<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/drivers/char/applicom.c, branch linux-5.1.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.1.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.1.y'/>
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<updated>2019-01-22T12:34:35Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>applicom: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities</title>
<updated>2019-01-22T12:34:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-09T22:05:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=d7ac3c6ef5d8ce14b6381d52eb7adafdd6c8bb3c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d7ac3c6ef5d8ce14b6381d52eb7adafdd6c8bb3c</id>
<content type='text'>
IndexCard is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/char/applicom.c:418 ac_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'apbs' [r]
drivers/char/applicom.c:728 ac_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'apbs' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing IndexCard before using it to index apbs.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>applicom: constify pci_device_id.</title>
<updated>2017-08-28T15:11:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arvind Yadav</name>
<email>arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-01T16:01:57Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2c9c4ae6573a3f4c270e8a35cd71700d3b802ea8</id>
<content type='text'>
pci_device_id are not supposed to change at runtime. All functions
working with pci_device_id provided by &lt;linux/pci.h&gt; work with
const pci_device_id. So mark the non-const structs as const.

Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav &lt;arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Annotate hardware config module parameters in drivers/char/</title>
<updated>2017-04-20T11:02:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-04T15:54:22Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1c37ab5e51792a5419bdc84804aec6379cb43adb</id>
<content type='text'>
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/.

Suggested-by: Alan Cox &lt;gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare to move signal wakeup &amp; sigpending methods from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; into &lt;linux/sched/signal.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-02T18:15:33Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:174cd4b1e5fbd0d74c68cf3a74f5bd4923485512</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix up affected files that include this signal functionality via sched.h.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Replace &lt;asm/uaccess.h&gt; with &lt;linux/uaccess.h&gt; globally</title>
<updated>2016-12-24T19:46:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-24T19:46:01Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7c0f6ba682b9c7632072ffbedf8d328c8f3c42ba</id>
<content type='text'>
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:

  PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*&lt;asm/uaccess.h&gt;'
  sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include &lt;linux/uaccess.h&gt;!" \
        $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)

to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.

Requested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>applicom: dereferencing NULL on error path</title>
<updated>2014-05-28T00:43:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-09T11:59:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8bab797c6e5724a43b7666ad70860712365cdb71</id>
<content type='text'>
This is a static checker fix.  The "dev" variable is always NULL after
the while statement so we would be dereferencing a NULL pointer here.

Fixes: 819a3eba4233 ('[PATCH] applicom: fix error handling')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>applicom: use correct array offset</title>
<updated>2013-03-15T19:23:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-01T20:31:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2154e0a4f43e0c811737e391e7981d331e450d42</id>
<content type='text'>
We're iterating through abps[] printing information, but here we
use the wrong array index.  IndexCard comes from the user and in
this case it was specifically not range checked because we didn't
expect to use it.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers/char/applicom.c: fix information leak to userland</title>
<updated>2010-10-28T01:03:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kulikov</name>
<email>segooon@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-27T22:34:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:19714a8af8fe8618a9beace1f7a3bb10d55d5e2f</id>
<content type='text'>
Structure st_loc is copied to userland with some fields unitialized.  It
leads to leaking of stack memory.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segooon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers: autoconvert trivial BKL users to private mutex</title>
<updated>2010-10-05T13:01:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2010-06-02T12:28:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:613655fa39ff6957754fa8ceb8559980920eb8ee</id>
<content type='text'>
All these files use the big kernel lock in a trivial
way to serialize their private file operations,
typically resulting from an earlier semi-automatic
pushdown from VFS.

None of these drivers appears to want to lock against
other code, and they all use the BKL as the top-level
lock in their file operations, meaning that there
is no lock-order inversion problem.

Consequently, we can remove the BKL completely,
replacing it with a per-file mutex in every case.
Using a scripted approach means we can avoid
typos.

These drivers do not seem to be under active
maintainance from my brief investigation. Apologies
to those maintainers that I have missed.

file=$1
name=$2
if grep -q lock_kernel ${file} ; then
    if grep -q 'include.*linux.mutex.h' ${file} ; then
            sed -i '/include.*&lt;linux\/smp_lock.h&gt;/d' ${file}
    else
            sed -i 's/include.*&lt;linux\/smp_lock.h&gt;.*$/include &lt;linux\/mutex.h&gt;/g' ${file}
    fi
    sed -i ${file} \
        -e "/^#include.*linux.mutex.h/,$ {
                1,/^\(static\|int\|long\)/ {
                     /^\(static\|int\|long\)/istatic DEFINE_MUTEX(${name}_mutex);

} }"  \
    -e "s/\(un\)*lock_kernel\&gt;[ ]*()/mutex_\1lock(\&amp;${name}_mutex)/g" \
    -e '/[      ]*cycle_kernel_lock();/d'
else
    sed -i -e '/include.*\&lt;smp_lock.h\&gt;/d' ${file}  \
                -e '/cycle_kernel_lock()/d'
fi

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers/char/applicom.c: use memdup_user</title>
<updated>2010-05-27T16:12:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julia Lawall</name>
<email>julia@diku.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2010-05-26T21:43:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f67231f80126f4e08c79c7b2056989c5c89ad4c6</id>
<content type='text'>
Use memdup_user when user data is immediately copied into the
allocated region.

The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)

// &lt;smpl&gt;
@@
expression from,to,size,flag;
position p;
identifier l1,l2;
@@

-  to = \(kmalloc@p\|kzalloc@p\)(size,flag);
+  to = memdup_user(from,size);
   if (
-      to==NULL
+      IS_ERR(to)
                 || ...) {
   &lt;+... when != goto l1;
-  -ENOMEM
+  PTR_ERR(to)
   ...+&gt;
   }
-  if (copy_from_user(to, from, size) != 0) {
-    &lt;+... when != goto l2;
-    -EFAULT
-    ...+&gt;
-  }
// &lt;/smpl&gt;

Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall &lt;julia@diku.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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