: 227 Next Free Rec: 230 ## Offset Clusters Block# 0 0 2310 2776351 1 2310 2139 2777375 2 4449 1221 2778399 3 5670 731 2779423 4 6401 566 2780447 ....... .... ....... ....... .... ....... The issue was in the reflink workfow while reserving space for inline xattr. The problematic function is ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(). By the time this function is called the reflink tree is already recreated at the destination inode from the source inode. At this point, this function reserves space for inline xattrs at the destination inode without even checking if there is space at the root metadata block. It simply reduces the l_count from 243 to 227 thereby making space of 256 bytes for inline xattr whereas the inode already has extents beyond this index (in this case up to 230), thereby causing corruption. The fix for this is to reserve space for inline metadata at the destination inode before the reflink tree gets recreated. The customer has verified the fix. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240918063844.1830332-1-gautham.ananthakrishna@oracle.com Fixes: ef962df057aa ("ocfs2: xattr: fix inlined xattr reflink") Signed-off-by: Gautham Ananthakrishna Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Gang He Cc: Jun Piao Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ocfs2: strict bound check before memcmp in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry()

2024-09-30T14:23:50Z

[ Upstream commit af77c4fc1871847b528d58b7fdafb4aa1f6a9262 ] xattr in ocfs2 maybe 'non-indexed', which saved with additional space requested. It's better to check if the memory is out of bound before memcmp, although this possibility mainly comes from crafted poisonous images. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240520024024.1976129-2-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Ferry Meng Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi Reported-by: lei lu Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Gang He Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Jun Piao Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Mark Fasheh Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ocfs2: add bounds checking to ocfs2_xattr_find_entry()

2024-09-30T14:23:50Z

[ Upstream commit 9e3041fecdc8f78a5900c3aa51d3d756e73264d6 ] Add a paranoia check to make sure it doesn't stray beyond valid memory region containing ocfs2 xattr entries when scanning for a match. It will prevent out-of-bound access in case of crafted images. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240520024024.1976129-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Ferry Meng Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi Reported-by: lei lu Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Gang He Cc: Jun Piao Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Stable-dep-of: af77c4fc1871 ("ocfs2: strict bound check before memcmp in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ocfs2: Switch to security_inode_init_security()

2023-05-30T13:03:17Z

commit de3004c874e740304cc4f4a83d6200acb511bbda upstream. In preparation for removing security_old_inode_init_security(), switch to security_inode_init_security(). Extend the existing ocfs2_initxattrs() to take the ocfs2_security_xattr_info structure from fs_info, and populate the name/value/len triple with the first xattr provided by LSMs. As fs_info was not used before, ocfs2_initxattrs() can now handle the case of replicating the behavior of security_old_inode_init_security(), i.e. just obtaining the xattr, in addition to setting all xattrs provided by LSMs. Supporting multiple xattrs is not currently supported where security_old_inode_init_security() was called (mknod, symlink), as it requires non-trivial changes that can be done at a later time. Like for reiserfs, even if EVM is invoked, it will not provide an xattr (if it is not the first to set it, its xattr will be discarded; if it is the first, it does not have xattrs to calculate the HMAC on). Finally, since security_inode_init_security(), unlike security_old_inode_init_security(), returns zero instead of -EOPNOTSUPP if no xattrs were provided by LSMs or if inodes are private, additionally check in ocfs2_init_security_get() if the xattr name is set. If not, act as if security_old_inode_init_security() returned -EOPNOTSUPP, and set si->enable to zero to notify to the functions following ocfs2_init_security_get() that no xattrs are available. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Joseph Qi Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs/ocfs2: fix comments mentioning i_mutex

2022-03-22T22:57:00Z

inode->i_mutex has been replaced with inode->i_rwsem long ago. Fix comments still mentioning i_mutex. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220214031314.100094-1-hongnan.li@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: hongnanli Acked-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Gang He Cc: Jun Piao Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

treewide: remove editor modelines and cruft

2021-05-07T07:26:34Z

The section "19) Editor modelines and other cruft" in Documentation/process/coding-style.rst clearly says, "Do not include any of these in source files." I recently receive a patch to explicitly add a new one. Let's do treewide cleanups, otherwise some people follow the existing code and attempt to upstream their favoriate editor setups. It is even nicer if scripts/checkpatch.pl can check it. If we like to impose coding style in an editor-independent manner, I think editorconfig (patch [1]) is a saner solution. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200703073143.423557-1-danny@kdrag0n.dev/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210324054457.1477489-1-masahiroy@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda [auxdisplay] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

acl: handle idmapped mounts

2021-01-24T13:27:17Z

The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: David Howells Cc: Al Viro Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

treewide: Remove uninitialized_var() usage

2020-07-16T19:35:15Z

Using uninitialized_var() is dangerous as it papers over real bugs[1] (or can in the future), and suppresses unrelated compiler warnings (e.g. "unused variable"). If the compiler thinks it is uninitialized, either simply initialize the variable or make compiler changes. In preparation for removing[2] the[3] macro[4], remove all remaining needless uses with the following script: git grep '\buninitialized_var\b' | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u | \ xargs perl -pi -e \ 's/\buninitialized_var$([^$]+)\)/\1/g; s:\s*/\* (GCC be quiet|to make compiler happy) \*/$::g;' drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c was manually tweaked to avoid pathological white-space. No outstanding warnings were found building allmodconfig with GCC 9.3.0 for x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, powerpc64le, s390x, mips, sparc64, alpha, and m68k. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200603174714.192027-1-glider@google.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFw+Vbj0i=1TGqCR5vQkCzWJ0QxK6CernOU6eedsudAixw@mail.gmail.com/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFwgbgqhbp1fkxvRKEpzyR5J8n1vKT1VZdz9knmPuXhOeg@mail.gmail.com/ [4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFz2500WfbKXAx8s67wrm9=yVJu65TpLgN_ybYNv0VEOKA@mail.gmail.com/ Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky # drivers/infiniband and mlx4/mlx5 Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe # IB Acked-by: Kalle Valo # wireless drivers Reviewed-by: Chao Yu # erofs Signed-off-by: Kees Cook