kernel/fs/namespace.c, branch linux-5.1.y

fs/namespace: fix unprivileged mount propagation

2019-06-25T03:34:55Z

commit d728cf79164bb38e9628d15276e636539f857ef1 upstream. When propagating mounts across mount namespaces owned by different user namespaces it is not possible anymore to move or umount the mount in the less privileged mount namespace. Here is a reproducer: sudo mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /mnt sudo --make-rshared /mnt # create unprivileged user + mount namespace and preserve propagation unshare -U -m --map-root --propagation=unchanged # now change back to the original mount namespace in another terminal: sudo mkdir /mnt/aaa sudo mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /mnt/aaa # now in the unprivileged user + mount namespace mount --move /mnt/aaa /opt Unfortunately, this is a pretty big deal for userspace since this is e.g. used to inject mounts into running unprivileged containers. So this regression really needs to go away rather quickly. The problem is that a recent change falsely locked the root of the newly added mounts by setting MNT_LOCKED. Fix this by only locking the mounts on copy_mnt_ns() and not when adding a new mount. Fixes: 3bd045cc9c4b ("separate copying and locking mount tree on cross-userns copies") Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Al Viro Cc: Tested-by: Christian Brauner Acked-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge branch 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2019-03-12T21:08:19Z

Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro: "The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the next cycle fodder. It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better to fix it up after -rc1 instead. That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next cycle" * 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits) afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount afs: Add fs_context support vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log vfs: Implement logging through fs_context vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API vfs: Remove kern_mount_data() hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context cpuset: Use fs_context kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic() cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree() cgroup: start switching to fs_context ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context proc: Add fs_context support to procfs ...

Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit

2019-03-07T20:20:11Z

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1. Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another. Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems. All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1" * tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: mark expected switch fall-through audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes audit: join tty records to their syscall audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match audit: ignore fcaps on umount audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic audit: add support for fcaps v3 audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved

Merge branch 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2019-03-04T21:24:27Z

Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro: "Assorted fixes that sat in -next for a while, all over the place" * 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: aio: Fix locking in aio_poll() exec: Fix mem leak in kernel_read_file copy_mount_string: Limit string length to PATH_MAX cgroup: saner refcounting for cgroup_root fix cgroup_do_mount() handling of failure exits

vfs: Remove kern_mount_data()

2019-02-28T08:29:36Z

The kern_mount_data() isn't used any more so remove it. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Al Viro

vfs: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context

2019-02-28T08:29:26Z

[AV - unfuck kern_mount_data(); we want non-NULL ->mnt_ns on long-living mounts] [AV - reordering fs/namespace.c is badly overdue, but let's keep it separate from that series] [AV - drop simple_pin_fs() change] [AV - clean vfs_kern_mount() failure exits up] Implement a filesystem context concept to be used during superblock creation for mount and superblock reconfiguration for remount. The mounting procedure then becomes: (1) Allocate new fs_context context. (2) Configure the context. (3) Create superblock. (4) Query the superblock. (5) Create a mount for the superblock. (6) Destroy the context. Rather than calling fs_type->mount(), an fs_context struct is created and fs_type->init_fs_context() is called to set it up. Pointers exist for the filesystem and LSM to hang their private data off. A set of operations has to be set by ->init_fs_context() to provide freeing, duplication, option parsing, binary data parsing, validation, mounting and superblock filling. Legacy filesystems are supported by the provision of a set of legacy fs_context operations that build up a list of mount options and then invoke fs_type->mount() from within the fs_context ->get_tree() operation. This allows all filesystems to be accessed using fs_context. It should be noted that, whilst this patch adds a lot of lines of code, there is quite a bit of duplication with existing code that can be eliminated should all filesystems be converted over. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Al Viro

Revert "x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses"

2019-02-25T17:10:51Z

This reverts commit 9da3f2b74054406f87dff7101a569217ffceb29b. It was well-intentioned, but wrong. Overriding the exception tables for instructions for random reasons is just wrong, and that is what the new code did. It caused problems for tracing, and it caused problems for strncpy_from_user(), because the new checks made perfectly valid use cases break, rather than catch things that did bad things. Unchecked user space accesses are a problem, but that's not a reason to add invalid checks that then people have to work around with silly flags (in this case, that 'kernel_uaccess_faults_ok' flag, which is just an odd way to say "this commit was wrong" and was sprinked into random places to hide the wrongness). The real fix to unchecked user space accesses is to get rid of the special "let's not check __get_user() and __put_user() at all" logic. Make __{get|put}_user() be just aliases to the regular {get|put}_user() functions, and make it impossible to access user space without having the proper checks in places. The raison d'être of the special double-underscore versions used to be that the range check was expensive, and if you did multiple user accesses, you'd do the range check up front (like the signal frame handling code, for example). But SMAP (on x86) and PAN (on ARM) have made that optimization pointless, because the _real_ expense is the "set CPU flag to allow user space access". Do let's not break the valid cases to catch invalid cases that shouldn't even exist. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Tobin C. Harding Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

copy_mount_string: Limit string length to PATH_MAX

2019-02-01T06:57:33Z

On ppc64le, When a string with PAGE_SIZE - 1 (i.e. 64k-1) length is passed as a "filesystem type" argument to the mount(2) syscall, copy_mount_string() ends up allocating 64k (the PAGE_SIZE on ppc64le) worth of space for holding the string in kernel's address space. Later, in set_precision() (invoked by get_fs_type() -> __request_module() -> vsnprintf()), we end up assigning strlen(fs-type-string) i.e. 65535 as the value to 'struct printf_spec'->precision member. This field has a width of 16 bits and it is a signed data type. Hence an invalid value ends up getting assigned. This causes the "WARN_ONCE(spec->precision != prec, "precision %d too large", prec)" statement inside set_precision() to be executed. This commit fixes the bug by limiting the length of the string passed by copy_mount_string() to strndup_user() to PATH_MAX. Signed-off-by: Chandan Rajendra Reported-by: Abdul Haleem Suggested-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Al Viro

audit: ignore fcaps on umount

2019-01-31T01:51:47Z

Don't fetch fcaps when umount2 is called to avoid a process hang while it waits for the missing resource to (possibly never) re-appear. Note the comment above user_path_mountpoint_at(): * A umount is a special case for path walking. We're not actually interested * in the inode in this situation, and ESTALE errors can be a problem. We * simply want track down the dentry and vfsmount attached at the mountpoint * and avoid revalidating the last component. This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS. Please see the github issue tracker https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs [PM: merge fuzz in audit_log_fcaps()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

convert do_remount_sb() to fs_context

2019-01-30T22:44:26Z

Replace do_remount_sb() with a function, reconfigure_super(), that's fs_context aware. The fs_context is expected to be parameterised already and have ->root pointing to the superblock to be reconfigured. A legacy wrapper is provided that is intended to be called from the fs_context ops when those appear, but for now is called directly from reconfigure_super(). This wrapper invokes the ->remount_fs() superblock op for the moment. It is intended that the remount_fs() op will be phased out. The fs_context->purpose is set to FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE to indicate that the context is being used for reconfiguration. do_umount_root() is provided to consolidate remount-to-R/O for umount and emergency remount by creating a context and invoking reconfiguration. do_remount(), do_umount() and do_emergency_remount_callback() are switched to use the new process. [AV -- fold UMOUNT and EMERGENCY_REMOUNT in; fixes the umount / bug, gets rid of pointless complexity] [AV -- set ->net_ns in all cases; nfs remount will need that] [AV -- shift security_sb_remount() call into reconfigure_super(); the callers that didn't do security_sb_remount() have NULL fc->security anyway, so it's a no-op for them] Signed-off-by: David Howells Co-developed-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Al Viro