kernel/Documentation/admin-guide, branch linux-5.1.y

Documentation/admin: Remove the vsyscall=native documentation

2019-07-14T06:09:48Z

commit d974ffcfb7447db5f29a4b662a3eaf99a4e1109e upstream. The vsyscall=native feature is gone -- remove the docs. Fixes: 076ca272a14c ("x86/vsyscall/64: Drop "native" vsyscalls") Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Florian Weimer Cc: Jann Horn Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Kernel Hardening Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d77c7105eb4c57c1a95a95b6a5b8ba194a18e764.1561610354.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre

2019-07-14T06:09:48Z

commit 6e88559470f581741bcd0f2794f9054814ac9740 upstream. Add documentation for Spectre vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms: - Explain the problem and risks - Document the mitigation mechanisms - Document the command line controls - Document the sysfs files Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen Co-developed-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm, memcg: consider subtrees in memory.events

2019-06-09T07:16:13Z

commit 9852ae3fe5293264f01c49f2571ef7688f7823ce upstream. memory.stat and other files already consider subtrees in their output, and we should too in order to not present an inconsistent interface. The current situation is fairly confusing, because people interacting with cgroups expect hierarchical behaviour in the vein of memory.stat, cgroup.events, and other files. For example, this causes confusion when debugging reclaim events under low, as currently these always read "0" at non-leaf memcg nodes, which frequently causes people to misdiagnose breach behaviour. The same confusion applies to other counters in this file when debugging issues. Aggregation is done at write time instead of at read-time since these counters aren't hot (unlike memory.stat which is per-page, so it does it at read time), and it makes sense to bundle this with the file notifications. After this patch, events are propagated up the hierarchy: [root@ktst ~]# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/memory.events low 0 high 0 max 0 oom 0 oom_kill 0 [root@ktst ~]# systemd-run -p MemoryMax=1 true Running as unit: run-r251162a189fb4562b9dabfdc9b0422f5.service [root@ktst ~]# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/memory.events low 0 high 0 max 7 oom 1 oom_kill 1 As this is a change in behaviour, this can be reverted to the old behaviour by mounting with the `memory_localevents' flag set. However, we use the new behaviour by default as there's a lack of evidence that there are any current users of memory.events that would find this change undesirable. akpm: this is a behaviour change, so Cc:stable. THis is so that forthcoming distros which use cgroup v2 are more likely to pick up the revised behaviour. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190208224419.GA24772@chrisdown.name Signed-off-by: Chris Down Acked-by: Johannes Weiner Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Dennis Zhou Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values

2019-05-14T17:15:32Z

commit ea01668f9f43021b28b3f4d5ffad50106a1e1301 upstream Adjust the last two rows in the table that display possible values when MDS mitigation is enabled. They both were slightly innacurate. In addition, convert the table of possible values and their descriptions to a list-table. The simple table format uses the top border of equals signs to determine cell width which resulted in the first column being far too wide in comparison to the second column that contained the majority of the text. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation

2019-05-14T17:15:32Z

commit e672f8bf71c66253197e503f75c771dd28ada4a0 upstream Updated the documentation for a new CVE-2019-11091 Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM) which is a variant of Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS). MDS is a family of side channel attacks on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. MDSUM is a special case of MSBDS, MFBDS and MLPDS. An uncacheable load from memory that takes a fault or assist can leave data in a microarchitectural structure that may later be observed using one of the same methods used by MSBDS, MFBDS or MLPDS. There are no new code changes expected for MDSUM. The existing mitigation for MDS applies to MDSUM as well. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks Reviewed-by: Jon Masters Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS

2019-05-14T17:15:32Z

commit 5c14068f87d04adc73ba3f41c2a303d3c3d1fa12 upstream Add MDS to the new 'mitigations=' cmdline option. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

2019-05-14T17:15:31Z

commit 0336e04a6520bdaefdb0769d2a70084fa52e81ed upstream Configure s390 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Spectre v1 and Spectre v2. The default behavior is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Jiri Kosina (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Will Deacon Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Tyler Hicks Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Randy Dunlap Cc: Steven Price Cc: Phil Auld Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4a161805458a5ec88812aac0307ae3908a030fc.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

2019-05-14T17:15:31Z

commit 782e69efb3dfed6e8360bc612e8c7827a901a8f9 upstream Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass. The default behavior is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Jiri Kosina (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Will Deacon Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Tyler Hicks Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Randy Dunlap Cc: Steven Price Cc: Phil Auld Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/245a606e1a42a558a310220312d9b6adb9159df6.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

2019-05-14T17:15:31Z

commit d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812 upstream Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF. The default behavior is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Jiri Kosina (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Will Deacon Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Tyler Hicks Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Randy Dunlap Cc: Steven Price Cc: Phil Auld Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

2019-05-14T17:15:31Z

commit 98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429 upstream Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability. Most users fall into a few basic categories: a) they want all mitigations off; b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if it's vulnerable; or c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if vulnerable. Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing options: - mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations. - mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable. - mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling SMT if needed by a mitigation. Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do anything. They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Jiri Kosina (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Will Deacon Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Tyler Hicks Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Randy Dunlap Cc: Steven Price Cc: Phil Auld Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b07a8ef9b7c5055c3a4637c87d07c296d5016fe0.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman