<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c, branch linux-6.9.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-6.9.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-6.9.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/'/>
<updated>2021-01-29T04:36:24Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>drivers: Remove CONFIG_OPROFILE support</title>
<updated>2021-01-29T04:36:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Viresh Kumar</name>
<email>viresh.kumar@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-14T11:35:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=f8408264c77a0cebb20244d1f4750501b36abe0e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f8408264c77a0cebb20244d1f4750501b36abe0e</id>
<content type='text'>
The "oprofile" user-space tools don't use the kernel OPROFILE support
any more, and haven't in a long time. User-space has been converted to
the perf interfaces.

Remove kernel's old oprofile support.

Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar &lt;viresh.kumar@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Robert Richter &lt;rric@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt; #RCU
Acked-by: William Cohen &lt;wcohen@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers/oprofile: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process</title>
<updated>2020-04-16T15:19:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Budankov</name>
<email>alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-02T08:53:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=ab76878bb720cbd35a05ae868387f4373a58c949'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ab76878bb720cbd35a05ae868387f4373a58c949</id>
<content type='text'>
Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.  Providing
the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov &lt;alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jamorris@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Igor Lubashev &lt;ilubashe@akamai.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/691f1096-b15f-9b12-50a0-c2b93918149e@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Use array_size() in vmalloc()</title>
<updated>2018-06-12T23:19:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-12T21:27:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=42bc47b35320e0e587a88e437e18f80f9c5bcbb2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:42bc47b35320e0e587a88e437e18f80f9c5bcbb2</id>
<content type='text'>
The vmalloc() function has no 2-factor argument form, so multiplication
factors need to be wrapped in array_size(). This patch replaces cases of:

        vmalloc(a * b)

with:
        vmalloc(array_size(a, b))

as well as handling cases of:

        vmalloc(a * b * c)

with:

        vmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c))

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        vmalloc(4 * 1024)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  vmalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

  vmalloc(
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	array_size(COUNT, SIZE)
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  vmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  vmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants.
@@
expression E1, E2;
constant C1, C2;
@@

(
  vmalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
  vmalloc(
-	E1 * E2
+	array_size(E1, E2)
  , ...)
)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare to move signal wakeup &amp; sigpending methods from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; into &lt;linux/sched/signal.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-02T18:15:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=174cd4b1e5fbd0d74c68cf3a74f5bd4923485512'/>
<id>urn:sha1:174cd4b1e5fbd0d74c68cf3a74f5bd4923485512</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix up affected files that include this signal functionality via sched.h.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Replace &lt;asm/uaccess.h&gt; with &lt;linux/uaccess.h&gt; globally</title>
<updated>2016-12-24T19:46:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-24T19:46:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=7c0f6ba682b9c7632072ffbedf8d328c8f3c42ba'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7c0f6ba682b9c7632072ffbedf8d328c8f3c42ba</id>
<content type='text'>
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:

  PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*&lt;asm/uaccess.h&gt;'
  sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include &lt;linux/uaccess.h&gt;!" \
        $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)

to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.

Requested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>locking, oprofile: Annotate oprofilefs lock as raw</title>
<updated>2011-09-13T09:12:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2009-07-25T14:18:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=2d21a29fb62f142b8a62496700d8d82a6a8fd783'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2d21a29fb62f142b8a62496700d8d82a6a8fd783</id>
<content type='text'>
The oprofilefs_lock can be taken in atomic context (in profiling
interrupts) and therefore cannot cannot be preempted on -rt -
annotate it.

In mainline this change documents the low level nature of
the lock - otherwise there's no functional difference. Lockdep
and Sparse checking will work as usual.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>oprofile: make event buffer nonseekable</title>
<updated>2010-07-26T08:58:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2010-07-07T21:40:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=729419f0090601406abe714c5f8872a3bd53ff68'/>
<id>urn:sha1:729419f0090601406abe714c5f8872a3bd53ff68</id>
<content type='text'>
The event buffer cannot deal with seeks, so
we should forbid that outright.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Robert Richter &lt;robert.richter@amd.com&gt;
Cc: oprofile-list@lists.sf.net
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter &lt;robert.richter@amd.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>oprofile: warn on freeing event buffer too early</title>
<updated>2009-10-09T19:32:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Robert Richter</name>
<email>robert.richter@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-10-09T01:17:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=c0868934e536e0ff508f2d359d006b25abc4970d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c0868934e536e0ff508f2d359d006b25abc4970d</id>
<content type='text'>
A race shouldn't happen since all workqueues or handlers are canceled
or flushed before the event buffer is freed. A warning is triggered
now if the buffer is freed too early.

Also, this patch adds some comments about event buffer protection,
reworks some code and adds code to clear buffer_pos during alloc and
free of the event buffer.

Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter &lt;robert.richter@amd.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>oprofile: fix race condition in event_buffer free</title>
<updated>2009-10-09T16:02:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Rientjes</name>
<email>rientjes@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-09-09T13:02:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=066b3aa8454bee3cdc665d86b5de812d8d0513b3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:066b3aa8454bee3cdc665d86b5de812d8d0513b3</id>
<content type='text'>
Looking at the 2.6.31-rc9 code, it appears there is a race condition
in the event_buffer cleanup code path (shutdown). This could lead to
kernel panic as some CPUs may be operating on the event buffer AFTER
it has been freed. The attached patch solves the problem and makes
sure CPUs check if the buffer is not NULL before they access it as
some may have been spinning on the mutex while the buffer was being
freed.

The race may happen if the buffer is freed during pending reads. But
it is not clear why there are races in add_event_entry() since all
workqueues or handlers are canceled or flushed before the event buffer
is freed.

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter &lt;robert.richter@amd.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>oprofile: rename kernel-wide identifiers</title>
<updated>2008-12-16T16:52:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Robert Richter</name>
<email>robert.richter@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-12-16T15:19:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=bd2172f58094b3f8afa017e68f3f0b57577824e1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd2172f58094b3f8afa017e68f3f0b57577824e1</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch renames kernel-wide identifiers to something more oprofile
specific names.

Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter &lt;robert.richter@amd.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
