<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/arch/x86/include, branch linux-5.1.y</title>
<subtitle>Hosts the 0x221E linux distro kernel.</subtitle>
<id>https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.1.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/atom?h=linux-5.1.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/'/>
<updated>2019-07-28T06:28:38Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Revert "kvm: x86: Use task structs fpu field for user"</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T06:28:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-22T11:31:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=644688604559a6db751b9f26dcc8d38b8c439b0e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:644688604559a6db751b9f26dcc8d38b8c439b0e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ec269475cba7bcdd1eb8fdf8e87f4c6c81a376fe upstream.

This reverts commit 240c35a3783ab9b3a0afaba0dde7291295680a6b
("kvm: x86: Use task structs fpu field for user", 2018-11-06).
The commit is broken and causes QEMU's FPU state to be destroyed
when KVM_RUN is preempted.

Fixes: 240c35a3783a ("kvm: x86: Use task structs fpu field for user")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/atomic: Fix smp_mb__{before,after}_atomic()</title>
<updated>2019-07-26T07:12:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-24T11:38:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=380ca1300affcd5385d43d2c933c393346295531'/>
<id>urn:sha1:380ca1300affcd5385d43d2c933c393346295531</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 69d927bba39517d0980462efc051875b7f4db185 ]

Recent probing at the Linux Kernel Memory Model uncovered a
'surprise'. Strongly ordered architectures where the atomic RmW
primitive implies full memory ordering and
smp_mb__{before,after}_atomic() are a simple barrier() (such as x86)
fail for:

	*x = 1;
	atomic_inc(u);
	smp_mb__after_atomic();
	r0 = *y;

Because, while the atomic_inc() implies memory order, it
(surprisingly) does not provide a compiler barrier. This then allows
the compiler to re-order like so:

	atomic_inc(u);
	*x = 1;
	smp_mb__after_atomic();
	r0 = *y;

Which the CPU is then allowed to re-order (under TSO rules) like:

	atomic_inc(u);
	r0 = *y;
	*x = 1;

And this very much was not intended. Therefore strengthen the atomic
RmW ops to include a compiler barrier.

NOTE: atomic_{or,and,xor} and the bitops already had the compiler
barrier.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpufeatures: Add FDP_EXCPTN_ONLY and ZERO_FCS_FDS</title>
<updated>2019-07-26T07:12:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Aaron Lewis</name>
<email>aaronlewis@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-05T22:02:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=eb3e01b6c2e8c49c451f34e28372f93c20de8ac9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eb3e01b6c2e8c49c451f34e28372f93c20de8ac9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cbb99c0f588737ec98c333558922ce47e9a95827 ]

Add the CPUID enumeration for Intel's de-feature bits to accommodate
passing these de-features through to kvm guests.

These de-features are (from SDM vol 1, section 8.1.8):
 - X86_FEATURE_FDP_EXCPTN_ONLY: If CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):EBX[bit 6] = 1, the
   data pointer (FDP) is updated only for the x87 non-control instructions that
   incur unmasked x87 exceptions.
 - X86_FEATURE_ZERO_FCS_FDS: If CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):EBX[bit 13] = 1, the
   processor deprecates FCS and FDS; it saves each as 0000H.

Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis &lt;aaronlewis@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: marcorr@google.com
Cc: Peter Feiner &lt;pfeiner@google.com&gt;
Cc: pshier@google.com
Cc: Robert Hoo &lt;robert.hu@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Thomas Lendacky &lt;Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: x86-ml &lt;x86@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190605220252.103406-1-aaronlewis@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Add Ice Lake NNPI to Intel family</title>
<updated>2019-07-26T07:12:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rajneesh Bhardwaj</name>
<email>rajneesh.bhardwaj@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-06T01:24:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=c3ee70b831273cd7d02f7ef4a2251e2f44dfc4b2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c3ee70b831273cd7d02f7ef4a2251e2f44dfc4b2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e32d045cd4ba06b59878323e434bad010e78e658 ]

Add the CPUID model number of Ice Lake Neural Network Processor for Deep
Learning Inference (ICL-NNPI) to the Intel family list. Ice Lake NNPI uses
model number 0x9D and this will be documented in a future version of Intel
Software Development Manual.

Signed-off-by: Rajneesh Bhardwaj &lt;rajneesh.bhardwaj@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: bp@suse.de
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Kan Liang &lt;kan.liang@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo &lt;qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Srinivas Pandruvada &lt;srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Len Brown &lt;lenb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linux PM &lt;linux-pm@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190606012419.13250-1-rajneesh.bhardwaj@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/irq: Seperate unused system vectors from spurious entry again</title>
<updated>2019-07-21T07:02:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-28T11:11:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=4ac893646c2e7a234d0242ac7a02f675a923fd16'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4ac893646c2e7a234d0242ac7a02f675a923fd16</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f8a8fe61fec8006575699559ead88b0b833d5cad upstream.

Quite some time ago the interrupt entry stubs for unused vectors in the
system vector range got removed and directly mapped to the spurious
interrupt vector entry point.

Sounds reasonable, but it's subtly broken. The spurious interrupt vector
entry point pushes vector number 0xFF on the stack which makes the whole
logic in __smp_spurious_interrupt() pointless.

As a consequence any spurious interrupt which comes from a vector != 0xFF
is treated as a real spurious interrupt (vector 0xFF) and not
acknowledged. That subsequently stalls all interrupt vectors of equal and
lower priority, which brings the system to a grinding halt.

This can happen because even on 64-bit the system vector space is not
guaranteed to be fully populated. A full compile time handling of the
unused vectors is not possible because quite some of them are conditonally
populated at runtime.

Bring the entry stubs back, which wastes 160 bytes if all stubs are unused,
but gains the proper handling back. There is no point to selectively spare
some of the stubs which are known at compile time as the required code in
the IDT management would be way larger and convoluted.

Do not route the spurious entries through common_interrupt and do_IRQ() as
the original code did. Route it to smp_spurious_interrupt() which evaluates
the vector number and acts accordingly now that the real vector numbers are
handed in.

Fixup the pr_warn so the actual spurious vector (0xff) is clearly
distiguished from the other vectors and also note for the vectored case
whether it was pending in the ISR or not.

 "Spurious APIC interrupt (vector 0xFF) on CPU#0, should never happen."
 "Spurious interrupt vector 0xed on CPU#1. Acked."
 "Spurious interrupt vector 0xee on CPU#1. Not pending!."

Fixes: 2414e021ac8d ("x86: Avoid building unused IRQ entry stubs")
Reported-by: Jan Kiszka &lt;jan.kiszka@siemens.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628111440.550568228@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/irq: Handle spurious interrupt after shutdown gracefully</title>
<updated>2019-07-21T07:02:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-28T11:11:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=3fa8d2a72fbab7745175339dfcfd15717a62ab3c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3fa8d2a72fbab7745175339dfcfd15717a62ab3c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b7107a67f0d125459fe41f86e8079afd1a5e0b15 upstream.

Since the rework of the vector management, warnings about spurious
interrupts have been reported. Robert provided some more information and
did an initial analysis. The following situation leads to these warnings:

   CPU 0                  CPU 1               IO_APIC

                                              interrupt is raised
                                              sent to CPU1
			  Unable to handle
			  immediately
			  (interrupts off,
			   deep idle delay)
   mask()
   ...
   free()
     shutdown()
     synchronize_irq()
     clear_vector()
                          do_IRQ()
                            -&gt; vector is clear

Before the rework the vector entries of legacy interrupts were statically
assigned and occupied precious vector space while most of them were
unused. Due to that the above situation was handled silently because the
vector was handled and the core handler of the assigned interrupt
descriptor noticed that it is shut down and returned.

While this has been usually observed with legacy interrupts, this situation
is not limited to them. Any other interrupt source, e.g. MSI, can cause the
same issue.

After adding proper synchronization for level triggered interrupts, this
can only happen for edge triggered interrupts where the IO-APIC obviously
cannot provide information about interrupts in flight.

While the spurious warning is actually harmless in this case it worries
users and driver developers.

Handle it gracefully by marking the vector entry as VECTOR_SHUTDOWN instead
of VECTOR_UNUSED when the vector is freed up.

If that above late handling happens the spurious detector will not complain
and switch the entry to VECTOR_UNUSED. Any subsequent spurious interrupt on
that line will trigger the spurious warning as before.

Fixes: 464d12309e1b ("x86/vector: Switch IOAPIC to global reservation mode")
Reported-by: Robert Hodaszi &lt;Robert.Hodaszi@digi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;-
Tested-by: Robert Hodaszi &lt;Robert.Hodaszi@digi.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628111440.459647741@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/CPU: Add more Icelake model numbers</title>
<updated>2019-07-10T07:52:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kan Liang</name>
<email>kan.liang@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-03T13:41:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=a795fdcd8e1c079c67513314b95ad632cae296ad'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a795fdcd8e1c079c67513314b95ad632cae296ad</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e35faeb64146f2015f2aec14b358ae508e4066db ]

Add the CPUID model numbers of Icelake (ICL) desktop and server
processors to the Intel family list.

 [ Qiuxu: Sort the macros by model number. ]

Signed-off-by: Kan Liang &lt;kan.liang@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo &lt;qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Rajneesh Bhardwaj &lt;rajneesh.bhardwaj@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: rui.zhang@intel.com
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: x86-ml &lt;x86@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190603134122.13853-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/uaccess: Dont leak the AC flag into __put_user() argument evaluation</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:43:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-24T07:19:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=c0b481eb9da90713a8cf488925798e43477d74a5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c0b481eb9da90713a8cf488925798e43477d74a5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6ae865615fc43d014da2fd1f1bba7e81ee622d1b ]

The __put_user() macro evaluates it's @ptr argument inside the
__uaccess_begin() / __uaccess_end() region. While this would normally
not be expected to be an issue, an UBSAN bug (it ignored -fwrapv,
fixed in GCC 8+) would transform the @ptr evaluation for:

  drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c: if (unlikely(__put_user(offset, &amp;urelocs[r-stack].presumed_offset))) {

into a signed-overflow-UB check and trigger the objtool AC validation.

Finish this commit:

  2a418cf3f5f1 ("x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation")

and explicitly evaluate all 3 arguments early.

Reported-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt; # build-tested
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Fixes: 2a418cf3f5f1 ("x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190424072208.695962771@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: Hide the int3_emulate_call/jmp functions from UML</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:43:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-11T12:32:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=680ae6bae20a0a0a984ec1b7559b5da0942be7a5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:680ae6bae20a0a0a984ec1b7559b5da0942be7a5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 693713cbdb3a4bda5a8a678c31f06560bbb14657 upstream.

User Mode Linux does not have access to the ip or sp fields of the pt_regs,
and accessing them causes UML to fail to build. Hide the int3_emulate_jmp()
and int3_emulate_call() instructions from UML, as it doesn't need them
anyway.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mpx, mm/core: Fix recursive munmap() corruption</title>
<updated>2019-05-25T16:16:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Hansen</name>
<email>dave.hansen@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-19T19:47:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://universe.0xinfinity.dev/distro/kernel/commit/?id=bed41691293dfef5aff2fedebabf1df39d86fec1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bed41691293dfef5aff2fedebabf1df39d86fec1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5a28fc94c9143db766d1ba5480cae82d856ad080 upstream.

This is a bit of a mess, to put it mildly.  But, it's a bug
that only seems to have showed up in 4.20 but wasn't noticed
until now, because nobody uses MPX.

MPX has the arch_unmap() hook inside of munmap() because MPX
uses bounds tables that protect other areas of memory.  When
memory is unmapped, there is also a need to unmap the MPX
bounds tables.  Barring this, unused bounds tables can eat 80%
of the address space.

But, the recursive do_munmap() that gets called vi arch_unmap()
wreaks havoc with __do_munmap()'s state.  It can result in
freeing populated page tables, accessing bogus VMA state,
double-freed VMAs and more.

See the "long story" further below for the gory details.

To fix this, call arch_unmap() before __do_unmap() has a chance
to do anything meaningful.  Also, remove the 'vma' argument
and force the MPX code to do its own, independent VMA lookup.

== UML / unicore32 impact ==

Remove unused 'vma' argument to arch_unmap().  No functional
change.

I compile tested this on UML but not unicore32.

== powerpc impact ==

powerpc uses arch_unmap() well to watch for munmap() on the
VDSO and zeroes out 'current-&gt;mm-&gt;context.vdso_base'.  Moving
arch_unmap() makes this happen earlier in __do_munmap().  But,
'vdso_base' seems to only be used in perf and in the signal
delivery that happens near the return to userspace.  I can not
find any likely impact to powerpc, other than the zeroing
happening a little earlier.

powerpc does not use the 'vma' argument and is unaffected by
its removal.

I compile-tested a 64-bit powerpc defconfig.

== x86 impact ==

For the common success case this is functionally identical to
what was there before.  For the munmap() failure case, it's
possible that some MPX tables will be zapped for memory that
continues to be in use.  But, this is an extraordinarily
unlikely scenario and the harm would be that MPX provides no
protection since the bounds table got reset (zeroed).

I can't imagine anyone doing this:

	ptr = mmap();
	// use ptr
	ret = munmap(ptr);
	if (ret)
		// oh, there was an error, I'll
		// keep using ptr.

Because if you're doing munmap(), you are *done* with the
memory.  There's probably no good data in there _anyway_.

This passes the original reproducer from Richard Biener as
well as the existing mpx selftests/.

The long story:

munmap() has a couple of pieces:

 1. Find the affected VMA(s)
 2. Split the start/end one(s) if neceesary
 3. Pull the VMAs out of the rbtree
 4. Actually zap the memory via unmap_region(), including
    freeing page tables (or queueing them to be freed).
 5. Fix up some of the accounting (like fput()) and actually
    free the VMA itself.

This specific ordering was actually introduced by:

  dd2283f2605e ("mm: mmap: zap pages with read mmap_sem in munmap")

during the 4.20 merge window.  The previous __do_munmap() code
was actually safe because the only thing after arch_unmap() was
remove_vma_list().  arch_unmap() could not see 'vma' in the
rbtree because it was detached, so it is not even capable of
doing operations unsafe for remove_vma_list()'s use of 'vma'.

Richard Biener reported a test that shows this in dmesg:

  [1216548.787498] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:0000000017ce560b idx:1 val:551
  [1216548.787500] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: 24576

What triggered this was the recursive do_munmap() called via
arch_unmap().  It was freeing page tables that has not been
properly zapped.

But, the problem was bigger than this.  For one, arch_unmap()
can free VMAs.  But, the calling __do_munmap() has variables
that *point* to VMAs and obviously can't handle them just
getting freed while the pointer is still in use.

I tried a couple of things here.  First, I tried to fix the page
table freeing problem in isolation, but I then found the VMA
issue.  I also tried having the MPX code return a flag if it
modified the rbtree which would force __do_munmap() to re-walk
to restart.  That spiralled out of control in complexity pretty
fast.

Just moving arch_unmap() and accepting that the bonkers failure
case might eat some bounds tables seems like the simplest viable
fix.

This was also reported in the following kernel bugzilla entry:

  https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203123

There are some reports that this commit triggered this bug:

  dd2283f2605 ("mm: mmap: zap pages with read mmap_sem in munmap")

While that commit certainly made the issues easier to hit, I believe
the fundamental issue has been with us as long as MPX itself, thus
the Fixes: tag below is for one of the original MPX commits.

[ mingo: Minor edits to the changelog and the patch. ]

Reported-by: Richard Biener &lt;rguenther@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: H.J. Lu &lt;hjl.tools@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi &lt;yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Anton Ivanov &lt;anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Guan Xuetao &lt;gxt@pku.edu.cn&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Jeff Dike &lt;jdike@addtoit.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@surriel.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dd2283f2605e ("mm: mmap: zap pages with read mmap_sem in munmap")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190419194747.5E1AD6DC@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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