<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/fs/ceph/mds_client.c, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=master</id>
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<updated>2026-03-09T11:34:40Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ceph: fix memory leaks in ceph_mdsc_build_path()</title>
<updated>2026-03-09T11:34:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Max Kellermann</name>
<email>max.kellermann@ionos.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-24T13:26:57Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:040d159a45ded7f33201421a81df0aa2a86e5a0b</id>
<content type='text'>
Add __putname() calls to error code paths that did not free the "path"
pointer obtained by __getname().  If ownership of this pointer is not
passed to the caller via path_info.path, the function must free it
before returning.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3fd945a79e14 ("ceph: encode encrypted name in ceph_mdsc_build_path and dentry release")
Fixes: 550f7ca98ee0 ("ceph: give up on paths longer than PATH_MAX")
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann &lt;max.kellermann@ionos.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Convert remaining multi-line kmalloc_obj/flex GFP_KERNEL uses</title>
<updated>2026-02-22T16:26:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-22T07:46:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:189f164e573e18d9f8876dbd3ad8fcbe11f93037</id>
<content type='text'>
Conversion performed via this Coccinelle script:

  // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
  // Options: --include-headers-for-types --all-includes --include-headers --keep-comments
  virtual patch

  @gfp depends on patch &amp;&amp; !(file in "tools") &amp;&amp; !(file in "samples")@
  identifier ALLOC = {kmalloc_obj,kmalloc_objs,kmalloc_flex,
 		    kzalloc_obj,kzalloc_objs,kzalloc_flex,
		    kvmalloc_obj,kvmalloc_objs,kvmalloc_flex,
		    kvzalloc_obj,kvzalloc_objs,kvzalloc_flex};
  @@

  	ALLOC(...
  -		, GFP_KERNEL
  	)

  $ make coccicheck MODE=patch COCCI=gfp.cocci

Build and boot tested x86_64 with Fedora 42's GCC and Clang:

Linux version 6.19.0+ (user@host) (gcc (GCC) 15.2.1 20260123 (Red Hat 15.2.1-7), GNU ld version 2.44-12.fc42) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC 1970-01-01
Linux version 6.19.0+ (user@host) (clang version 20.1.8 (Fedora 20.1.8-4.fc42), LLD 20.1.8) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC 1970-01-01

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types</title>
<updated>2026-02-21T09:02:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-21T07:49:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:69050f8d6d075dc01af7a5f2f550a8067510366f</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:

Single allocations:	kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)

Array allocations:	kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)

Flex array allocations:	kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)

(where TYPE may also be *VAR)

The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: fix NULL pointer dereference in ceph_mds_auth_match()</title>
<updated>2026-02-04T21:00:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Viacheslav Dubeyko</name>
<email>Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-03T22:54:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7987cce375ac8ce98e170a77aa2399f2cf6eb99f</id>
<content type='text'>
The CephFS kernel client has regression starting from 6.18-rc1.
We have issue in ceph_mds_auth_match() if fs_name == NULL:

    const char fs_name = mdsc-&gt;fsc-&gt;mount_options-&gt;mds_namespace;
    ...
    if (auth-&gt;match.fs_name &amp;&amp; strcmp(auth-&gt;match.fs_name, fs_name)) {
            / fsname mismatch, try next one */
            return 0;
    }

Patrick Donnelly suggested that: In summary, we should definitely start
decoding `fs_name` from the MDSMap and do strict authorizations checks
against it. Note that the `-o mds_namespace=foo` should only be used for
selecting the file system to mount and nothing else. It's possible
no mds_namespace is specified but the kernel will mount the only
file system that exists which may have name "foo".

This patch reworks ceph_mdsmap_decode() and namespace_equals() with
the goal of supporting the suggested concept. Now struct ceph_mdsmap
contains m_fs_name field that receives copy of extracted FS name
by ceph_extract_encoded_string(). For the case of "old" CephFS file
systems, it is used "cephfs" name.

[ idryomov: replace redundant %*pE with %s in ceph_mdsmap_decode(),
  get rid of a series of strlen() calls in ceph_namespace_match(),
  drop changes to namespace_equals() body to avoid treating empty
  mds_namespace as equal, drop changes to ceph_mdsc_handle_fsmap()
  as namespace_equals() isn't an equivalent substitution there ]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 22c73d52a6d0 ("ceph: fix multifs mds auth caps issue")
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/73886
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Patrick Donnelly &lt;pdonnell@ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Patrick Donnelly &lt;pdonnell@ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: add trace points to the MDS client</title>
<updated>2025-12-10T10:50:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Max Kellermann</name>
<email>max.kellermann@ionos.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-25T10:45:12Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d927a595ab2f6de4e10b3e3962bc70ab61d8f907</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch adds trace points to the Ceph filesystem MDS client:

- request submission (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REQUEST) and completion
  (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REPLY)
- capabilities (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS)

These are the central pieces that are useful for analyzing MDS
latency/performance problems from the client's perspective.

In the long run, all doutc() calls should be replaced with
tracepoints.  This way, the Ceph filesystem can be traced at any time
(without spamming the kernel log).  Additionally, trace points can be
used in BPF programs (which can even deference the pointer parameters
and extract more values).

Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann &lt;max.kellermann@ionos.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'ceph-for-6.18-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client</title>
<updated>2025-10-10T18:30:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-10T18:30:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8bd9238e511d02831022ff0270865c54ccc482d6</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull ceph updates from Ilya Dryomov:

 - some messenger improvements (Eric and Max)

 - address an issue (also affected userspace) of incorrect permissions
   being granted to users who have access to multiple different CephFS
   instances within the same cluster (Kotresh)

 - a bunch of assorted CephFS fixes (Slava)

* tag 'ceph-for-6.18-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
  ceph: add bug tracking system info to MAINTAINERS
  ceph: fix multifs mds auth caps issue
  ceph: cleanup in ceph_alloc_readdir_reply_buffer()
  ceph: fix potential NULL dereference issue in ceph_fill_trace()
  libceph: add empty check to ceph_con_get_out_msg()
  libceph: pass the message pointer instead of loading con-&gt;out_msg
  libceph: make ceph_con_get_out_msg() return the message pointer
  ceph: fix potential race condition on operations with CEPH_I_ODIRECT flag
  ceph: refactor wake_up_bit() pattern of calling
  ceph: fix potential race condition in ceph_ioctl_lazyio()
  ceph: fix overflowed constant issue in ceph_do_objects_copy()
  ceph: fix wrong sizeof argument issue in register_session()
  ceph: add checking of wait_for_completion_killable() return value
  ceph: make ceph_start_io_*() killable
  libceph: Use HMAC-SHA256 library instead of crypto_shash
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: fix multifs mds auth caps issue</title>
<updated>2025-10-08T21:30:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kotresh HR</name>
<email>khiremat@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-11T09:32:35Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:22c73d52a6d05c5a2053385c0d6cd9984732799d</id>
<content type='text'>
The mds auth caps check should also validate the
fsname along with the associated caps. Not doing
so would result in applying the mds auth caps of
one fs on to the other fs in a multifs ceph cluster.
The bug causes multiple issues w.r.t user
authentication, following is one such example.

Steps to Reproduce (on vstart cluster):
1. Create two file systems in a cluster, say 'fsname1' and 'fsname2'
2. Authorize read only permission to the user 'client.usr' on fs 'fsname1'
    $ceph fs authorize fsname1 client.usr / r
3. Authorize read and write permission to the same user 'client.usr' on fs 'fsname2'
    $ceph fs authorize fsname2 client.usr / rw
4. Update the keyring
    $ceph auth get client.usr &gt;&gt; ./keyring

With above permssions for the user 'client.usr', following is the
expectation.
  a. The 'client.usr' should be able to only read the contents
     and not allowed to create or delete files on file system 'fsname1'.
  b. The 'client.usr' should be able to read/write on file system 'fsname2'.

But, with this bug, the 'client.usr' is allowed to read/write on file
system 'fsname1'. See below.

5. Mount the file system 'fsname1' with the user 'client.usr'
     $sudo bin/mount.ceph usr@.fsname1=/ /kmnt_fsname1_usr/
6. Try creating a file on file system 'fsname1' with user 'client.usr'. This
   should fail but passes with this bug.
     $touch /kmnt_fsname1_usr/file1
7. Mount the file system 'fsname1' with the user 'client.admin' and create a
   file.
     $sudo bin/mount.ceph admin@.fsname1=/ /kmnt_fsname1_admin
     $echo "data" &gt; /kmnt_fsname1_admin/admin_file1
8. Try removing an existing file on file system 'fsname1' with the user
   'client.usr'. This shoudn't succeed but succeeds with the bug.
     $rm -f /kmnt_fsname1_usr/admin_file1

For more information, please take a look at the corresponding mds/fuse patch
and tests added by looking into the tracker mentioned below.

v2: Fix a possible null dereference in doutc
v3: Don't store fsname from mdsmap, validate against
    ceph_mount_options's fsname and use it
v4: Code refactor, better warning message and
    fix possible compiler warning

[ Slava.Dubeyko: "fsname check failed" -&gt; "fsname mismatch" ]

Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/72167
Signed-off-by: Kotresh HR &lt;khiremat@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: cleanup in ceph_alloc_readdir_reply_buffer()</title>
<updated>2025-10-08T21:30:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Viacheslav Dubeyko</name>
<email>Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-02T19:08:45Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c66120c84295a0495eb46dcfba829457acd6ef7d</id>
<content type='text'>
The Coverity Scan service has reported potential issue
in ceph_alloc_readdir_reply_buffer() [1]. If order could
be negative one, then it expects the issue in the logic:

num_entries = (PAGE_SIZE &lt;&lt; order) / size;

Technically speaking, this logic [2] should prevent from
making the order variable negative:

if (!rinfo-&gt;dir_entries)
    return -ENOMEM;

However, the allocation logic requires some cleanup.
This patch makes sure that calculated bytes count
will never exceed ULONG_MAX before get_order()
calculation. And it adds the checking of order
variable on negative value to guarantee that second
half of the function's code will never operate by
negative value of order variable even if something
will be wrong or to be changed in the first half of
the function's logic.

v2
Alex Markuze suggested to add unlikely() macro
for introduced condition checks.

[1] https://scan5.scan.coverity.com/#/project-view/64304/10063?selectedIssue=1198252
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.17-rc3/source/fs/ceph/mds_client.c#L2553

Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze &lt;amarkuze@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: fix wrong sizeof argument issue in register_session()</title>
<updated>2025-10-08T21:30:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Viacheslav Dubeyko</name>
<email>Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-06T19:05:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1ed4471a4ee6cfa902467332042158ca5ef8ad24</id>
<content type='text'>
The Coverity Scan service has detected the wrong sizeof
argument in register_session() [1]. The CID 1598909 defect
contains explanation: "The wrong sizeof value is used in
an expression or as argument to a function. The result is
an incorrect value that may cause unexpected program behaviors.
In register_session: The sizeof operator is invoked on
the wrong argument (CWE-569)".

The patch introduces a ptr_size variable that is initialized
by sizeof(struct ceph_mds_session *). And this variable is used
instead of sizeof(void *) in the code.

[1] https://scan5.scan.coverity.com/#/project-view/64304/10063?selectedIssue=1598909

Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze &lt;amarkuze@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'vfs-6.18-rc1.inode' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs</title>
<updated>2025-09-29T16:42:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-29T16:42:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:56e7b310717697109998966cb3c4d3e490d09200</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs inode updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This contains a series I originally wrote and that Eric brought over
  the finish line. It moves out the i_crypt_info and i_verity_info
  pointers out of 'struct inode' and into the fs-specific part of the
  inode.

  So now the few filesytems that actually make use of this pay the price
  in their own private inode storage instead of forcing it upon every
  user of struct inode.

  The pointer for the crypt and verity info is simply found by storing
  an offset to its address in struct fsverity_operations and struct
  fscrypt_operations. This shrinks struct inode by 16 bytes.

  I hope to move a lot more out of it in the future so that struct inode
  becomes really just about very core stuff that we need, much like
  struct dentry and struct file, instead of the dumping ground it has
  become over the years.

  On top of this are a various changes associated with the ongoing inode
  lifetime handling rework that multiple people are pushing forward:

   - Stop accessing inode-&gt;i_count directly in f2fs and gfs2. They
     simply should use the __iget() and iput() helpers

   - Make the i_state flags an enum

   - Rework the iput() logic

     Currently, if we are the last iput, and we have the I_DIRTY_TIME
     bit set, we will grab a reference on the inode again and then mark
     it dirty and then redo the put. This is to make sure we delay the
     time update for as long as possible

     We can rework this logic to simply dec i_count if it is not 1, and
     if it is do the time update while still holding the i_count
     reference

     Then we can replace the atomic_dec_and_lock with locking the
     -&gt;i_lock and doing atomic_dec_and_test, since we did the
     atomic_add_unless above

   - Add an icount_read() helper and convert everyone that accesses
     inode-&gt;i_count directly for this purpose to use the helper

   - Expand dump_inode() to dump more information about an inode helping
     in debugging

   - Add some might_sleep() annotations to iput() and associated
     helpers"

* tag 'vfs-6.18-rc1.inode' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  fs: add might_sleep() annotation to iput() and more
  fs: expand dump_inode()
  inode: fix whitespace issues
  fs: add an icount_read helper
  fs: rework iput logic
  fs: make the i_state flags an enum
  fs: stop accessing -&gt;i_count directly in f2fs and gfs2
  fsverity: check IS_VERITY() in fsverity_cleanup_inode()
  fs: remove inode::i_verity_info
  btrfs: move verity info pointer to fs-specific part of inode
  f2fs: move verity info pointer to fs-specific part of inode
  ext4: move verity info pointer to fs-specific part of inode
  fsverity: add support for info in fs-specific part of inode
  fs: remove inode::i_crypt_info
  ceph: move crypt info pointer to fs-specific part of inode
  ubifs: move crypt info pointer to fs-specific part of inode
  f2fs: move crypt info pointer to fs-specific part of inode
  ext4: move crypt info pointer to fs-specific part of inode
  fscrypt: add support for info in fs-specific part of inode
  fscrypt: replace raw loads of info pointer with helper function
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
