kernel/arch/powerpc/lib, branch linux-5.2.y

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 295

2019-06-05T15:36:38Z

Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of version 2 of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 64 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras Reviewed-by: Allison Randal Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141901.894819585@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 156

2019-05-30T18:26:35Z

Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc 59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Allison Randal Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.113240726@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152

2019-05-30T18:26:32Z

powerpc: disable KASAN instrumentation on early/critical files.

2019-05-02T15:20:26Z

All files containing functions run before kasan_early_init() is called must have KASAN instrumentation disabled. For those file, branch profiling also have to be disabled otherwise each if () generates a call to ftrace_likely_update(). Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman

powerpc: prepare string/mem functions for KASAN

2019-05-02T15:20:25Z

CONFIG_KASAN implements wrappers for memcpy() memmove() and memset() Those wrappers are doing the verification then call respectively __memcpy() __memmove() and __memset(). The arches are therefore expected to rename their optimised functions that way. For files on which KASAN is inhibited, #defines are used to allow them to directly call optimised versions of the functions without going through the KASAN wrappers. See commit 393f203f5fd5 ("x86_64: kasan: add interceptors for memset/memmove/memcpy functions") for details. Other string / mem functions do not (yet) have kasan wrappers, we therefore have to fallback to the generic versions when KASAN is active, otherwise KASAN checks will be skipped. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy [mpe: Fixups to keep selftests working] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman

powerpc/lib: Refactor __patch_instruction() to use __put_user_asm()

2019-04-21T13:06:02Z

__patch_instruction() is called in early boot, and uses __put_user_size(), which includes the allow/prevent calls to enforce KUAP, which could either be called too early, or in the Radix case, forced to use "early_" versions of functions just to safely handle this one case. __put_user_asm() does not do this, and thus is safe to use both in early boot, and later on since in this case it should only ever be touching kernel memory. __patch_instruction() was previously refactored to use __put_user_size() in order to be able to return -EFAULT, which would allow the kernel to patch instructions in userspace, which should never happen. This has the functional change of causing faults on userspace addresses if KUAP is turned on, which should never happen in practice. A future enhancement could be to double check the patch address is definitely allowed to be tampered with by the kernel. Signed-off-by: Russell Currey Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman

powerpc: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection

2019-04-21T13:05:57Z

This patch implements a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection. Then subarches will have the possibility to provide their own implementation by providing setup_kuap() and allow/prevent_user_access(). Some platforms will need to know the area accessed and whether it is accessed from read, write or both. Therefore source, destination and size and handed over to the two functions. mpe: Rename to allow/prevent rather than unlock/lock, and add read/write wrappers. Drop the 32-bit code for now until we have an implementation for it. Add kuap to pt_regs for 64-bit as well as 32-bit. Don't split strings, use pr_crit_ratelimited(). Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Russell Currey Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman

powerpc: Remove duplicate headers

2019-04-20T12:02:44Z

Remove duplicate headers inclusions. Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Pagadala Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman

powerpc/64: Fix memcmp reading past the end of src/dest

2019-03-25T12:33:26Z

Chandan reported that fstests' generic/026 test hit a crash: BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0xc00000062ac40000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000092240 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE SMP NR_CPUS=2048 DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NUMA pSeries CPU: 0 PID: 27828 Comm: chacl Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2-next-20190115-00001-g6de6dba64dda #1 NIP: c000000000092240 LR: c00000000066a55c CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000062c0c3430 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.0.0-rc2-next-20190115-00001-g6de6dba64dda) MSR: 8000000002009033 CR: 44000842 XER: 20000000 CFAR: 00007fff7f3108ac DAR: c00000062ac40000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: 0000000000000000 c00000062c0c36c0 c0000000017f4c00 c00000000121a660 GPR04: c00000062ac3fff9 0000000000000004 0000000000000020 00000000275b19c4 GPR08: 000000000000000c 46494c4500000000 5347495f41434c5f c0000000026073a0 GPR12: 0000000000000000 c0000000027a0000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: c00000062ea70020 c00000062c0c38d0 0000000000000002 0000000000000002 GPR24: c00000062ac3ffe8 00000000275b19c4 0000000000000001 c00000062ac30000 GPR28: c00000062c0c38d0 c00000062ac30050 c00000062ac30058 0000000000000000 NIP memcmp+0x120/0x690 LR xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int+0x53c/0x5b0 Call Trace: xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int+0x78/0x5b0 (unreliable) xfs_da3_node_lookup_int+0x32c/0x5a0 xfs_attr_node_addname+0x170/0x6b0 xfs_attr_set+0x2ac/0x340 __xfs_set_acl+0xf0/0x230 xfs_set_acl+0xd0/0x160 set_posix_acl+0xc0/0x130 posix_acl_xattr_set+0x68/0x110 __vfs_setxattr+0xa4/0x110 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0xac/0x240 vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x130 setxattr+0x248/0x600 path_setxattr+0x108/0x120 sys_setxattr+0x28/0x40 system_call+0x5c/0x70 Instruction dump: 7d201c28 7d402428 7c295040 38630008 38840008 408201f0 4200ffe8 2c050000 4182ff6c 20c50008 54c61838 7d201c28 <7d402428> 7d293436 7d4a3436 7c295040 The instruction dump decodes as: subfic r6,r5,8 rlwinm r6,r6,3,0,28 ldbrx r9,0,r3 ldbrx r10,0,r4 <- Which shows us doing an 8 byte load from c00000062ac3fff9, which crosses the page boundary at c00000062ac40000 and faults. It's not OK for memcmp to read past the end of the source or destination buffers if that would cross a page boundary, because we don't know that the next page is mapped. As pointed out by Segher, we can read past the end of the source or destination as long as we don't cross a 4K boundary, because that's our minimum page size on all platforms. The bug is in the code at the .Lcmp_rest_lt8bytes label. When we get there we know that s1 is 8-byte aligned and we have at least 1 byte to read, so a single 8-byte load won't read past the end of s1 and cross a page boundary. But we have to be more careful with s2. So check if it's within 8 bytes of a 4K boundary and if so go to the byte-by-byte loop. Fixes: 2d9ee327adce ("powerpc/64: Align bytes before fall back to .Lshort in powerpc64 memcmp()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+ Reported-by: Chandan Rajendra Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool Tested-by: Chandan Rajendra Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman

treewide: add checks for the return value of memblock_alloc*()

2019-03-12T17:04:02Z

Add check for the return value of memblock_alloc*() functions and call panic() in case of error. The panic message repeats the one used by panicing memblock allocators with adjustment of parameters to include only relevant ones. The replacement was mostly automated with semantic patches like the one below with manual massaging of format strings. @@ expression ptr, size, align; @@ ptr = memblock_alloc(size, align); + if (!ptr) + panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n", __func__, size, align); [anders.roxell@linaro.org: use '%pa' with 'phys_addr_t' type] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131161046.21886-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org [rppt@linux.ibm.com: fix format strings for panics after memblock_alloc] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548950940-15145-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com [rppt@linux.ibm.com: don't panic if the allocation in sparse_buffer_init fails] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131074018.GD28876@rapoport-lnx [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix xtensa printk warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548057848-15136-20-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell Reviewed-by: Guo Ren [c-sky] Acked-by: Paul Burton [MIPS] Acked-by: Heiko Carstens [s390] Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross [Xen] Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven [m68k] Acked-by: Max Filippov [xtensa] Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Christophe Leroy Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Dennis Zhou Cc: Greentime Hu Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Guan Xuetao Cc: Guo Ren Cc: Mark Salter Cc: Matt Turner Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: Michal Simek Cc: Petr Mladek Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Rich Felker Cc: Rob Herring Cc: Rob Herring Cc: Russell King Cc: Stafford Horne Cc: Tony Luck Cc: Vineet Gupta Cc: Yoshinori Sato Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds