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<title>kernel/crypto, branch linux-5.10.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.10.y</id>
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<updated>2026-02-06T15:40:04Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authencesn - reject too-short AAD (assoclen&lt;8) to match ESP/ESN spec</title>
<updated>2026-02-06T15:40:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Taeyang Lee</name>
<email>0wn@theori.io</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-16T07:03:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:df22c9a65e9a9daa368a72fed596af9d7d5876bb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2397e9264676be7794f8f7f1e9763d90bd3c7335 ]

authencesn assumes an ESP/ESN-formatted AAD. When assoclen is shorter than
the minimum expected length, crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt() can advance past
the end of the destination scatterlist and trigger a NULL pointer dereference
in scatterwalk_map_and_copy(), leading to a kernel panic (DoS).

Add a minimum AAD length check to fail fast on invalid inputs.

Fixes: 104880a6b470 ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD interface")
Reported-By: Taeyang Lee &lt;0wn@theori.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Taeyang Lee &lt;0wn@theori.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: af_alg - zero initialize memory allocated via sock_kmalloc</title>
<updated>2026-01-19T12:12:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Shivani Agarwal</name>
<email>shivani.agarwal@broadcom.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-31T20:41:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e125c8e346e4eb7b3e854c862fcb4392bc13ddba</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6f6e309328d53a10c0fe1f77dec2db73373179b6 ]

Several crypto user API contexts and requests allocated with
sock_kmalloc() were left uninitialized, relying on callers to
set fields explicitly. This resulted in the use of uninitialized
data in certain error paths or when new fields are added in the
future.

The ACVP patches also contain two user-space interface files:
algif_kpp.c and algif_akcipher.c. These too rely on proper
initialization of their context structures.

A particular issue has been observed with the newly added
'inflight' variable introduced in af_alg_ctx by commit:

  67b164a871af ("crypto: af_alg - Disallow multiple in-flight AIO requests")

Because the context is not memset to zero after allocation,
the inflight variable has contained garbage values. As a result,
af_alg_alloc_areq() has incorrectly returned -EBUSY randomly when
the garbage value was interpreted as true:

  https://github.com/gregkh/linux/blame/master/crypto/af_alg.c#L1209

The check directly tests ctx-&gt;inflight without explicitly
comparing against true/false. Since inflight is only ever set to
true or false later, an uninitialized value has triggered
-EBUSY failures. Zero-initializing memory allocated with
sock_kmalloc() ensures inflight and other fields start in a known
state, removing random issues caused by uninitialized data.

Fixes: fe869cdb89c9 ("crypto: algif_hash - User-space interface for hash operations")
Fixes: 5afdfd22e6ba ("crypto: algif_rng - add random number generator support")
Fixes: 2d97591ef43d ("crypto: af_alg - consolidation of duplicate code")
Fixes: 67b164a871af ("crypto: af_alg - Disallow multiple in-flight AIO requests")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal &lt;shivani.agarwal@broadcom.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
[ Adjust context ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: seqiv - Do not use req-&gt;iv after crypto_aead_encrypt</title>
<updated>2026-01-19T12:11:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-17T06:15:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:18202537856e0fae079fed2c9308780bcff2bb9d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 50fdb78b7c0bcc550910ef69c0984e751cac72fa ]

As soon as crypto_aead_encrypt is called, the underlying request
may be freed by an asynchronous completion.  Thus dereferencing
req-&gt;iv after it returns is invalid.

Instead of checking req-&gt;iv against info, create a new variable
unaligned_info and use it for that purpose instead.

Fixes: 0a270321dbf9 ("[CRYPTO] seqiv: Add Sequence Number IV Generator")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu &lt;xmu@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: asymmetric_keys - prevent overflow in asymmetric_key_generate_id</title>
<updated>2026-01-19T12:11:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thorsten Blum</name>
<email>thorsten.blum@linux.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-13T11:40:10Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit df0845cf447ae1556c3440b8b155de0926cbaa56 ]

Use check_add_overflow() to guard against potential integer overflows
when adding the binary blob lengths and the size of an asymmetric_key_id
structure and return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW) accordingly. This prevents a
possible buffer overflow when copying data from potentially malicious
X.509 certificate fields that can be arbitrarily large, such as ASN.1
INTEGER serial numbers, issuer names, etc.

Fixes: 7901c1a8effb ("KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling")
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum &lt;thorsten.blum@linux.dev&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner &lt;lukas@wunner.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: essiv - Check ssize for decryption and in-place encryption</title>
<updated>2025-10-29T13:01:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-08T07:54:20Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6bb73db6948c2de23e407fe1b7ef94bf02b7529f ]

Move the ssize check to the start in essiv_aead_crypt so that
it's also checked for decryption and in-place encryption.

Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan &lt;ramdhan@starlabs.sg&gt;
Fixes: be1eb7f78aa8 ("crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: rng - Ensure set_ent is always present</title>
<updated>2025-10-29T13:01:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-02T09:45:39Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit c0d36727bf39bb16ef0a67ed608e279535ebf0da upstream.

Ensure that set_ent is always set since only drbg provides it.

Fixes: 77ebdabe8de7 ("crypto: af_alg - add extra parameters for DRBG interface")
Reported-by: Yiqi Sun &lt;sunyiqixm@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: af_alg - Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsg</title>
<updated>2025-10-02T11:35:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-16T09:20:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0f28c4adbc4a97437874c9b669fd7958a8c6d6ce</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1b34cbbf4f011a121ef7b2d7d6e6920a036d5285 ]

Issuing two writes to the same af_alg socket is bogus as the
data will be interleaved in an unpredictable fashion.  Furthermore,
concurrent writes may create inconsistencies in the internal
socket state.

Disallow this by adding a new ctx-&gt;write field that indiciates
exclusive ownership for writing.

Fixes: 8ff590903d5 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations")
Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan &lt;ramdhan@starlabs.sg&gt;
Reported-by: Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng &lt;billy@starlabs.sg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: xts - Only add ecb if it is not already there</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:04:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-15T08:34:04Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 270b6f13454cb7f2f7058c50df64df409c5dcf55 ]

Only add ecb to the cipher name if it isn't already ecb.

Also use memcmp instead of strncmp since these strings are all
stored in an array of length CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.

Fixes: f1c131b45410 ("crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: lrw - Only add ecb if it is not already there</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:04:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-15T08:28:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fee92b8dfaa1695e2d106c6c96e806fc6473a079</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3d73909bddc2ebb3224a8bc2e5ce00e9df70c15d ]

Only add ecb to the cipher name if it isn't already ecb.

Also use memcmp instead of strncmp since these strings are all
stored in an array of length CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.

Fixes: 700cb3f5fe75 ("crypto: lrw - Convert to skcipher")
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;oliver.sang@intel.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202505151503.d8a6cf10-lkp@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: algif_hash - fix double free in hash_accept</title>
<updated>2025-06-04T12:37:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ivan Pravdin</name>
<email>ipravdin.official@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-18T22:41:02Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit b2df03ed4052e97126267e8c13ad4204ea6ba9b6 upstream.

If accept(2) is called on socket type algif_hash with
MSG_MORE flag set and crypto_ahash_import fails,
sk2 is freed. However, it is also freed in af_alg_release,
leading to slab-use-after-free error.

Fixes: fe869cdb89c9 ("crypto: algif_hash - User-space interface for hash operations")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ivan Pravdin &lt;ipravdin.official@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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